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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S
CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO**

by

Peter Rodriguez Sr.

June 2020

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Ryan Gingeras
David S. Yost

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ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO**

Peter Rodriguez Sr.
Major, United States Marine Corps
BS, Northern Arizona University, 2004

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The current multipolar international system is fraught with uncertainty for states seeking security assurances. Alliances are tools of statecraft used to enhance the security of their members. Over the past seventy years, NATO has successfully achieved its *raison d'être*—collective defense. Yet, Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, has increasingly diverged from its traditional alliance behavior. This has called into question Turkey's future role in NATO. Why would Ankara forge an informal alliance with Moscow and purchase Russia's S-400, knowing that it would jeopardize NATO's security and undermine the Alliance's cohesion? This thesis merges two complementary alliance theories with Turkish identity politics to explore the factors driving Turkey's perplexing behavior. Turkey's shifting alliance behavior is the result of increasing distrust between Turkey and the Alliance, structural changes to the international system, differing threat perceptions, and the Justice and Development Party's Ottoman Islamist ideology. These factors collided during the Syrian War as Turkey's and the rest of the Alliance's security interests misaligned. Consequently, NATO's internal threat level surpassed its shared external threat level—severely eroding the Alliance's cohesion and compelling Turkey to change its alliance behavior. Despite Ankara's worrisome behavior, Turkey remains a vital NATO ally. Thus, the Alliance should seek to mend the rift, lest Turkey continue its divergent course.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	5
1.	Synopsis of Existing Literature.....	6
2.	Variables of Turkey’s Foreign Policy	6
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	17
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN	20
1.	Thesis Limitations.....	21
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE	22
 II.	 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, CONCEPTS, AND LOGIC	 25
A.	THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE THEORY	26
B.	STEPHEN M. WALT: BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY (BOT)	28
1.	Balancing vs. Bandwagoning	29
2.	Key Variables: Threat Level Components in Alliance Behavior	31
C.	WEITSMAN’S THEORY OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND COHESION	37
1.	Internal Levels of Threat and Alliance Cohesion	38
2.	External and Internal Threat Levels: How they Impact Alliance Cohesion.....	39
D.	COMBINING WALT AND WEITSMAN.....	41
E.	LISEL HINTZ: TURKISH IDENTITY PROPOSALS	42
1.	Importance of Identity Politics in Deciphering Threat Perceptions.....	42
2.	Ottoman Islamism and Pan-Turkic Nationalism.....	45
F.	THESIS APPLICATION AND LOGIC	46
 III.	 THE GENESIS FOR THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, NATO, AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION.....	 49
A.	THE END OF AN EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC	50
1.	Consequences of Defeat: the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkish War of Independence.....	51
2.	The Making of the Modern Turkish State: Kemalism and Social Engineering	56

3.	Turkish Foreign Policy (1923–1945)	58
B.	THE ORIGINS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE	62
1.	Soviet Expansionism	63
2.	The Perception of the Soviet Union as an Existential Threat to the West	67
3.	The United States: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan	68
4.	North Atlantic Treaty: Purpose and Principles	72
C.	TURKEY’S ACCESSION.....	73
1.	Turkey’s Early Attempts at Joining a Western Security Pact	74
2.	Turkey and the Korean War	74
3.	Turkey’s Contribution to the Alliance from the Western Perspective	75
D.	CONCLUSION	77
IV.	TURKEY’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN NATO	79
A.	TURKEY’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR DURING THE COLD WAR.....	80
1.	The Cuban Missile Crisis	82
2.	The Republic of Cyprus and the Johnson Letter	83
3.	The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and U.S. Punitive Actions.....	85
4.	Summary of Turkey’s Alliance Behavior during the Cold War	86
B.	THE END OF THE COLD WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND TURKEY	89
1.	Walt and the End of the Cold War’s Impact	89
2.	The End of The Cold War on the Future of NATO	90
3.	Walt and How the Collapse of the Soviet Union Would Impact NATO and the International System	91
4.	Impact on Turkey	96
C.	TURKEY’S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND OPINION OF THE WEST: KEY POST–COLD WAR MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS.....	100
1.	The Gulf War (1990–1991).....	102
2.	The American-Led Invasion of Iraq (2003–2012).....	103
3.	The Syrian War (2011–present)	107
4.	Erdoğan, the AKP, and its Ottoman Islamist Identity	113
5.	Turkey Tethering Behavior	116
D.	CONCLUSION	120

V.	CONCLUSION	121
A.	TURKEY STILL IMPORTANT TO NATO	124
B.	TURKEY AND RUSSIA	125
C.	CONCLUSION	125
	APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY.....	129
A.	GENERAL TERMINOLOGY	129
B.	FORMS OF ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR.....	132
C.	PERCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS.....	133
	APPENDIX B. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (1949).....	137
	APPENDIX C. PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY	141
	APPENDIX D. PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S LETTER TO ANKARA.....	143
	LIST OF REFERENCES	147
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	159

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Thesis's Theoretical Framework.....	48
Figure 2.	Treaty of Sèvres: Borders, Foreign Occupiers, and Proposed Mandates.	53

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Threats and Cohesion.....	40
Table 2.	Identity Proposals.....	44
Table 3.	Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey's Alliance Behavior in the Cold War.....	88
Table 4.	Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey's Alliance Behavior in the Post-Cold War.....	119

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party): founded in 2001; President Erdoğan's political party in Turkey; AKP has been in power since 2002; AKP is categorized under the Ottoman Islamist identity proposal
AMD	Air Missile Defense
BoT	Balance of Threat theory: an IR theory regarding alliance formation and alliance behavior created by Stephen M. Walt
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party): Atatürk's Kemalist political party in Turkey; the main opposition to AKP; left-leaning secularist party; CHP is categorized under the Republican Nationalist identity proposal
EU	European Union
FSA	Free Syrian Army: main armed opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; infiltrated and overtaken by Islamist elements; primarily supported by Turkey and Qatar
HDP	<i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i> (People's Democratic Party): the main Kurdish political party in Turkey
IR	International Relations: an academic discipline under the field of political science
IS	Islamic State: radical Islamist group comprised mainly of foreign fighters; the main adversary of the United States and Europe within the Syrian War
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (Nationalist Action Party): founded in the 1960s; MHP is a far-right leaning conservative, ultra-nationalist party in Turkey; anti-Kurdish; currently shares a political alliance with the AKP; MHP is categorized under the Pan-Turkic Nationalist identity proposal
MGK	<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i> (National Security Council): Turkish government organization that advises the president on security matters and foreign policy decision making.
MSP	<i>Milli Selâmet Partisi</i> (National Salvation Party): the primary Islamist political party in Turkey during the 1970s; the first political party that Erdoğan was a member of; was founded by Necmettin Erbakan; anti-Western Islamist party; forcefully dissolved after the 1980 Turkish military coup

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PATRIOT	Phased Array Tracking Radar Intercept on Target
PKK	<i>Partiye Karkerên Kurdistanê</i> (Kurdistan Workers' Party): Kurdish militia founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978; moved to Syria in 1979 and operated under the protection of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; has waged an insurgency against Turkey since 1984; PKK was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union in 1997
PYD	<i>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat</i> (Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party): an offshoot party of the PKK; the largest and best armed Kurdish political party in Syria; PYD considers the YPG as its militant wing.
RFP	Russian foreign policy
RP	<i>Refah Partisi</i> (Welfare Party): Erbakan's new Islamist political party in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s; dissolved after the bloodless, 'post-modern' coup in 1997
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TSK	Turkish Military Forces
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YPG	<i>Yekîneyên Parastina Gel</i> (People's Protection Units): the Syrian armed wing of the PYD; affiliated with the PKK; founded in 2004; designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, but is a key ally to the United States in the fight against IS

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Turkey has been an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. However, with the advent of the Syrian War in 2011 and the subsequent event that followed, Turkey's shared security interests with its fellow NATO allies have increasingly diverged. Turkey's shifting alliance behavior has most notably manifested in Ankara's informal alliance with Moscow in Syria since 2016 and its decision to purchase Russia's advanced S-400 surface to air missile defense system in 2017. Both decisions are worrisome because they directly undermine the NATO Alliance by calling into question its overall solidarity and *raison d'être*—collective defense. This paper applies a hybrid alliance theoretical framework to seek an answer to the following question: what factors led to Ankara's security cooperation with Moscow in Syria and its decision to acquire the S-400 despite the assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO allies that both decisions jeopardize the integrity, security, and overall cohesion of the Alliance?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the failed coup attempt on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2016, an informal alliance between Ankara and Moscow has become increasingly discernable.¹ Then in February 2017, Turkey's former Defense Minister Fikri İşık announced Ankara's intent to purchase Russia's advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile system.² Despite overwhelming concern from the Alliance, diplomatic pressure from Washington, and the United States' offer to sell Ankara the PATRIOT air missile defense

¹ Michael A. Reynolds, "Turkey and Russia: A Remarkable Rapprochement," *The Texas National Security Review*, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey's Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 23–37; Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance* (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 73.

² "Bakan Fikri Işık'tan S-400 açıklaması," CNNTurk, February 22, 2017, accessed February 23, 2017, <http://www.cnnurk.com/turkiye/bakanfikriisiktans400aciklamasi>, from Sitki Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," *All Azimuth* 8, no. 1 (2019): 81.

system, Turkey received its first delivery of the S-400 in July 2019.³ Thus, signifying that the relationship between Turkey and the West had reached rock bottom. Ankara's recent alliance behavior is of great consternation to the United States and NATO. Turkey is the only NATO ally currently conducting military foreign sales and security cooperation with Russia.⁴ Ankara's S-400 acquisition weakens the Alliance's security and erodes the Alliance's cohesion. Moreover, Turkey's recent alliance behavior calls into question NATO's collective defense rationale, as well as Turkey's future role within the Alliance.⁵ Indeed, Turkey's informal alliance with Russia and its acquisition of the S-400 exemplify an increasingly divergent trend between Turkey and the West with regards to domestic and foreign policy goals at large.

Since its establishment on April 4, 1949, NATO has remained “the single most important contributor to security, stability and peace in Europe and North America.”⁶ Alliance solidarity and cohesion arguably have been the bedrock for NATO's enduring success. As a NATO ally since 1952, Turkey has maintained an important role in upholding its collective defense posture—acting as a frontline state that has contributed to the protection of Europe's eastern and southern flanks. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Turkey's strategic location strengthens the Alliance's influence and extends its strategic reach by safeguarding strategic waterways, providing NATO with key logistical and staging bases for military operations, and helping to maintain regional stability in the volatile Middle East. Moreover, Turkey's army is the second largest in all

³ Suzan Fraser, “Despite U.S. Warnings, Russian S-400 Systems Land in Turkey,” AP News, July 12, 2019, <https://apnews.com/6fa91d466e444fcf94b507a9325d0a09>.

⁴ Doyle Hodges, “Security and Politics at the Center of the World: The Future of U.S.-Turkish-Russian Relations,” *The Texas National Security Review*, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey's Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 3.

⁵ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief,” *Congressional Report* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019), 2, 9; Doug Bandow, “Time to Kick the Islamizing Turkey Out of NATO,” *The American Conservative*, July 25, 2019, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/time-to-kick-the-islamizing-turkey-out-of-nato/>.

⁶ Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,” *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Kennedy School, February 2019), 1, <https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70>.

of NATO.⁷ Undoubtedly, Turkey's role in NATO has been a significant reason for the Alliance's success.

Despite Turkey's membership in NATO, tensions between Turkey and its fellow NATO allies periodically occurred throughout the Cold War—notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–3), the Cyprus Crisis involving President Johnson's letter (1963–4), and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974).⁸ Nevertheless, NATO overcame these internal tensions. As William Hale notes, “Although relations with western governments were not always entirely harmonious, Turkey had no other foreign policy interests which clearly conflicted with those of the main western powers, so the alliance seems to have been perceived as firm on both sides.”⁹

However, with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as Turkey's ruling political party in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy began to slowly diverge from that of its fellow NATO allies. Around 2010, this diverging trend increasingly accelerated and became more discernable—likely due to the instability in the region caused from the Arab Spring (2010), the Libyan War (2011), the Syrian War (2011), and ensuing refugee crisis. Turkey's diverging domestic and foreign policies with the West have widened as the country has experienced considerable illiberal backsliding, especially after the failed coup attempt in July 2016.¹⁰ Following the coup attempt, Erdoğan implement a state of emergency. The “gift from God,” as Erdoğan called the coup attempt, enabled the ruler to consolidate his political authority—transforming the secular country into an authoritarian populist regime.¹¹ Since 2016, numerous human rights violations have been reported, forced refugee reparations have been observed, and the arrests of journalists and

⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey* (Westport, Connecticut; London: Praeger Security International, 2009), ix.

⁸ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 98–101, 106–8, 111–15.

⁹ Hale, 88.

¹⁰ “Turkey,” *Turkey* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, January 30, 2019), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/turkey>.

¹¹ Marc Champion, “Coups Was ‘Gift from God’ for Erdoğan Planning a New Turkey,” *Bloomberg*, July 17, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-17/coup-was-a-gift-from-god-says-erdogan-who-plans-a-new-turkey>.

press censorship have reached an all-time high.¹² It seems in the midst of this turmoil, primordial attachment has taken primacy over the secular diversity Turkey once symbolized.¹³ Overall, Turkey's recent domestic and foreign policy trends appear to contradict Atatürk's Kemalist principles,¹⁴ the ideals and principles codified in the preamble of the Alliance's treaty, and undermine NATO's collective security.¹⁵

Compounding these concerns is the growing relationship between Turkey and Russia. Russia has historically opposed the NATO and has sought disintegration of the Alliance. Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior, including its invasion of Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, its malign activities in eastern Ukraine, and its growing global influence are perceived by the West as a challenge to the status quo international order—what the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy calls “the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” by the “revisionist powers” of Russia and China.¹⁶ Both countries seek to challenge the United States and undermine the credibility of the United States alliance structure in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁷ Consequently, the competition threatens the security, stability, and peace that the NATO Alliance has preserved since its formation. Thus, the importance of having a cohesive, strong Alliance has taken on a criticality not seen since the Cold War era. Indeed, as stated in the United States National Defense Strategy of 2018, “our [U.S.] network of alliances and partnerships remain [s] the

¹² Christopher Brandt et al., “Freedom in the World 2019,” *Democracy in Retreat* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, January 15, 2019), 11, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat>.

¹³ Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution. Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Clifford Geertz (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 109.

¹⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th Edition. (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2017), 183.

¹⁵ NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO, 1976), 300–303.

¹⁶ Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy” (United States Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 2, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/.../2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

¹⁷ “Dunford Describes U.S. Great Power Competition with Russia, China,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed August 28, 2019, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1791811/dunford-describes-us-great-power-competition-with-russia-china/>.

backbone of global security.”¹⁸ Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior threatens the strategic partnership it has had with the United States for over seventy years and the cohesion of the NATO Alliance.

Aside from Turkey’s informal alliance with Russia in Syria, Ankara’s S-400 decision raises significant challenges and implications for the NATO Alliance’s future. Key concerns include NATO security, Alliance interoperability, Russian intelligence collection, the effectiveness of the F-35’s capabilities, an apparent shift in Ankara’s international alignment, and the continued cohesion of NATO.¹⁹ A strategic dissonance between Turkey and its NATO allies has become increasingly apparent. Turkey’s recent behavior does not bode well for the future of the Alliance and the principles of the Treaty preamble.²⁰ Consequently, many experts have called into question Turkey’s continued role and membership within the Alliance.²¹ Hence, understanding the factors for Turkey’s diverging security interests away from its traditional fellow allies requires examining the origins of the Alliance and Turkey’s role within it.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

During the Cold War, foreign policy was an area of Turkish studies that received relatively little scholarly attention.²² However, since the end of the Cold War, scholarly literature on Turkish foreign policy has significantly increased. Observers and scholars disagree over the key variables that have influenced Turkish foreign policymaking in the Post–Cold War era. Consequently, academic circles have formulated distinct schools of thought regarding the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the Post–Cold War era.

¹⁸ Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2.

¹⁹ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,” Congressional Report CR44000 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019).

²⁰ Aurel Sari, “Can Turkey Be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent,” *Just Security*, October 15, 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/>.

²¹ “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?,” Carnegie Europe, accessed February 21, 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/73174>.

²² Philip Robins, “The Foreign Policy of Turkey,” in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 311.

This literature review begins by providing a brief synopsis of the existing literature specific to the examination of Turkey's S-400 decision. Next, the review examines the existing literature on Turkey's foreign policy. Scholars have generally taken a theoretical approach to analyze Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, the literature review discusses the two approaches most often applied by scholars—realism and constructivism. Finally, the literature review concludes with a synthesis of the study's observations.

1. Synopsis of Existing Literature

The events surrounding Turkey's S-400 decision are ongoing and highly dynamic. Ankara's first official announcement regarding the agreement to purchase Russia's S-400 occurred in 2017, and Turkey received its first delivery of S-400 equipment in July 2019.²³ Because the decision is fairly recent and fluid there is not an extensive body of existing scholarly literature on the causal factors behind Turkey's decision to purchase Russia's S-400. Most literature regarding Turkey's purchase of the S-400 consists of works by media outlets, think tanks, and scholarly journals on the internet. Since the body of literature is small, this literature review broadens its aperture by examining the scholarly literature on Turkish foreign policy. Foreign policy writ large is an immense topic. Therefore, it must be noted that the study remains primarily focused on the security aspect within Turkey's foreign policy (i.e., the S-400 and Turkey's relationship with the Alliance).

2. Variables of Turkey's Foreign Policy

Turkey's geography is located at the crossroads of multiple cultural and political fault lines. The multidimensional fault lines significantly influence the country's identity, politics, and foreign policy. Additionally, they make understanding the factors contributing to Turkey's foreign policy extremely complex. On one hand, the country's geographical fault between the East and the West endows Turkey with an enduring strategic location with international relevance. Therefore, Turkey has often been made the objective of war and conquest by other ambitious states throughout history.²⁴ On the other hand, Turkey's

²³ Zanotti and Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief."

²⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 5.

cultural fault line makes it difficult for the country to conceptualize a homogeneous national identity or self-image. Samuel P. Huntington wrote that Turkey is the “classic torn country...identifiable by two phenomena...[its] leaders refer to them [Turkey] as a ‘bridge’ between two cultures, and observers describe them [it] as Janus-faced.”²⁵ Erik Zürcher writes that Turkey’s geography inherently makes the country “not fully a part of either, or, alternatively, part of both.”²⁶

These complex dynamics make it difficult for scholars to agree on the main factors that shape the country’s foreign policy. Despite their disagreements, scholars tend to agree that the end of the Cold War had a significant effect on the transformation of the country’s foreign policy. However, these schools of thought diverge over how this important event has influenced Turkish foreign policymaking in the Post–Cold War era. On one hand the body of literature focuses on the role of identity in Turkish domestic politics—contending that Turkey’s cultural and political dynamics are the main factors in explaining Turkey’s changing foreign policy. On the other hand, some scholars identify changes in the international system and the transformation of the security environment as the main drivers of Turkish foreign policymaking.

Generally, these two distinct arguments fall under two International Relations (IR) schools of thought—realism and constructivism. Realist contend that Turkish foreign policymaking is primarily influenced by the country’s need for security, self-help or autonomy, and the accumulation of material assets to increase its relative gains (power). Constructivists assert that Turkish foreign policy is shaped primarily by domestic variables such as individuals, culture, and identity. The following section discusses these two schools of thought, along with the associated scholarly literature.

a. International Relations

International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline seeks to understand the nature of state behavior, interactions, and the variations of potential outcomes. Outside the

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Paperback Edition (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011), 138–39.

²⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 367.

academic discipline, the term international relations is used to describe relations between states, organizations, and individuals at the global level—also known as international politics or geopolitics.²⁷ IR theories are tools for analyzing international relations or foreign policy.²⁸ The IR theories of realism and constructivism are two of the main tools that can be applied to enhance the understanding of foreign policy by nation-states. Both theories share three basic assumptions—states desire to survive; states are sovereign entities, with no political superior; and states exist in a system of anarchy sometimes called the international system.²⁹ Although they acknowledge these important assumptions, constructivism and realism are vastly dissimilar in the role, influence, and level of unitary actors; in the interpretations of motives of state behavior and their interactions; and how they characterize the international system. Despite differences between these theories, it is important to examine both to gain a holistic appreciation of the factors influencing foreign policymaking. Indeed, as Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara keenly observe, extolling one theory while excluding the other “ultimately hinders efforts to understand the complexities of the real world.”³⁰ The next section discusses each of the IR theories in greater detail.

b. Realism

Realism adheres to the core elements of statism, survival, and self-help. The theory primarily focuses on the state as the principal, unitary actor in international relations—as opposed to the individual or society which constructivism considers. Realists acknowledge these other actors but assume that their powers and influence are limited within the

²⁷ Stephen McGlinchey, ed., *International Relations* (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 2.

²⁸ Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug, eds., *International Relations Theory* (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 13.

²⁹ F.H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 159.

³⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 154. See also Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 1–33, cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” *International Security* 30, no. 2 (2005): 10–11.

international system.³¹ Another important assumption that realists make is that state decision-makers are rational actors. In other words, they assume that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the state's national interest.³² Realists believe that states are forced to compete against one another because of the egotistical nature of the anarchic system. Thus, states are compelled to pursue material advantages—in geography, natural resources, wealth, manpower, and military capabilities—to increase their relative power and security for ensuring state survival in the competition with other states.

Despite realism's contributions to the study of foreign policy, some IR theorists have criticized its formulation of variables. Realists rely primarily on the state as the unitary actor. Therefore, critics contend, the theory fails to appropriately consider other important variables, such as ruling elites, domestic institutions, and societal ideations, which may explain foreign policymaking. For example, constructivists argue that "Explanations based primarily on interests and the material distribution of power cannot fully account for important international phenomena and that analysis of the social construction of state identities ought to precede, and may even explain, the genesis of state interests."³³ Despite its flaws, realism's assumptions that the most important variables in foreign policymaking are measures to ensure the state's survival, security, and prosperity are difficult to dispute. Moreover, these variables are easier to distinguish and simpler to apply in the analysis of foreign policy in comparison to the social and ideological elements that constructivism seeks to understand.

³¹ Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisao, "Realism," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 15–21.

³² Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisao, "Realism," in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 15–21.

³³ Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 209. cited in Yucel Bozdaglioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 15.

c. *Constructivism*

Constructivism is primarily focused on the social dimension. Constructivist theory is founded on the assumption that ideas, beliefs, identities, and norms are important factors that shape state interests and the nature of international relations.³⁴ Constructivists emphasize the importance of historical and societal influences in shaping state behavior.³⁵ They believe that a state's behavior is based on the schemas of self-identity—self-image, interests, and interactions with other states.³⁶ Moreover, constructivists contend that the anarchic system, state identity, and state interests evolve. This directly contradicts the realist argument that the anarchic system and the interests of the state are static. Constructivism allows for a system of anarchy in which a wide range of outcomes is possible because an extensive spectrum of behavior is compatible with the need to survive under anarchy.³⁷ In the words of a renowned constructivist, Alexander Wendt, “anarchy is what states make of it.”³⁸

There is little doubt that constructivist ideational variables, such as culture and identity, have an impact on the way a state interprets threats and formulates strategy. However, the limitations of constructivism must be underlined. The social variables used in the constructivist approach are difficult to understand, measure, and test. Determining how and to what degree these factors contribute to the making of foreign policy is exceedingly challenging. To reduce uncertainties in the application of the theory, large quantities of accurate empirical data must be collected. This requires massive amounts of personal data that are impossible to corroborate for truthfulness.³⁹ Therefore, the validity of these variables is subject to much conjecture. Still, constructivism addresses factors and

³⁴ Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in *International Relations Theory*, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinplflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 36–41.

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 393.

³⁶ Wendt, 404–5.

³⁷ Wendt, 395.

³⁸ Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.”

³⁹ Lisel Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 5.

concepts that are generally neglected by realism and other mainstream IR theories.⁴⁰ Thus, it is necessary to examine the constructivist scholarly literature regarding Turkish foreign policy.

d. Interpretation of Turkish Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach

Scholars who contend that Turkish foreign policymaking is primarily influenced by the country's need for security, autonomy, and material assets to increase its relative gains (power) tend to fall under the realist school of thought. As noted previously, realism contends that the nature of the system of anarchy forces competition among states, establishing interests that help the state to increase its relative power and security.

These scholars claim the end of the Cold War was the impetus of Turkey's changing foreign policy. Indeed, Yevgeniya Gaber contends that "changes in the nature and conceptualization of the international system" constituted the most significant engine for change to Turkey's foreign policy.⁴¹ Why was the end of the Cold War so significant for Turkey? First, it significantly altered Turkey's strategic position, changing it from a periphery state to a central one.⁴² This loosened the constraints on Turkish foreign policy and enabled it to pursue a more independent, activist course.⁴³ Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union called into question NATO's continued existence, and therefore, Turkey's security assurance was threatened.⁴⁴

Lars Haugom claims Turkish foreign policy has increasingly demonstrated a realist approach, especially since 2014.⁴⁵ He argues that Turkish foreign policy has always been

⁴⁰ Theys, "Constructivism."

⁴¹ Yevgeniya Gaber, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Reconsidering the Power Balance Equation," in *Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Kılıç Buğra Kanat, Ahmet Selim Tekelioglu, and Kadir Ustun (Ankara: SETA Publications, 2014), 19–20.

⁴² Lars Haugom, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdoğan: A Change in International Orientation?," *Comparative Strategy* 38, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 209, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606662>.

⁴³ Gaber, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Reconsidering the Power Balance Equation."

⁴⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 109–10.

⁴⁵ Haugom, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdoğan."

about security; however, it was after 2014 that this became more apparent to observers. Philip Robins makes a similar claim. Robins states that the imperative of security has often dictated Turkish foreign policy, especially if it involved the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).⁴⁶ Although Ankara adopted Davutoğlu's strategic depth strategy, which was predicated on a shared history and culture with its neighbors, Haugom argues that Turkey's "national security has for long periods dominated matters of state and has remained a primary concern in Turkish foreign policy."⁴⁷ Eda Kuşku-Sönmez makes a similar observation in her quantitative analysis of Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) between January 2009 and October 2016, asserting that Turkey's bilateral and multilateral engagements with its neighbors demonstrated that security dominated the Turkish agenda in these discussions during the period examined.⁴⁸

According to Haugom, Ankara has placed a primacy on transactional-based preferences to foreign policy decisions—not ideational or values-based preferences.⁴⁹ Highlighting events in Syria and within Turkey's borders, Haugom contends recent changes in Turkish foreign policy are the result of an endemic deteriorating security environment in the Middle East. Consequently, he writes that Ankara has been more willing to enter "into flexible alliances with erstwhile adversaries (Russia and Iran) to achieve certain security and defense goals, and even at the peril of upsetting established relations with Western allies."⁵⁰ Emre Iseri and Oguz Dilek, in their analysis of Turkish foreign policy, make similar observations—claiming that as a result of the waning of the influence of the United States in the region surrounding Turkey, Ankara has had to forge closer relations and agreements with Russia and Iran.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Robins, "The Foreign Policy of Turkey," 318.

⁴⁷ Haugom, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdoğan," 209.

⁴⁸ Eda Kuşku-Sönmez, "Dynamics of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evidence from High-Level Meetings of the AKP Government," *Turkish Studies* 20, no. 3 (May 27, 2019): 392–93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1495078>.

⁴⁹ Haugom, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdoğan," 212–15.

⁵⁰ Haugom, 217.

⁵¹ Emre Işeri and Oğuz Dilek, "The Limitations of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Activism in the Caucasian Regional Security Complexity," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 1 (March 2011): 42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.563502>.

Although the recent assertiveness of Turkish foreign policy has caused a rift between Turkey and the West, Haugom holds that the benefits of remaining close to the West and in the NATO Alliance outweigh the benefits that a reorientation to the East would provide. Ultimately, the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy do “not appear to herald a change in Turkey’s international orientation either toward realignment or nonalignment.”⁵²

e. Interpretation of Turkish Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Approach

Scholars who claim Turkish foreign policy is shaped primarily by internal or domestic variables—such as, individuals, culture, and identity—generally fall under the constructivist school of thought.⁵³ Constructivists contend that foreign policy is a product of self-perception and social interaction at the individual, state, and international levels.

Since before the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the country’s cultural fault lines have created challenges in the conceptualization of a homogeneous Turkish identity because of the complexity, dynamism, ideological differences, and competition within Turkey. Indeed, Lisel Hintz states that identity is at the root of Turkey’s recent and puzzling shifts in foreign policy.⁵⁴ According to Hintz, Turkish “foreign policy serves as an alternative arena to domestic politics in which these contests over identity take place.”⁵⁵ Like Hintz, Hasan Kosebalaban emphasizes the importance of domestic identities in explaining Turkey’s foreign policy preferences and interests. However, he contends that identity politics are primarily used as a tool to advance the Turkish foreign policy agenda. In his view, it is not used as a tool to advance one identity group’s domination of the country’s domestic realm, as Hintz contends.⁵⁶

⁵² Haugom, “Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdoğan,” 220.

⁵³ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*; Bozdaglıoglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*; Hasan Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁵⁴ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 4.

⁵⁵ Hintz, 4.

⁵⁶ Bozdaglıoglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, xiv.

How can identity drive a nation-state's foreign policy? Hintz develops and applies inside-out contestation theory, which "contends that elites who face obstacles or threats to their attempts to spread their own proposal [ideation] in the domestic political arena choose to take their struggle outside to the foreign policy arena."⁵⁷ Identity proposals will use the country's foreign affairs as a means to strengthen their domestic agenda by engaging with transnational advocacy networks, invoking international organizations' accession criteria, or mobilizing a diaspora.

According to Hintz, there are four distinct and coherent Turkish identity proposals—Republican Nationalism, Ottoman Islamism, Pan-Turkic Nationalism, and Western Liberalism.⁵⁸ Although some of the beliefs within each proposal may overlap, each of the four groups competes for identity hegemony within Turkey by increasing its support at home. Once power and legitimacy are achieved, the proposal then systematically transforms the domestic institutions such as military, judiciary, and educational systems to advance the proposal's ideation and block the other proposals from contesting its hegemony.⁵⁹ Kosebalaban also categorizes Turkish identity into four groups but labels them slightly differently—secularist nationalism, Islamic nationalism, secular liberalism, and Islamic liberalism. Unlike Hintz, Kosebalaban provides an in-depth analysis of the history of how these groups emerged throughout Turkey's history as a republic. He claims that there were two classic fault lines in Turkish politics: Islamism versus secularism, and liberalism versus nationalism—each having distinct ideas of who they consider to be friends, enemies, and rivals.⁶⁰ The historical interactions between these fault lines have thus created the contemporary groups observed today.

Hintz's theory helps to explain the vexing foreign policy changes that have been observed under the ruling AKP (Ottoman Islamism). Republican Nationalism, which adopts the principles of Turkey's founding father (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), has long

⁵⁷ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 5.

⁵⁸ Hintz, 10.

⁵⁹ Hintz, 11.

⁶⁰ Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, xiv.

dominated identity politics in Turkey.⁶¹ This group came close to achieving hegemony but has lately been eclipsed by the rise of the Ottoman Islamism proposal—the AKP. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has deployed this effective strategy to advance its interests by taking the contest to the foreign policy area and by engaging with international institutions. Thus, the AKP was able to: first, circumvent the Republican Nationalists by pushing a European Union (EU)-oriented agenda; then, increase its power base at home to replace the Republican Nationalist-dominated domestic institutions with its group; and finally, begin implementing its true Ottoman Islamist domestic and foreign policy agenda.⁶²

Conversely, Kosebalaban argues that identity politics within Turkey have influenced foreign affairs in a much more traditional manner. Although identity politics influence Turkish foreign policymaking, external factors such as material distribution and normative pressures by international institutions still factor heavily in Turkey’s foreign policy. Moreover, he contends that the ruling AKP’s foreign policy does not demonstrate a radical departure from Turkey’s traditional approach. Contrary to Hintz’s analysis and description of the AKP’s (Ottoman Islamism) ideological principles, Kosebalaban writes “despite the fact that conservative identity and worldview of the AKP leadership has influenced certain foreign policy decisions, its overall liberal, pro-Western, and globalist dimensions have often complemented its pro-Islamic orientation.”⁶³ However, Kosebalaban warns that Turkish foreign policy may change if prospects for accession to the EU do not make progress.⁶⁴

Although these scholars adopt a constructivist approach to analyzing Turkish foreign policy, they develop significantly different assumptions of the ideology of the identity groups, notably their motives and outcomes—specifically with regards to the AKP.

⁶¹ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 58–83.

⁶² Hintz, 100–126.

⁶³ Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 194.

⁶⁴ Kosebalaban, 194.

Furthermore, because their findings are dissimilar, the scholars develop vastly different recommendations for improving the relations between Turkey and the West.

f. Synthesis of Literature Review

Understanding the main factors that have influenced Turkey's recent security interests within its foreign policy is indeed a challenging endeavor. As the literature review demonstrates, Turkish foreign policy is a contested field of study with vastly different approaches and conclusions. Yet, examining both the realist and constructivist schools of thought provides a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics behind Turkish foreign policymaking. Each school of thought has its own set of strengths and weaknesses. No single theory can fully explain the complex realities of international politics.⁶⁵ Stephen Walt writes, "Each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world politics."⁶⁶ In Walt's view, "we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy...we should encourage the heterogeneity."⁶⁷

The literature review demonstrates a deficiency in the field of Turkish foreign policy with regards to the role alliance behavior may play in shaping the security aspect of foreign policy decision making. Alliance theory is a discipline within IR that studies the factors that cause states to form alliances, how they manage them, what leads to their disintegration. Although alliance theory has been used in the analysis of the NATO Alliance for many case studies, the theoretical approach specific to Turkey and its role in the Alliance is wanting. A search for scholarly literature on Turkey using an alliance theoretical approach to examine its foreign policy reveals only one study that was written prior to 2010.⁶⁸ Considering Turkey is a NATO member state, that its decision to purchase the S-400 jeopardizes the Alliance by weakening NATO's security, and there is no alliance theory literature published on Turkey in NATO since 2010—it is prudent to examine

⁶⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring 1998): 30.

⁶⁶ Walt, 44.

⁶⁷ Walt, 30.

⁶⁸ İlhan Aydemir, "Alliance in Flux: Turkey's Alliance Behavior, from the Cold War to the Present, 1947–2010" (master's thesis, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University, 2010).

Turkey's S-400 decision using an alliance theoretical approach. By doing so, the study seeks to contribute to the scholarly understanding of the factors that have contributed to Turkey's foreign policy divergence with its NATO allies, while offering additional insight into NATO alliance behavior.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The purpose of this study is to discover the key causal factors which influenced Turkey's decision to purchase Russia's S-400. The literature review suggests that two overarching factors stand out: the changing security environment and Turkish identity politics. This study builds upon the conclusion of the literature review, while applying an alliance theoretical approach to the case study. The alliance theory framework and the theses logic for the application of the framework will be discussed in Chapter II.

This study hypothesizes that during the Cold War, perceptions of Soviet aggression created a mutually shared level of external threat across NATO. The high external threat level not only kept the internal threat level low, but also suppressed the domestic and cultural cleavages amongst the Alliance members because security remains paramount to state survival.⁶⁹ Subsequently, the alliance cohesion remained relatively strong amongst the member states.⁷⁰ The high external threat level also suppressed the differences that existed in domestic and cultural cleavages among Alliance members because security is paramount in state survival.⁷¹ Consequently, the alliance cohesion was strong and Turkish foreign policy remained relatively aligned with its fellow NATO allies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War significantly altered NATO and the entire international system. Many scholars and politicians assumed liberal democracy would flourish and the possibility of global conflict would be less likely to occur.⁷² The collapse of the Soviet Union created both opportunities and challenges for

⁶⁹ M. L. Crepaz, "Chapter 2: A Primordial Challenge to the Welfare State?," in *Trust beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 19.

⁷⁰ Crepaz, 18.

⁷¹ Crepaz, 19.

⁷² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History, and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

Turkey and NATO. The external threat against NATO no longer existed. Paradoxically, as an external threat level diminishes, the internal threat level grows for alliances in general. The end of the Cold War had two major implications that influenced the Alliance's external-internal threat level phenomenon.

First, the priorities of the Alliance transformed. Whereas before security was paramount, now the values and ideals embodied in the Treaty's preamble gained increased relevance. For Turkey, domestic and cultural cleavages, which were suppressed during the Cold War, began to take on greater influence in Turkish foreign policy⁷³ because the reduction in the external threat level had diminished Ankara's need for the Alliance.⁷⁴ Turkey developed an increasingly divergent and independent foreign policy aimed at accumulating greater influences in the Middle East. Turkey's new foreign policy, known as the 'strategic depth' doctrine, called for an active engagement with the country's neighbors and emphasized their shared cultural, religious, and historical linkages that were forged during the Ottoman Empire's rule.⁷⁵ Consequently, the reversal in the Alliance's priorities increased the internal threat level within the Alliance.

Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a destabilizing force on many of its former satellites. Conflict arose in the regions surrounding Turkey—the Middle East and the Balkans. The proximity of the conflicts and instability at large significantly impacted Turkish national security—including War on Terror (2001-Present), the Iraq War (2003–2014), the Arab Spring (2010), the Libyan War (2011), the Syrian War and its ensuing refugee crisis (2011–present), and an emboldened PKK organization. The emergence of these new threats increased the Alliance's external threat levels once again. Yet, unlike the effect Soviet expansionism had on the Alliance's mutual external threat levels, the new threats were perceived with differing levels of concern and urgency between Turkey and its fellow allies. The disparity in threat perceptions was the result of the geographic

⁷³ Crepaz, "Chapter 2: A Primordial Challenge to the Welfare State?," 19.

⁷⁴ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1987), vii–viii.

⁷⁵ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 950, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200600923526>.

proximity to the threat. The closer a threat is to a state, the greater the danger it poses to that state—and many of the new threats encircled Turkey.⁷⁶ Recent historical examples illuminate the differing threat perceptions. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has requested security assistance from the Alliance in the form of air defense capabilities on at least three occasions. However, certain members within the Alliance demonstrated hesitancy in contributing to Turkey's security concerns on several occasions—the Gulf War (1990–1991),⁷⁷ the Iraq War (2003–2014),⁷⁸ and the Syrian War (2011–Present).⁷⁹

In the end, Turkey's requested security requirements were fulfilled by its fellow NATO allies in each of these wars, but Turkish skepticism about the West grew, along with the Alliance's internal threat levels—resulting in the erosion of cohesion and trust.⁸⁰ When a state's allies demonstrate a perceived unwillingness to accommodate its security concerns, that state is more likely to seek security assistance outside the alliance.⁸¹

Another important example of the increase in the internal level of threat and subsequent erosion of cohesion is the disagreement over the Alliance's approach to fighting the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. The United States and other NATO allies have supported Syrian Kurdish-led militias with reported links to the PKK, a terrorist organization that has been at war with Turkey since 1984 and is responsible for the death of over 40,000 Turks.⁸²

The study hypothesizes the factors for Turkey's purchase of the S-400 as well as its ongoing foreign policy dissonance has been caused by a combination of differing perceptions by member states over the level of external threat and the increasing internal

⁷⁶ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 23.

⁷⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 40.

⁷⁸ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 197.

⁷⁹ Kılıç Buğra Kanat et al., *US-Turkey Relations Under the AK Party: An Almanac* (Istanbul, Turkey: SETA Publications, 2017), 161.

⁸⁰ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 25–28.

⁸¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 30.

⁸² Zanotti and Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief," 1.

threat level within the Alliance. Moreover, the identity proposals of the current Turkish ruling political alliance between the AKP and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) share an anti-Western view and both wish for stronger relations in the East.⁸³ Overall, this toxic combination has undermined the Alliance's cohesion. Consequently, Turkey has chosen to distance itself with the West and seek alternative solutions to address the country's perceived threats outside the Alliance. Meanwhile, Russia identified and exploited the growing rift in the Alliance, offering to sell the S-400 to Ankara.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will apply the theoretical framework of Stephen M. Walt's Balance of Threat Theory (BoT) as the primary theory to examine the case study.⁸⁴ To reinforce his seminal work, theoretical concepts by Patricia Weitsman on internal threat levels and alliance cohesion⁸⁵ will be included as well as the identity proposals developed by Lisel Hintz.⁸⁶ Both Weitsman's and Hintz's work enrich the foundational theory by Walt's. Weitsman's concepts of internal threats and the effect it has on alliance cohesion add an important variable to examine, especially in preexisting alliances. Meanwhile, Hintz's work which focuses on identity proposals within Turkey greatly contributes to providing a more holistic understanding of what the Turkish ruling elite perceives as a threat. All three scholars work, the variables that will be used, and the theses logic will be discussed in Chapter II. The focus of the thesis is to examine what variables have changed from Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952 to Ankara's decision to purchase Russia's S-400. To gain a greater perspective for Turkey's current foreign policy dissonance, the thesis will examine the case study using a historical analysis approach.

The study will consist of a qualitative analysis and will derive its data from both primary and secondary sources. These include interviews of state officials, official government archives, government websites, academic books and journals, and research

⁸³ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 36.

⁸⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

⁸⁵ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*.

⁸⁶ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*.

institute reports. Process tracing will be used to establish the causal relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, while considering the dominant identity proposal of the Turkish regime during the periods examined.

1. Thesis Limitations

The thesis is primarily an exercise in IR theory, not Turkish studies. Although, the study is an interplay between historical investigation and theory, Turkey's history and culture are too complex to examine completely for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally, measuring the importance of each different theoretical variable is challenging because it is exceedingly difficult to know the inner workings of state elites' minds and the inherent secrecy of a state's foreign policy decision making and design. As Sergey Kireyev writes, "In many aspects, political theory forms a subjective structure of this abstract science. Perhaps, it is since unlike natural sciences or mathematics, social sciences often lack the privilege of testing the theories in absolute and unadulterated conditions."⁸⁷ In an attempt to mitigate these limitations, the study uses three methods. First, the study makes use of primary sources (elite interviews, speeches, and government archives) to aid in identifying the causal factors most important to the actors in a situation or instance. Second, the study relies on secondary sources (area experts) to examine Turkey and the Alliance. Finally, the study uses Hintz's description of current identify proposals in Turkey to aid in gaining a greater understanding of the values and beliefs of Turkey's ruling elites.

Considering the area of interest for this thesis is on the security aspect of alliances and state foreign policy, the primary focus of the thesis will be on the military aspect of alliance formation and behavior. The study is premised on the importance of the NATO Alliance in contributing to U.S. national security and for ensuring the preservation of Western values, peace, and security globally. Because Turkey is a NATO member, the study is interested in the role that alliance behavior plays in the shaping of an alliance member's own foreign policy. Specifically, the thesis considers how alliance behavior and interactions can either strengthen alliance cohesion or weaken it. The thesis defines the

⁸⁷ Sergey Kireyev, "George Liska's Realist Alliance Theory, And the Transformation of Nato" (master's thesis, Orlando, Florida, University of Central Florida, 2004), iii.

term “the West” as those nations which have adopted and are committed to liberal-democratic values, democratic institutions, and liberal international institutions. In general, these include the nations of North America and Europe, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The terms “NATO,” “the Transatlantic Alliance,” and “the Alliance” are synonymous unless otherwise indicated. Reference is also made to “the allies”—the independent and sovereign states which make up the treaty-based coalition that is NATO. Additional theoretical terminology and definitions used in this study will be provided.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II consists of the theoretical frameworks, concepts, and the logic behind the thesis’s application and approach. First, a brief overview on alliances and their importance in statecraft will be discussed. Then, Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory (BoT), which is the primary theoretical framework applied to this thesis will be discussed; followed by Patricia Weitsman’s theoretical contributions; and Lisel Hintz’s description of the ideas, principles, and beliefs of the Turkish ruling elite. The aim of the chapter is to enhance the reader’s understanding of the key variables the thesis’s modified theoretical framework applies in the examination of the case study. Chapter III examines and discusses the historical context of the key events that took place during the first half of the twentieth century that led to the formation of the NATO Alliance. The chapter first analyzes how the implications of the First World War led to seminal events in the making of the Republic of Turkey. Next, the origins of the NATO Alliance are examined, along with its *raison d’être*. Finally, the chapter examines the reasons for Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952. Chapter IV applies the theoretical framework to examine Turkey’s alliance behavior (see Figure 1) during the period from its accession to the Alliance to the Ankara’s recent alliance behavior and decision making in 2019. The chapter is primarily divided into three main sections. The first examines Turkey’s alliance behavior during the Cold War. The second examines the significance the Cold War had on the structure of the international system, NATO, and Turkish foreign policy outlook. The third section examines Turkey’s alliance behavior in the Post-Cold War Era. This section will analyze key Middle East conflicts that influenced Turkey’s perception of the West and increased its threat perceptions in comparison to the rest of the

Alliance—specifically after the advent of the Syrian War because it is after this period when Turkey’s alliance behavior and Ankara’s decision making became increasingly discernable. The aim of the chapter is to identify and compare Turkey’s traditional alliance behavior with that of the country’s recent alliance behavior to potentially detect variations that may deepen the understanding of Turkey’s divergent security policy with regards to its informal alliance with Russia in Syria and Ankara’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400. Chapter V concludes with a synthesis of the study’s findings and recommendations.

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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, CONCEPTS, AND LOGIC

Alliances are an essential element of statecraft and are a critical component of international politics. States consider alliances as tools for protecting and furthering their national interests.⁸⁸ Therefore, alliances traditionally fall under the security component of foreign policy. Yet, arguably foreign policy is primarily a derivative of the state's domestic situation.⁸⁹ As Sangit Dwivedi writes, "Whether it is domestic politics or international politics, the logic and the reason of alliances and counter-alliances is quite an accepted phenomenon. Therefore, they cannot be studied apart from other security policies, enmities and rivalries to which they are designed to respond."⁹⁰

Since 2013, Turkey's domestic and foreign policies have repeatedly contradicted the policies of other Atlantic members and the values codified in the North Atlantic Treaty's preamble. Turkey's security cooperation with Russia in Syria after 2016, as well as the recent acquisition of Russia's S-400 air-missile defense system in 2019 are perhaps the most obvious example of Turkey's divergent alliance behavior. Why has Turkey's alliance behavior changed from balancing with its longtime allies to tethering with Russia? Moreover, why would Turkey purchase Russia's S-400 knowing that it would jeopardize NATO's security and undermine the Alliance's cohesion? This thesis applies an alliance theoretical framework to examine this perplexing case study. In doing so, the thesis seeks to contribute to the scholarly understanding of Turkey's recent alliance behavior. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the importance of alliances to states within the international system. Next, the chapter examines the theoretical framework, concepts, and variables that will be applied in the case study. Finally, the chapter explains the logic in using the theoretical approach.

⁸⁸ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 1.

⁸⁹ Walter Pincus, "How Iraq's Domestic Situation Drove Its Foreign Policy on U.S. Troop Withdrawal," *Washington Post*, November 22, 2011.

⁹⁰ Sangit Sarita Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," *International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research* 1, no. 8 (August 2012): 225.

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE THEORY

Alliance theory is a discipline within the field of International Relations (IR). While IR seeks to understand how and why states interact, alliance theory examines the formation, efficacy, and disintegration of alliances among sovereign political units. The concept of alliances is as old as war itself. Indeed, alliances and war are intrinsically linked because alliances are formed primarily to increase a state's security. The Greek historian Thucydides' book, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, written during the fifth century B.C., provides a clear account of the important role alliances play in statecraft and state security.⁹¹ Alliances are a critical component within the study of international politics because they are considered tools of the state which are created to maximize its security against perceived threats.⁹² The concepts within the study of alliance theory contribute greatly to state policymaking and play a crucial role in the making of a state's national strategy.⁹³

The main purpose of an alliance is to safeguard its member states against dangers that threaten state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other words, the top priority of creating and maintaining an alliance is to enhance the individual state's security level. Yet, alliances can serve other goals for states as well. Alliances can manage or mitigate the likelihood of inter-state tension and conflict both inside and outside an alliance.⁹⁴ Within an alliance, institutional processes may enhance transparency, trust, cooperation, and solidarity between allies. Additionally, alliances can reduce the chance of conflict with non-member states by deterring aggression by combining the aggregate power and security of the alliance members. Thus, alliances can be used as a tool to promote peace and stability within the international system. On the other hand, alliances may create a perception of

⁹¹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, The Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; Penguin Books, 1972).

⁹² Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 2001 Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 168; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 32; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 25–26.

⁹³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 262.

⁹⁴ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 21–24.

threat to non-member states. This may in turn encourage states to form rival counter-alliances to balance against the perceived danger. Because of this behavior, a security dilemma may arise. Paradoxically, alliance formation can also promote instability and conflict.⁹⁵

The primary framework for explaining how international relations are understood is categorized into three images or political units—man (the first image), the state (the second image), and the international system (the third image).⁹⁶ Alliance theoreticians acknowledge that more than one image can shape a state's international interactions. As Kenneth Waltz wrote, "So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system [or international system] in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two."⁹⁷ Nevertheless, scholars debate over what image is the primary factor in explaining international relations. The first image theory focuses on the nature of people and argues that states are a reflection of human nature—regardless of the belief that human nature is innately good (as argued by Rousseau) or inherently corrupt and selfish (as held by Hobbes).⁹⁸ The second image theory focuses on the nature of the state regime and its institutions and argues that the state's domestic structure is the determining factor in its behavior (e.g. Marxism and democratic peace theory).⁹⁹ The third image theory focuses on the international system and argues that its nature drives state behavior (i.e., structural realism and liberalism).¹⁰⁰ Regardless of image, alliances are a tool of statecraft and play a crucial role in international politics. As Stephen M. Walt notes, "the forces that shape international alliances are among the most important in international politics."¹⁰¹ Moreover, Patricia Weitsman writes, "Military alliances shape worlds. They embody the

⁹⁵ Weitsman, 7.

⁹⁶ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 12.

⁹⁷ Waltz, 160.

⁹⁸ Waltz, 18.

⁹⁹ Waltz, 81.

¹⁰⁰ Waltz, 159–60.

¹⁰¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 262.

patterns of conflict and cooperation in international politics.”¹⁰² Alliances, for better or worse, have a significant impact on the nature and outlook of the international system and are a critical component in a state’s foreign policy, national security, and grand strategy. Considering the significant role NATO has had in international politics over the last seventy years, it is both appropriate and essential to examine Turkey’s recent alliance behavior about its S-400 decision using an alliance theoretical approach.

This thesis examines Turkey’s alliance behavior using the theoretical framework of Stephen M. Walt. It also incorporates concepts of Patricia Weitsman’s theory of alliance formation and cohesion. The thesis draws primarily from Walt’s balance of threat theory (BoT), discussed in his book, *The Origins of Alliances*.¹⁰³ Patricia Weitsman’s theory of alliance formation and cohesion, discussed in her book, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, also contributes to the thesis.¹⁰⁴ Weitsman’s theoretical concepts regarding internal levels of threat and alliance cohesion complement Walt’s seminal work—thus, providing a more comprehensive understanding of alliance behavior.¹⁰⁵

B. STEPHEN M. WALT: BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY (BOT)

Stephen M. Walt’s central thesis posits that the primary reason states form alliances is to balance against the greatest threat.¹⁰⁶ Walt contends that there are four main factors (or variables) that determine a threat: power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.¹⁰⁷ Walt notes that in most instances a state facing an external threat “will align with others to oppose the states [or non-state actors] posing the threat.”¹⁰⁸ This form of alliance behavior is called balancing.

¹⁰² Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 1.

¹⁰³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

¹⁰⁴ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*.

¹⁰⁵ Weitsman, 37.

¹⁰⁶ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vi, 263.

¹⁰⁷ Walt, vi.

¹⁰⁸ Walt, 32.

Although the title of the book may imply that his study is relevant only to explaining alliance formation, his theory provides a rich understanding of alliance behavior writ large. As Oliver Stuenkel writes, “Walt integrates a range of domestic variables (including perceptions and intentions) into the realist model, turning it into a far more sophisticated and applicable theory.”¹⁰⁹ Walt’s work holds particular value to this thesis for two additional reasons. First, his study primarily focuses on alliance behavior within the Middle East,¹¹⁰ a region including Turkey in which Ankara has been increasingly active since the AKP came to power. Second, Walt analyzes ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration as possible variables for explaining alliance behavior. His examination of these additional variables provides valuable and relevant insight into this thesis topic. Overall, considering the emphasis placed on Turkey’s S-400 decision, his detailed study, and the theoretical framework he develops are significant to this thesis indeed. The exhaustive methodology Walt uses to test his theory allows it to be applicable across the international political spectrum.¹¹¹ Ultimately, Walt’s theory is an important contribution to the discipline of alliance theory and remains widely accepted among IR scholars.¹¹²

1. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning

When a foreign power poses a threat to another state, the threatened state will most likely either ally with the source of danger (bandwagon) or ally against it (balance).¹¹³ In general, these two distinct actions are the most common and widely accepted forms of alliance behavior exhibited among states when facing a threat. Walt argues that balancing is a far more common occurrence than bandwagoning.¹¹⁴ Balancing behavior enables states facing a common threat to combine their capabilities. Thus, balancing creates

¹⁰⁹ Oliver Stuenkel, “Book Review: ‘The Origins of Alliances’ by Stephen M. Walt,” *Post Western World*, September 10, 2013, <https://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/09/10/book-review-the-origins-of-alliance-by-stephen-m-walt/>.

¹¹⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 11.

¹¹¹ Walt, 15.

¹¹² “Stephen M. Walt,” *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, accessed August 23, 2019, <https://www.belfercenter.org/person/stephen-m-walt>.

¹¹³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21.

¹¹⁴ Walt, 263.

alliances that are more capable of countering a common threat.¹¹⁵ Yet, Walt notes that balancing is not universal.¹¹⁶

On occasion, a state may choose to bandwagon. Weak states that perceive their allies to be unreliable and regard the threatening state as appeasable are especially prone to bandwagoning behavior.¹¹⁷ There are two main forms of logic behind bandwagoning behavior. The first is an act of appeasement to the threatening state. Walt writes, “By aligning with an ascendant state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere.”¹¹⁸ The second form of logic is to “align with the dominant side in wartime in order to share the spoils of victory” and increase the bandwagoning state’s chances to influence the war termination negotiations.¹¹⁹ Ultimately, however, the decision to bandwagon is based on “the hope that such a step will moderate its [the threatening power’s] aggressive intentions.”¹²⁰

Nevertheless, bandwagoning is more dangerous than balancing because bandwagoning increases the threatening state’s total power and influence over the bandwagoning state. In other words, the potential loss of some or all its sovereignty increases for states that bandwagon. Moreover, it requires the bandwagoning state to place “trust in its [the threatening power’s] continued forbearance.”¹²¹ Walt writes, “Because perceptions are unreliable and intentions can change, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to rely on the hope that a state will remain benevolently disposed.”¹²² Consequently, balancing is more common an bandwagoning because an alignment that preserves most of a state’s interests and freedom of action is preferable to accepting

¹¹⁵ Walt, 263.

¹¹⁶ Walt, 28.

¹¹⁷ Walt, 173.

¹¹⁸ Walt, 21.

¹¹⁹ Walt, 21.

¹²⁰ Walt, 176.

¹²¹ Walt, 29.

¹²² Walt, 29.

subordination.¹²³ Regardless of the state's decision to balance or bandwagon, it is important to note that both balancing and bandwagoning behavior are responses caused by a perceived threat.¹²⁴

2. Key Variables: Threat Level Components in Alliance Behavior

An imposing threat, whether real or perceived, is the main causal factor for alliance formation and behavior. When states are confronted with an imposing threat, states will likely seek to balance against it by increasing their capabilities, in addition to seeking an alliance; and if a state is already part of an alliance, it will seek assistance from its fellow allies.¹²⁵ By now it is clear that threats are the key cause of alliance behavior, but what are the key factors that make a threat? Walt acknowledges the influence that power has in alliance behavior: "The power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used."¹²⁶ Still, power alone cannot explain alliance behavior. According to Walt, there are four main components to a threat: power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and, in particular, perceived intentions.¹²⁷ He cautions that the weight each factor has on a state's alliance behavior will ultimately vary.¹²⁸ Therefore, he notes that specific "historical case studies provide the most detailed evidence regarding the causes of a particular alliance" and thus offer the best method to deepen understanding of specific interactions.¹²⁹

a. Aggregate Power

Aggregate power or total power is the combination of a state's total resources (the population, economic capacity, industrial output, military capability, political cohesion,

¹²³ Dwivedi, "Alliances in International Relations Theory," 231.

¹²⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 22.

¹²⁵ Walt, vi, 9.

¹²⁶ Walt, x.

¹²⁷ Walt, vi.

¹²⁸ Walt, 14.

¹²⁹ Walt, 11.

and technological advancements) and the state's distribution capability.¹³⁰ A state's total power can have varying effects on other states. It may attract other states or threaten them.¹³¹ Therefore, although aggregate power is a significant threat component, other factors must be considered as well.

b. Geographic Proximity

Geographic proximity is an important component of a threat because the closer a state is to another, the easier it is to project influence on other states. Walt contends, "Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. Other things being equal, therefore, states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant."¹³² Like aggregate power, geographic proximity alone is unable to explain what behavior a state is more likely to choose. However, Walt notes that smaller states that share a border with a great power are more likely to bandwagon with it than with a distant, non-contiguous great power, especially if the nearby "great power" has demonstrated its capability and willingness to intervene and command obedience.¹³³ Walt notes that states within a shared region are more distrustful of one another than of states far away. Therefore, they generally seek alliances with states outside the region.¹³⁴

c. Offensive Capabilities

Offensive power refers to a state's capabilities to threaten another state's sovereignty or territorial integrity.¹³⁵ Walt notes that offensive power is "closely related but not identical to aggregate power."¹³⁶ A key element in offensive capabilities is a state's willingness to utilize them against another state. Although perceptions are a distinct

¹³⁰ Walt, 22.

¹³¹ Walt, 23.

¹³² Walt, 23.

¹³³ Walt, 24.

¹³⁴ Walt, 153.

¹³⁵ Walt, 24.

¹³⁶ Walt, 24.

component of a threat, they are closely related to offensive capabilities because they shape how states are viewed. For example, a state that has a large arsenal and is perceived to behave aggressively will likely cause the threatened state to balance against it.¹³⁷

d. Perceived Intentions

Understanding how and what a state perceives as a threat is essential to comprehending alliance behavior. Walt argues that perceptions “play an especially crucial role in alliance choices.”¹³⁸ Indeed, Walt contends that perceived intentions are more important than power for forming a threat.¹³⁹ Why are perceptions so crucial? As Walt observes, “Because power can be used either to threaten or to support other states, how states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes paramount.”¹⁴⁰ Beyond power, other factors that shape a state’s threat perceptions can include rhetoric, behavior, beliefs, ideology, and history.

e. Other Variables for Consideration

As noted previously, Walt holds that the four main variables that determine a threat are power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Yet, Walt also examines other important and less obvious variables that may encourage certain alliance behavior, including ideology, foreign aid, political penetration, and nationalism. Though Walt contends these other variables are not decisive in determining alliance behavior, they are worth briefly noting, in view of the relevance they may have in shaping Turkey’s recent security decision making.

(1) Ideology

Ideology can either reinforce alliance behavior or create divisions among states. On one hand, shared ideology can reinforce state alignment and is preferable to ideological

¹³⁷ Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 230.

¹³⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 25.

¹³⁹ Walt, 26.

¹⁴⁰ Walt, 179.

discord and antagonism in pursuing alliance formation and coordinated behavior. This is especially true during times of peace and relative stability. In general, states that share similar beliefs, especially domestic principles and values, appear less threatening.¹⁴¹ Thus they are more likely to trust and align with one another.¹⁴² Moreover, states with similar ideologies may affect alliance behavior by helping to enhance the legitimacy of weak or unstable regimes by demonstrating that they are part of a larger, legitimate movement to gain popularity with their constituents.¹⁴³ As Walt writes, “Accordingly, we can expect regimes whose legitimacy is precarious to enter ideologically based alliances.”¹⁴⁴

Paradoxically, certain types of ideology can create divisiveness among states. Indeed, divisive ideologies, such as pan-Arabism, can erode trust in relations between Arab and non-Arab states and increase the likelihood of conflict between states.¹⁴⁵ This finding is particularly relevant to this thesis because of Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy under the AKP as well as the shared irredentist aspirations of reclaiming the glory of the former Ottoman Empire among the Turkish ruling elites.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Walt claims that ideology is not a decisive factor because the importance of shared ideology among states declines as the level of threat increases.¹⁴⁷ Ideological solidarity is more important when threat levels are low or when the shared ideology acts to reinforce the state’s security.¹⁴⁸ In other words, a state’s national security requirements will likely take precedence over shared ideology, especially when the state faces an imposing threat.

¹⁴¹ Walt, 180.

¹⁴² Walt, 180.

¹⁴³ Walt, 34–35, 39.

¹⁴⁴ Walt, 39.

¹⁴⁵ Walt, 35–36.

¹⁴⁶ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 117, 151.

¹⁴⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263.

¹⁴⁸ Walt, 263.

(2) Foreign Aid and Political Penetration

Foreign aid and political penetration are commonly considered to be policy tools that deepen inter-state relations between the provider and the recipient. The logic behind both policy tools is to gain some form of concessions or leverage in exchange for assistance. Despite the popular usage of both political instruments in attracting potential allies or maintaining an alliance, Walt's findings demonstrate "that focusing on foreign aid or penetration alone usually does not explain much about how states choose their allies"¹⁴⁹ and "rarely gives patrons significant political leverage over their clients."¹⁵⁰ In the absence of a common threat or shared political interests, neither policy tool will be effective for attracting potential allies or maintaining alliance solidarity.¹⁵¹ Thus, foreign aid and foreign penetration cannot explain alliance formation and behavior. Consequently, Walt holds that foreign aid should be considered as "just another form of balancing behavior."¹⁵²

Nevertheless, foreign aid is still a useful policy tool. In preexisting alliances, foreign aid between allied members is commonly considered a means to strengthen fellow allies and foster alliance cohesion.¹⁵³ However, if alliance members' political interests greatly diverge or if the allies disagree over the level of danger a threat poses to them, the lack of adequate foreign aid and assistance will likely cause the ally in need to seek assistance elsewhere or realign. Consequently, this may weaken the alliance and erode the alliance's cohesion.

Political penetration "is defined as the manipulation of the target state's domestic political system to promote alignment."¹⁵⁴ In other words, it is the application of foreign influence directed at a state's population to influence a desired state behavior. The

¹⁴⁹ Walt, 261.

¹⁵⁰ Walt, 236.

¹⁵¹ Walt, 225.

¹⁵² Walt, 224.

¹⁵³ Walt, 218.

¹⁵⁴ Walt, 242.

likelihood of penetration influencing a target country is heavily reliant on the state having an open society. Walt argues that penetration is rarely successful if other alignment motivations are absent.¹⁵⁵ In fact, “when penetration threatens a prospective ally’s internal stability [or regime], it is more likely to create hostility than to encourage an effective alliance.”¹⁵⁶ Hence, attempts to penetrate a state’s internal political dynamics are most likely to be counterproductive.

Despite the popularity of using foreign aid and political penetration as policy instruments to influence alliance behavior, Walt’s study demonstrates that both are unreliable tools that may have little effect. In his words, “Aid and penetration can enhance alliances between states with similar interests, but neither is an especially effective instrument by itself.”¹⁵⁷ If the political interests and shared threat perceptions among states are not aligned, neither policy tool will serve to create or maintain effective alliances.¹⁵⁸ Thus, they are secondary factors in determining alliance formation and behavior.¹⁵⁹

(3) Nationalism

What is the most powerful political force in the world? Walt argues it is nationalism.¹⁶⁰ In his words, nationalism is “The belief that humanity is comprised of many different cultures—i.e., groups that share a common language, symbols, and a narrative about their past (invariably self-serving and full of myths)—and that those groups ought to have their own state has been an overwhelmingly powerful force in the world over the past two centuries.”¹⁶¹ Walt’s position on the power nationalism is not unique. Indeed, Benedict Anderson, a renowned scholar of nationalism, wrote in his book, *Imagined*

¹⁵⁵ Walt, 242.

¹⁵⁶ Walt, 244.

¹⁵⁷ Walt, 261.

¹⁵⁸ Walt, 225.

¹⁵⁹ Walt, 218–19.

¹⁶⁰ Stephen M. Walt, “Nationalism Rules,” *Foreign Policy*, July 15, 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/15/nationalism-rules/>.

¹⁶¹ Walt, 1.

Communities, that nationalism “is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” with no end in sight.¹⁶² Moreover, John J. Mearsheimer, a respected IR scholar, contends that “there is little question that nationalism is a real-world phenomenon. It is commonplace to talk about nationalism as a powerful force in everyday life that shapes politics within and among states.”¹⁶³

The power of nationalism cannot be overstated and is important to comprehend in the case of Turkish politics and state foreign policy decision making writ large. The phenomenon of nationalism can evoke many responses and outcomes. Among the many outcomes, nationalism can be used to unify a common people or a state; conversely it can also create deep fault lines within a state. Nationalism can be engineered to mobilize a state for war and promote a collective irredentism in a society. Further still, it must be understood that the power of nationalism is able to trump alliance commitments and even limit the power and influence that strong states may attempt to impose on weaker states.¹⁶⁴

C. WEITSMAN’S THEORY OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND COHESION

Building upon the seminal work of Stephen M. Walt, Patricia Weitsman’s theory of alliance formation and cohesion, presented in her book, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, is considered a contribution complementary to Walt’s theoretical framework.¹⁶⁵ Weitsman’s central thesis posits that differing levels of threat can produce varying forms of alliance behavior and that the specific threat level will determine a state’s alliance behavior.¹⁶⁶ She notes that a “state behaves differently according to the specific level of threat they experience.”¹⁶⁷ Therefore, she believes it is essential to examine levels of threat and alliance cohesion in order to truly understand

¹⁶² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Revised Edition (London; New York: Verso, 2006), 3.

¹⁶³ John J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism,” *University of Chicago*, May 5, 2011, 2.

¹⁶⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 228–29.

¹⁶⁵ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 37.

¹⁶⁶ Weitsman, 12, 165.

¹⁶⁷ Weitsman, 18.

alliance behavior.¹⁶⁸ Because Weitsman agrees with Walt's theoretical findings, this thesis does not discuss in detail her entire corpus of theoretical work. Indeed, her external threat factors are strikingly similar to Walt's four key variables, although she labels them differently.¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Weitsman's theoretical concept regarding the relationship between an alliance's internal threat levels and the subsequent effects it may have on alliance cohesion enriches Walt's theory. The inherent relationship between internal threats and alliance cohesion are invaluable to this thesis. Both variables are useful for analyzing an established alliance because of the implications the relationship may have in shaping an alliance member's behavior and determining the fate of the alliance. Consequently, Weitsman's concept of internal threat levels and its relationship to alliance cohesion is considered in the examination of Turkey's recent alliance behavior.

1. Internal Levels of Threat and Alliance Cohesion

Weitsman's theory places a much-needed emphasis on examining the relationship between internal threats and alliance cohesion to understand established alliances and their members' behavior. Whereas Walt focused primarily on external threats, Weitsman places internal and external threats into two distinct categories.¹⁷⁰ This offers the possibility of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Turkey's recent alliance behavior. Weitsman's concept of internal threats refers to threats that take place within an alliance. Internal threat levels are influenced by factors such as the impetus for creating the alliance, the level of external threat, and trust, as well as shared values, goals, and interests.¹⁷¹ Although not all of these factors must be present or in good order for an alliance to function, they are all intrinsically linked to an alliance's level of cohesion.

¹⁶⁸ Weitsman, 165.

¹⁶⁹ Weitsman, 34.

¹⁷⁰ Weitsman, 23–27.

¹⁷¹ Weitsman, 24–25.

Weitsman defines alliance cohesion as the ability of the member allies “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends.”¹⁷² Alliance cohesion, at its core, is shaped by how alliances perform. What drives alliance performance? Weitsman contends that the original impetus “behind a state’s decision to ally is essential” to an alliance’s efficacy in achieving its intended goals.¹⁷³ Moreover, it is important to examine if the alliance’s goals were established during peacetime or war because ultimately security is the top priority of states. In other words, during wartime, alliances generally put aside lesser disagreements because survival is at stake. Thus, alliance cohesion is usually high and internal threat levels are low. Paradoxically, in peacetime, it is common for internal threats to increase and alliance cohesion to erode because no existential threat exists. Treaties and agreements are important, but what ultimately matters are the actions exhibited by fellow alliance members when an ally perceives a threat.

2. External and Internal Threat Levels: How they Impact Alliance Cohesion

Weitsman’s ‘Threats and Cohesion’ table (see Table 1), clarifies her theoretical concept between threats (internal and external) and alliance cohesion and how it influences alliance behavior. Understanding Weitsman’s theoretical concept regarding the relationship between internal threats and alliance cohesion, coupled with an agreed-upon level of external threat an alliance faces, is essential to this thesis. It explains why the end of the Cold War was such a pivotal event in the history of NATO and Turkey’s foreign policy activism during the first decade of the twenty-first century. As Weitsman illustrates in the table, when internal and external threats are low, cohesion is low. In this scenario, member states are more likely to hedge and develop policies at variance with those of fellow allies.

¹⁷² Weitsman, 35, in Ole Holsti et al., *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*, 1st Edition, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 16.

¹⁷³ Weitsman, 24.

Weitsman's table also helps to explain Turkey's increased divergence from the rest of the Alliance since 2013. Differing external threat perceptions among members of an alliance can alter the internal threat level within that alliance. This can influence the alliance's cohesion and drive a member state's alliance behavior. In the case of Turkey's recent alliance behavior, the external threat for most of the NATO allies remained relatively low in comparison to the threats perceived by Turkey. Once the Syrian War began, the differing external threat perspectives between Turkey and most of the allies caused the internal threat level within NATO to increase and lower (or weaken) the Alliance's cohesion. Thus, Turkey exhibited the alliance behavior of tethering (see Appendix A, Thesis Definitions and Terminology, for additional information on tethering), in which a member state seeks support from the threatening state to mitigate conflict and manage relations.

Table 1. Threats and Cohesion.¹⁷⁴

	<i>Low Internal Threat</i>	<i>High Internal Threat</i>
<i>Low External Threat</i>	Moderate or low cohesion; depends on which (internal or external) threat is higher; usually hedging alliances. In these cases, insights generated from liberalist [liberalism] theory will hold.	Low or no cohesion; tethering alliances.
<i>High External Threat</i>	Moderate to high cohesion; balancing alliances. In these cases, insights from realist theory will hold.	Cohesion difficult though not impossible to attain; depends on which (internal or external) threat is higher. These may be tethering, ¹⁷⁵ balancing, or bandwagoning alliances.

¹⁷⁴ Adapted from Weitsman, 26.

¹⁷⁵ According to Weitsman, "Tethering is a strategy to manage relations with one's adversary by drawing closer to it via agreement." This form of behavior is distinct because its driven by mutual antipathy. Tethering allows rivals to control conflicts of interest and reduce threat levels between one another—if only for a temporary period.

D. COMBINING WALT AND WEITSMAN

Walt's BoT provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding alliance behavior, and it is the main theory applied through this thesis. Yet, including Weitsman's theoretical concept regarding the essential correlation between internal threat levels and alliance cohesion serves to bolster Walt's seminal work. These theoreticians' findings are strikingly similar. Walt and Weitsman agree that the level of threat facing a state is the main factor in determining alliance formation and behavior.¹⁷⁶ Weitsman concurs with Walt's four external threat components: power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and, perceived intentions.¹⁷⁷ However, her work enriches his by adding the importance of internal threats to alliance cohesion and behavior. Both theoreticians rightly emphasize the importance of perceptions in shaping what a state determines is a threat.¹⁷⁸ Walt writes, "the importance of intentions has been apparent throughout this analysis. Because power can be used either to threaten or to support other states, how states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes paramount."¹⁷⁹ Yet, neither Walt nor Weitsman describes ways in which to determine or comprehend how states perceive threats and intentions—other than analyzing direct communiqués and actions and aligning with domestically like-minded states.¹⁸⁰ Walt admits that determining intentions is a difficult endeavor.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of the domestic factors influencing Turkey's alliance behavior, including the ideas, principles, and beliefs of the current Turkish ruling elite.

¹⁷⁶ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 18–19.

¹⁷⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vi; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 34.

¹⁷⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 179; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 33.

¹⁷⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 179.

¹⁸⁰ Walt, 180.

¹⁸¹ Walt, 180.

E. LISEL HINTZ: TURKISH IDENTITY PROPOSALS

Alliances are instruments used by states to maximize their security against perceived threats.¹⁸² Although a state's aggregate capabilities are essential in determining a threat, understanding a state's perceptual frameworks are equally important in studying alliance behavior because perceptions influence who and what is deemed a threat to the state. Indeed, Weitsman contends that threats are fundamentally a perceptual factor and that perceived intentions are an essential ingredient to determining a threat.¹⁸³ Walt adds strong emphasis on the criticality of perceived intentions in influencing a state's alliance behavior.¹⁸⁴ Both theoreticians identify the importance of perceptions and ideas; yet, many IR scholars struggle to identify ways to analyze perceptions and intentions. The thesis seeks to address this challenge by taking into account the identity proposals developed by Lisel Hintz in her book, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*.¹⁸⁵ Hintz identifies four distinct and coherent Turkish identity proposals in present-day Turkey—Republican Nationalism, Ottoman Islamism, Pan-Turkic Nationalism, and Western Liberalism.¹⁸⁶ By incorporating her analysis of the identity proposals of the Turkish regime, this thesis aims to gain a deeper understanding of the Turkish ruling elites' beliefs, worldviews, and self-perceptions. This might enhance one of Walt's four threat components—perceived intentions.

1. Importance of Identity Politics in Deciphering Threat Perceptions

The concept of a distinct political identity proposal (or group) is vital to understanding how threats are perceived. Examining a state's domestic identity politics is essential in understanding its foreign policy decisions.¹⁸⁷ Hintz explains that identity proposals are groups that “compete against each other to delineate, among other standards,

¹⁸² Walt, 32; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 25–26.

¹⁸³ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 33.

¹⁸⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 179–80.

¹⁸⁵ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*.

¹⁸⁶ Hintz, 10.

¹⁸⁷ Hintz, 4.

the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, desired goals of the group, and friends and enemies—essentially who ‘we’ are and how we should behave.”¹⁸⁸ The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been the ruling party in Turkey since 2002 and is categorized under the Ottoman Islamism identity proposal. In 2018, AKP leaders forged a political alliance with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) that falls under the Pan-Turkic Nationalism identity proposal.¹⁸⁹ Since this political alliance is responsible for Turkey’s domestic and foreign policymaking, it is essential to understand the beliefs, values, principles, aims, and redlines of these two proposals in order to address Walt’s fourth threat component. Indeed, Hintz argues that Turkey’s recent changes in its foreign policy can best be explained by the rise of the AKP in 2002, a political party that falls under the Ottoman Islamism identity proposal, and the ideology its leaders espouse.¹⁹⁰ Along with Walt’s three other main threat components—power, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities—the Turkish ruling elites’ (AKP/MHP political alliance) perceptions of themselves and the world are influential in the shaping Turkey’s recent alliance behavior.

The purpose of this thesis is not to go into detail regarding Hintz’s “inside out” contestation theory,¹⁹¹ but rather to use her analysis and description of the Turkish ruling elites’ beliefs and perceptions to determine what role they have in shaping Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. The thesis will primarily focus on the identity proposals of the current ruling elite—Ottoman Islamism (AKP) and Pan-Turkic Nationalism (MHP). Hintz develops a useful framework for providing a comparative analysis of each identity proposal by categorizing them into four main elements of content—constitutive norms, social purpose, relational meaning, and cognitive worldview (see Table 2).¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ Hintz, 18.

¹⁸⁹ Burak Kadercan, “The Year of the Gray Wolf: The Rise of Turkey’s New Ultranationalism,” *War on the Rocks*, July 16, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-year-of-the-gray-wolf-the-rise-of-turkeys-new-ultranationalism/>.

¹⁹⁰ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 100–103.

¹⁹¹ Hintz, 4–5.

¹⁹² Hintz, 9.

Table 2. Identity Proposals.¹⁹³

	<i>Pan-Turkic Nationalism</i>	<i>Western Liberalism</i>	<i>Republican Nationalism</i>	<i>Ottoman Islamism</i>
<i>Constitutive Norms of Membership (prescribed and proscribed behaviors)</i>	Ethnic /cultural Turkish membership; Sunni Muslim faith, deeper roots in Central Asia	Nonethnic, nonlinguistic, nonreligious membership; embrace diversity, liberties	Nonethnic, linguistic and territorial membership; must call oneself Turk; embrace principles of Atatürk	Sunni Muslim; piety; deference of women; absolute authority; Ottoman rule as greatest era
<i>Social Purpose (interests of the group)</i>	Enrich and protect Turkish culture; eradicate Kurdish, Armenian claims that threaten this culture; realize some form of union with Turkic populations	Protect rights, liberties, equality (especially minorities, women, LGBTQs); promote freedom of expression in all forms	Uphold Atatürk's principles; protect secularism and territory at all costs; retain Western orientation	Spread Islam in public sphere; provide aid to and deepen ties with Muslim, Ottoman peoples; regain Ottoman glory
<i>Relational Meaning (view of relations with various out-groups)</i>	Natural brotherhood with Turkic peoples; hostile relationship with the West; suspicion of Arab peoples	Natural kinship with West, Europe as civilizational home; no inherent hostility toward any peoples or regimes	Natural Western orientation but suspicious view of Western regimes as imperialist (Sevres); cautious relations due to fear of entanglement, border compromise; Muslim peoples seen as backward/ignorant	Natural kinship with Muslim peoples, possibility of good relations with other former Ottoman territories; hostility toward West; enmity toward Israel as Palestine oppressor
<i>Cognitive Worldview (general role, beliefs about position in space and time)</i>	Natural big brotherhood to and savior of Turkic people (Central Asia, Uyghurs, Tatars)	Natural place in modern, liberal, Western world; Turkey should be example of peace, freedom, liberty, and rights recognition	Secular guard of modern lifestyle in region of Islamic fundamentalism; Turkey as a non-aggressor state	Turkey as legitimate inheritor of Ottoman legacies, power; leader of Islamic world, Palestinian protector

¹⁹³ Adapted from Hintz, 36.

2. Ottoman Islamism and Pan-Turkic Nationalism

Of the four prominent Turkish identity proposals, Pan-Turkic Nationalism and Ottoman Islamism share the most commonalities. Their similarities far outweigh any minor differences they have between each other. Perhaps one of the more important shared beliefs between these two identity proposals is their negative perception of Atatürk and his legacy.¹⁹⁴ As Hintz writes, both “view him as the figure responsible for the repression of their religious rights and their persecution as a collectivity under an absolutist secular regime.”¹⁹⁵ Another important shared commonality is their enmity toward the United States as an “imperialist enemy” and their view of the West as a hostile out-group that cannot be trusted.¹⁹⁶ Other commonalities between Pan-Turkic Nationalism and Ottoman Islamism include their strong adherence to Sunni Islam,¹⁹⁷ their anti-Semitism, their glorification of the Ottoman Empire’s past,¹⁹⁸ and subsequently, their shared irredentist goal for Turkey to gain greater global power and influence.¹⁹⁹ Consequently, both identity proposals’ relational meaning drive a Turkish foreign policy that distances itself from the West.²⁰⁰

Hintz’s analysis of the current Turkish ruling elites’ identity proposals greatly contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s recent divergent alliance behavior, its increasingly illiberal backsliding, and the decision to purchase the Russian S-400. The Ottoman Islamist belief in the resurrection of the Sunni caliphate in Turkey helps to explain Ankara’s foreign policy activism in the region under the AKP.²⁰¹ Hintz writes, “In order to re-establish Turkey’s roles as inheritor of the Ottoman legacy of regional rule and the legitimate center of the Muslim world, as it had been while hosting the caliphate,

¹⁹⁴ Hintz, 152.

¹⁹⁵ Hintz, 152.

¹⁹⁶ Hintz, 40, 150.

¹⁹⁷ Hintz, 36, 152.

¹⁹⁸ Hintz, 50.

¹⁹⁹ Hintz, 39, 41, 117, 151.

²⁰⁰ Hintz, 12, 55–56, 116.

²⁰¹ Hintz, 50, 55–57.

the AKP sought to spread its influence and leadership authority across former Ottoman lands.”²⁰² Her assessment that the Ottoman Islamists hold that the government should have absolute authority within the state provides increased clarity behind the government’s brutal reaction to the Gezi Park protests,²⁰³ the repression of human rights, and the recent purges.²⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the Pan-Turkic Nationalists’ disdain and exclusion of all Kurds from what they consider genuine Turkishness helps explain why Kurdish-Turkish rapprochement has failed in Turkey. As a result, Kurds have endured injustices both in and outside of Turkey from Ankara.²⁰⁵ Thus, the political alliance between the AKP and MHP appears to be beneficial for both groups in the pursuit of their Turkish identity hegemony.

F. THESIS APPLICATION AND LOGIC

Since 2013, Turkey, a member of the NATO Alliance, has increasingly engaged in both domestic and foreign policy actions that contradict the purposes, principles, and ideals on which the Alliance was formed. Consequently, Turkey’s recent alliance behavior has increasingly called into question the future of the Alliance and Turkey’s role within it.²⁰⁶ This thesis seeks to understand the factors that influenced Turkey’s recent alliance behavior in the purchase of Russia’s S-400. Why would an alliance member state make a decision that would weaken its own alliance’s security and erode its cohesion?

This thesis will apply the theoretical framework of Stephen M. Walt’s BoT as the primary theory to examine the case study. To reinforce his seminal work, theoretical concepts by Patricia Weitsman on internal threat levels and alliance cohesion will be included as well as the identity proposals developed by Lisel Hintz. Weitsman’s and Hintz’s works enrich the foundational theory put forth by Walt. Weitsman’s concepts of

²⁰² Hintz, 116.

²⁰³ The Gezi Park incident from May to June 2013, start as a small environmental protest over the construction of a shopping mall in Istanbul. The police brutally attacked the protesters. This in turn, sparked a larger anti-government movement that was condemned by the AKP as traitorous and was eventually violently repressed by Turkish government forces.

²⁰⁴ Hintz, 51, 156–165; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 355–57.

²⁰⁵ Hintz, 53–54, 144–46, 153–156.

²⁰⁶ “Judy Asks.”

internal threats and the effects they have on alliance cohesion add an important variable to examine, especially in established alliances. Meanwhile, Hintz's work on identity proposals within Turkey greatly contributes to providing a more comprehensive understanding of what the Turkish ruling elite perceives as a threat.

The two independent variables are external threat levels and internal threat levels (see Figure 1). Walt's four key components of a threat (power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions) will be applied to examine the external threat level.²⁰⁷ While, the internal threat level draws from Weitsman's work.²⁰⁸ The dependent variable is alliance cohesion, which is in a constant state of fluctuation as a result of the varying levels of the two independent variables. Hintz's work on identity politics within Turkey's current domestic society is incorporated in both independent variables to enrich the comprehension of the current Turkish elites' beliefs and perceptions. By combining the three scholars' work, the thesis aims to deepen the understanding of Turkey's recent alliance behavior.

²⁰⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vi.

²⁰⁸ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 24–25.




Figure 1. Thesis's Theoretical Framework.

Although the focus of the thesis is to examine Turkey's recent security decision regarding Ankara's informal alliance with Moscow and its purchase of the Russian S-400 through the application of alliance theory, the modified theoretical framework presented throughout this chapter aims to potentially fill a gap in academia gap that may enrich the understanding of Turkey's overall foreign policy divergence from the West. To achieve this aim, the thesis employs a combination of historical analysis and process tracing to establish a baseline of the theoretical variables and then identify possible variations in the established baseline variables to answer the question: what factors led Ankara to decide to acquire the S-400 despite the assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO allies that the acquisition of the Russian surface to air missile defense system would jeopardize the integrity and security of the Alliance?

III. THE GENESIS FOR THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, NATO, AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION

To understand why Turkey's alliance behavior appears to be increasingly divergent from the rest of its NATO allies it is prudent to first examine the key events of the first half of the twentieth century. This period played a significant role in the shaping of state perceptions, the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923), and the creation of the NATO Alliance. The dynamism and uncertainty exhibited during the first half of the twentieth century created an extremely volatile international system that witnessed two world wars, the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the collapse of six empires (the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian Empires after the First World War; and the German Third Reich and the Japanese Empire after the Second World War). Two world wars were among the primary factors in the collapse of these great powers and the emergence of new ones, which greatly shifted the balance of power within the international system. As Martin Wight wrote, "Great-power status is lost, as it is won, by violence."²⁰⁹ Indeed, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented amount of violence and carnage on a scale the world had never before experienced nor has witnessed since. Hence, the effects of state militarism, international instability, and the consequences of the world wars increased the value states saw in alliances for enhancing the members' security and advancing their interests.

The NATO Alliance was formed from because of this international volatility, dynamism, and insecurity. The outcome of the rise of nationalism and the First World War sowed the seeds of state perceptions. Specifically, Turkey's dialectical perception of the West, which consisted partly of suspicion and partly of admiration.²¹⁰ Still, it was the events during and subsequently after the Second World War that became the impetus for the Alliance's formation and the primary driver for Turkey's accession to NATO. As Walt

²⁰⁹ Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London; New York: Leicester University Press, 1978), 48.

²¹⁰ Graham E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 15.

and Weitsman hold, states will likely form alliances when faced with a threat.²¹¹ That shared threat was the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. The chapter seeks to deepen the understanding of shared threat perceptions, the roles and benefits the original signatories saw in Turkey's accession to NATO, and conversely, the roles and benefits Turkey considered in deciding to join the Alliance. By examining these topics, the chapter seeks to provide a clearer comprehension of Turkey's recent alliance behavior.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the implications of the Ottoman Empire's defeat after the First World War and the subsequent construction of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As Walt holds, perceived intentions are a critical component in informing what a state sees as a threat.²¹² Many scholars contend that Turkish perceptions of the West were deeply influenced by the events following the end of the First World War.²¹³ Next, the chapter examines the origins of the NATO Alliance. It is crucial to examine the Alliance's purposes, goals, and desired end state to understand how they affected NATO's external and internal threat levels and its alliance cohesion. Then, the chapter analyzes the reasoning for Turkey's accession to the Alliance. Identifying the benefits that Turkey and the original signatories conceived may explain Turkey's recent alliance behavior. Finally, a synthesis of the findings is discussed and contextualized through Walt's theoretical variables of alliance behavior and theory.

A. THE END OF AN EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

The history between Europe and the Ottoman Empire is highly complex. The relationship spans roughly six centuries. During this period, Europeans and the Ottomans learned to coexistence, experienced several wars and uprisings, but also exchanged many cultural and ideological concepts. The immense history between Europe and the Ottoman

²¹¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 18–19, 22–23.

²¹² Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 25.

²¹³ Under Pressure: The Trajectory of U.S.-Turkish Relations, Panel Discussion, vol. 1691 (Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 2019), 38:03, <http://www.hudson.org/events/1691-under-pressure-the-trajectory-of-u-s-turkish-relations52019>.

Empire is not possible to encapsulate within this thesis and therefore, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, providing a historical context is necessary in the understanding of Turkey's current collective perceptions and the country's recent alliance behavior. Thus, this chapter begins by examining the historically relevant events that have influenced recent Turkish alliance behavior and its trend away from the country's traditional Western allies.

During the period between 1912 to 1922, the Ottoman Empire experienced an extremely violent and volatile time of tremendous insecurity that fundamentally transformed the Ottoman legacy and created the collective Turkish narrative, psyche, perspective, and mythos surrounding Atatürk as the great hero and nation builder.²¹⁴ Indeed, Uur Ümit Üngör describes this period as “the ‘dark side’ of the Turkish process of nation-building, of which violence was a defining feature.”²¹⁵ These violent events include: the Balkan War (1912) and the subsequent forced expulsion of European Muslims, the Ottoman defeat during the First World War (1914–1918), the genocide of Armenians and Syrians (1915), the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), the Kocgiri and Pontus massacres in 1921, and the violent treatment of the Kurdish people throughout the 1920s and 1930s culminating in the Dersim massacre of 1938.²¹⁶ Undeniably, the ideas of national sovereignty and militarism which dominated this period of history is seminal to the making of Turkish politics, its foreign policy, and the Turkish collective perception of the West.

1. Consequences of Defeat: the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkish War of Independence

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany and the Central Powers to wage war against the Entente Powers.²¹⁷ The Central Powers were

²¹⁴ Üngör.

²¹⁵ Üngör, 17.

²¹⁶ Üngör, 17.

²¹⁷ Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Baxter, *Middle East Politics, and International Relations* (New York & London: Routledge, 2018), 7.

ultimately defeated and signed an armistice that ended the war on November 11, 1918.²¹⁸ The Ottoman regime's costly defeat prompted the eventual demise of the 600 year old empire. Due to the strategic location, historical affinity, and resource-rich territories of the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Russia were conducting confidential negotiations for the division of the empire as early as 1915. The British-French accords were later known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.²¹⁹ At the Conference of San Remo in April 1920, the Allied Powers convened to determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire.²²⁰ This conference produced the language codified in the Treaty of Sèvres (see Figure 2). The Treaty was agreed upon by representatives from the Ottoman government and the victorious allies on August 10, 1920.²²¹

²¹⁸ Raymond J. Sontag, *A Broken World, 1919–1939, The Rise of Modern Europe*, TB 1651 (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1972), 1.

²¹⁹ Akbarzadeh and Baxter, *Middle East Politics, and International Relations*, 10.

²²⁰ Akbarzadeh and Baxter, 10.

²²¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 32.




Figure 2. Treaty of Sèvres: Borders, Foreign Occupiers, and Proposed Mandates.²²²

The Treaty of Sèvres was a humiliation for the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish nationalists. The significance of the treaty cannot be overstated. According to the terms of the treaty, the Ottomans renounced all rights and ownership of the Middle East, North Africa, Thrace, the Aegean islands, and large tracts of western and southern Anatolia.²²³ In addition, the treaty called for an independent Armenian state and an autonomous region of Kurdistan (see Figure 2).²²⁴ Moreover, the Ottomans were stripped of control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The treaty placed them under international control. The Treaty of Sèvres severely damaged the prestige and status of the Ottomans. Ultimately, it signaled the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Republic of Turkey.

²²² Adapted from Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*, Paperback Edition (New York: Random House, Inc, 2003), xxii.

²²³ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th Edition (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2017), 147.

²²⁴ Zürcher, 147.

Although the Treaty of Sèvres was never legally ratified, the humiliation it created for the Turks had immediate and enduring consequences that still resonate within the Turkish psyche. Indeed, Hasan Kosebalaban opines that “The Ottoman decline in the First World War and the Treaty of Sèvres created irreparable damage to in [*sic*] the Turkish nationalist psyche continuing its effects to this day.”²²⁵ Not only did the treaty contribute to Turkish feelings of insecurity, it deepened the collective mistrust of the West at large. In the near term, the treaty was denounced by the Turkish nationalist movement as an unacceptable agreement. Although Turkish nationalism was already present, the treaty became a powerful catalyst to the movement. Led by Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalist movement was founded on militarism. Turkish nationalists waged a war of independence (1919–1922) to remove both the foreign occupiers and the ailing Ottoman government.²²⁶

Eventually, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal forced the war-weary Western Allies to renegotiate the terms of the original Treaty of Sèvres at Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1922. The outcome was the creation of a new agreement called the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed on July 24, 1923.²²⁷ The new treaty was an enormous victory for Mustafa Kemal and the participants of the war of independence. First, it returned much of the territory that now makes up modern-day Turkey. Second, the treaty called for the removal of the foreign occupiers. Lastly, the treaty no longer contained language requiring the establishment of an independent Armenian state nor a Kurdish autonomous region.²²⁸

In the long term, the Treaty of Sèvres created an enduring legacy of mistrust and suspicion toward the West. The treaty became a political trope, commonly referred to as the *Sèvres Syndrome*, a narrative that created a near constant skepticism about the West’s true intentions that range from dividing and annexing Turkey’s territorial integrity to secretly supporting an autonomous Kurdish regional government. Indeed, Graham E.

²²⁵ Hasan Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 187.

²²⁶ Zürcher, 144–60.

²²⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 38.

²²⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 163.

Fuller holds that the Sèvres Syndrome “today is still an emotive call for remembrance and a reminder to never again permit foreigners to act in ways that might dismember or cripple Turkey.”²²⁹ Characterized as a strategic paranoia, the trope applies to the Kurdish question that Ankara currently struggles to peacefully solve.²³⁰ Consequently, the Sèvres Syndrome continues to play an important narrative in shaping Turkish suspicions of Kurdish connections to the PKK, as well as informs Turkey’s perceptions of the West as dishonest imperialists.²³¹ These events remain significant. For the Turks, the Ottoman Empire’s defeat during the First World War at the hands of a more capable Western military force and the consequences of that defeat—the Treaty of Sèvres—created a complex dual perception of the West that still exists in Turkish politics and society.²³²

On one hand, Turkey views the West with suspicion, resentment, and skepticism. Indeed, Graham E. Fuller writes that the West is “recognized as a long-standing, source of imperialist aggression that was a key force in the dismantling and destruction of the Ottoman Empire.”²³³ The Sèvres Syndrome persists as a powerful political trope that influences Turkey’s collective perceptions characterized by deep distrust of the West.²³⁴ While, the redrawing of Turkey’s southern border with Syria by the Western victors remains a collective source of Turkish irredentism in Turkish politics. On the other hand, Turkey views the West with admiration because of its power and success. Fuller notes, “The West is admired as a powerful, advanced, and accomplished civilization..”²³⁵ Thus, after establishing the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his successors implemented national reforms aimed at transforming the country along Western lines.²³⁶ Turkey’s dual view of the West has remained an important factor in shaping

²²⁹ Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, 28.

²³⁰ Fuller, 28.

²³¹ Under Pressure: The Trajectory of U.S.-Turkish Relations, 1691:38:03.

²³² Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, 15.

²³³ Fuller, 15.

²³⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance* (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 99.

²³⁵ Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, 15.

²³⁶ Fuller, 15.

Turkish foreign policy. The importance that Walt and Weitsman place on the perceptual concept of who is a friend and an enemy in determining a state's alliance behavior cannot be overstated. State perceptions help to inform its leadership as to who is a friend and an enemy. The Treaty of Sèvres and Atatürk's making of the new Turkish Republic are significant events that arguably continue to shape Turkey's alliance behavior and perceptions of the West.

2. The Making of the Modern Turkish State: Kemalism and Social Engineering

The making of the modern Turkish state was led by Turkey's founding father and first elected president, Mustafa Kemal—later known as Atatürk.²³⁷ The goal of his nation-state making was to create a homogeneous, secular, and Westernized modern state. However, due to Turkey's multiethnic diversity and Ottoman past, achieving these goals proved to be extremely challenging. As Lord Acton wrote, "The greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence."²³⁸ In essence, from the beginning, Atatürk's vision of a homogenous and secular state was either doomed to fail or would involve implementing procedures that contradicted Western values. Atatürk chose to establish an authoritarian hegemony over the state to impose his reforms on Turkish society via a top-down process of social engineering.²³⁹ Ultimately, Atatürk and his Kemalist legacy made great progress in transforming Turkey from a conservative, religious society to one which arguably resembled a semi-Western democratic state.

²³⁷ The Turkish "assembly voted to bestow on Mustafa Kemal Pasha the family name Atatürk (Father-Türk)," according to Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 189.

²³⁸ John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), 297.

²³⁹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 187.

On October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established with Atatürk becoming the new Turkish Republic's first duly elected president.²⁴⁰ Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk implemented policies intended to remove the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim past from Turkish society. His aim was to replace this backward legacy with a secular, unified, and modern nation-state modeled after the West. Atatürk's Kemalist ideology was founded on six key principles: populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism.²⁴¹ Adopting many of Mussolini's techniques at the time, Atatürk set about manufacturing a nationalist society. According to Zürcher, "An extreme form of nationalism, with the attendant creation of historical myths, was used as the prime instrument in the building of a new national identity, and as such was intended to take the place of religion in many aspects."²⁴²

Kemalist reforms focused primarily on three key areas—the state, the Islamic religion and its symbols, and the Turkish society.²⁴³ Some of Atatürk's key secular reforms included abolishing the caliphate (1924) and the dervish orders (1925), outlawing the fez—a symbol of religious traditionalism (1925), implementing a civil and criminal code modeled after the Swiss (1926), adopting the Western clock and Gregorian calendar (1926), renouncing Islam as the state's official religion (1928), replacing the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet and the Arabic numerals with the Western numerals (1928), and implementing a secular system of public education.²⁴⁴ Samuel P. Huntington argued that Atatürk's decision to adopt the Latin alphabet was particularly important because "It made it virtually impossible for the new generations educated in the Roman script to acquire access to the vast bulk of traditional literature; it encouraged the learning of European languages; and it greatly eased the problem of increasing literacy."²⁴⁵

²⁴⁰ William Hale, *Turkish Politics, and the Military* (New York & London: Routledge, 2001), 64.

²⁴¹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 183, 187.

²⁴² Zürcher, 187.

²⁴³ Zürcher, 188.

²⁴⁴ Zürcher, 187–94; Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order*, 144.

²⁴⁵ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of World Order*, 144.

Undoubtedly, Atatürk's series of calculated reforms throughout the early years of the new Turkish Republic were effective in the pursuit of achieving his vision of a secular, nationalistic, and Western-oriented Turkish state. Most of the modernizing reforms occurred within urban areas; however, they had less impact in rural Turkey. Although many Turks accepted the reforms with indifference, resistance to secularism remained.²⁴⁶

Atatürk's vision of a homogeneous, secular, Westernized, modern state never fully came to fruition. Hintz contends that Atatürk and his identity proposal legacy—Republican Nationalism—arguably came the closest of Turkey's four identity proposals to achieving a unified Turkish national identity.²⁴⁷ Yet, Atatürk's image of Turkey has been increasingly weakened by the identity contestation within Turkey, especially after the AKP came to power in 2002.

3. Turkish Foreign Policy (1923–1945)

From the Turkish Republic's founding until the end of World War II, Turkish foreign policy was primarily based on maintaining neutrality. Throughout this period, Atatürk's 'peace at home, peace in the world' remained the guiding principle of Ankara's foreign policy.²⁴⁸ Atatürk and his Kemalist successor, İsmet İnönü, were primarily concerned with implementing domestic reforms that were aimed at modernizing the country and reinforcing the authority of the state.²⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Turkey had concerns in the surrounding region, particularly in territories that the Ottoman Empire once ruled. These foreign policy concerns included Mosul, the Balkans, the Sadabad Pact, and Hatay.

a. Mosul

From 1923 to 1926, Turkey's primary foreign policy agenda centered on the dispute over Mosul and its surrounding area.²⁵⁰ Britain, the dominant foreign power in the Middle

²⁴⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 194–96.

²⁴⁷ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 11.

²⁴⁸ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 20.

²⁴⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 42.

²⁵⁰ Hale, 42.

East, claimed tutelage of Mosul and other areas within the Middle East. British interests were mostly focused on the economic aspects of gaining access and revenue from the oil in the region. However, Turkey felt that it had a legitimate claim to Mosul and was concerned that its inability to acquire it would be perceived as a failure to uphold the objectives of the National Pact.²⁵¹ After negotiations between the two parties failed in 1924, the issue was taken to the League of Nations, which determined that Mosul would become part of the new province of Iraq. The decision pleased the British but angered the Turks. Yet, neither party was prepared to go to war over the decision. Ultimately, in June 1926, a bilateral treaty was signed providing Turkey with 10% of the oil revenue from the Mosul province for the next 25 years.²⁵² However, to this day, Turkey has exhibited an irredentist interest in reclaiming the northern Iraqi region.

b. The Balkan Pact

In the 1930s, the Balkans became the other foreign policy concern for Turkey during the period from 1923 to 1945. Like the province surrounding Mosul, the Balkans had been an Ottoman territory that still contained elements of Turkic speaking diasporas. Yet, unlike Mosul, the situation and actors involved in the Balkans made things much more complicated to diplomatically navigate. War in Europe was becoming increasingly imminent. Turkey's main concern was with Italy, which was perceived as a potential adversary to one of Turkey's traditional zones of danger—the Balkans.²⁵³ Turkey's key objectives were its security, to be left out of the looming war, to prevent instability within the Balkan region, and to prevent the Europeans from seizing it.²⁵⁴ Hence, Turkey actively sought diplomatic means of achieving its objectives. In 1932, Turkey renewed its Treaty of Neutrality, Mediation and Judicial Settlement with Mussolini's regime.²⁵⁵ Then, in 1933, Turkey sought a rapprochement with Greece intended to create an anti-Italian

²⁵¹ Hale, 42.

²⁵² Hale, 43.

²⁵³ Hale, 44.

²⁵⁴ Hale, 44.

²⁵⁵ Hale, 45.

alliance. The move was successful in creating an Entente Cordiale—a bilateral pact for the defense of Thrace.²⁵⁶ Lastly, Turkey signed formal non-aggression pacts with both Yugoslavia and Romania. The separate agreements between the various states eventually evolved into the Balkan Pact (Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) in 1934, which guaranteed that if one of the states was attacked the others would come to its defense.²⁵⁷ Despite Turkey's diplomatic activism in Europe, Ankara perceived itself as vulnerable to Italian aggression.

c. The Sadabad Pact

Like the Balkan Pact, the impetus for Turkey's decision to become a signatory to the Sadabad Pact of 1937 was its fear of Italian activity and perceived aggression in the Horn of Africa, combined with Italy's apparent interests in the eastern Mediterranean.²⁵⁸ The Middle East regional security pact included Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.²⁵⁹ Yet, the pact was unique in that it did not call for guarantees of military aid and support to one another against an outside aggressor. Instead, the primary purpose of the accord was to ensure the territorial integrity of signatories against one another.²⁶⁰ Indeed, as Hale writes the main objectives of the Sadabad Pact was for the signatories to "preserve their common frontiers, not to interfere in one another's territory and to consult together on all matters of common interest...The Sadabad agreement was primarily a means of preventing frontier disputes between the four states" and confirmed that the parties would not aid the Kurdish rebels to undermine one another.²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Hale, 45.

²⁵⁷ Hale, 45.

²⁵⁸ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 34.

²⁵⁹ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 34.

²⁶⁰ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 34.

²⁶¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 46.

d. The Annexation of Hatay

Perhaps the riskiest Turkish foreign policy confrontation that occurred during the inner-war period was the dispute over the territory of Hatay²⁶² with France. As part of the former Ottoman Empire's defeat in the First World War, France and the Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Ankara in 1921, which gave Hatay special status under the French mandate.²⁶³ Hatay was at the time located within Syrian territory. However, Ankara considered the inhabitants of Hatay as part of the Turkic people and had ambitions to have the territory annexed to Turkey.²⁶⁴ After failing to fully settle the matter diplomatically under the auspice of the Council of the League of Nations in 1937, along with the growing tensions between Turkey and Syria over the territory, Turkey deployed approximately 30,000 troops to the border of Hatay in 1938.²⁶⁵ The events taking place in Europe regarding Germany revanchism during this time obliged France to acquiesce to Turkey's demands for the annexation of Hatay in 1939.²⁶⁶ According to Zürcher, the annexation of Hatay to this day is a source of "great anger" with Syrians, who still "depict the area as Syrian on their maps."²⁶⁷ Although, Turkey was successful in gaining the territory of Hatay, the redrawing of the Turkish-Syrian border after the First World War remains a source of irredentism in southern Turkey, exhibiting its desire to reclaim the territories north of Aleppo.

Overall, Turkey was successful in maintaining Atatürk's guiding principle of 'peace at home, peace in the world' with regards to its foreign policy, maintaining a neutral position—even as the Second World War was waged. Still, Turkey made formal agreements with various states to ensure its security and to protect its interests during the period from 1923 to 1945. The focus for Turkey was on its domestic reforms, which were shaped by Atatürk and his six principles of Kemalism. Yet, as will be discussed, Turkey's

²⁶² Also known as the sancaks (town) of Alexandrette and Antioch

²⁶³ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 30.

²⁶⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 204.

²⁶⁵ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 31.

²⁶⁶ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 31.

²⁶⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 205.

foreign policy after the Second World War increasingly emphasized inclusion and cooperation with the West. To understand why Turkish foreign policy progressively shifted westward, it is necessary to examine the origins of the NATO Alliance.

B. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE

“It..[is] the common practice of mankind, ...[to] accept an empire [of alliances]..., and refused to give it up [without going to war] under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest.”

—Thucydides²⁶⁸

Alliances are a tool of statecraft and a crucial component of international relations. Indeed, Weitsman contends that “Military alliances shape worlds.”²⁶⁹ Examining alliances deepens the understanding of conflict and cooperation between states and ultimately reveals the causes of changes in the international system. Therefore, it is vital to identify and examine the origins of an alliance because this will clarify the forces compelling the alliance’s formation and its goals. Analysis may increase the likelihood of determining the reasons an alliance may dissolve or continue to exist, as well as explain a member’s alliance behavior. Walt writes, “The forces that bring states together and drive them apart will affect the security of individual states by determining both how large a threat they face and how much help they can expect.”²⁷⁰ Additionally, Weitsman holds that alliance “Cohesion will flow from the *raison d’être* of the alliance.”²⁷¹ Hence, to increase the understanding of Turkey’s current alliance behavior concerning its fellow NATO allies and with Russia, it is imperative to analyze the origins of the Alliance, its *raison d’être*, and the reasoning behind Turkey’s accession into NATO.

The creation of the NATO Alliance was by no means an inevitable outcome. The creation of the Alliance was highly contested by various parts of society within some of

²⁶⁸ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York & London: Free Press, 1998), 43.

²⁶⁹ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 1.

²⁷⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 1.

²⁷¹ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 5.

the original state signatories.²⁷² Jamie Shea, formerly NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, stated during a lecture in 2008 that "NATO...was controversial at the time [1949]. There was even a riot in Iceland in 1949 when that rather sober country agreed to adhere to the Washington Treaty...one of the reasons why the negotiations took so long was precisely because there were always on both sides of the Atlantic hesitations and doubts."²⁷³ Yet, the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta stated, as reported by Thucydides, the formation of military alliances is a derivative of fear, interest, and honor.²⁷⁴ Arguably all three factors influenced the decision to create the NATO Alliance. However, above all, it was fear of Soviet expansionism into Western Europe following the end of World War II that compelled the twelve original signatories (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to overcome their differences and consequently sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949.²⁷⁵ The formation of the NATO Alliance was revolutionary in that it was the first time in history an alliance forged in peacetime committed an organized military force under a unified command structure.²⁷⁶

1. Soviet Expansionism

Although the fear of Soviet expansionism was the main reason for the creation of the NATO Alliance, the origins of the Alliance were discernable before the Second World War began. Martin Malia, an expert on Russian history, contended that Josef Stalin's decision to sign the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was primarily based on his irredentist aims to recapture the territories of the

²⁷² Jamie Shea, *1949: NATO'S Anxious Birth* 1. (NATO Archives, 2008), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139301.htm.

²⁷³ Shea.

²⁷⁴ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, 43.

²⁷⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 281.

²⁷⁶ Wight, *Power Politics*, 222–23.

old Russian empire of Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Bessarabia.²⁷⁷ The second article of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reinforces Malia's Soviet irredentist claims, stating that neither signatory would intervene on behalf of a third party if either Germany or the Soviet Union made a warlike action on a third party.²⁷⁸ Subsequently, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact facilitated Stalin's move to make the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania his frontier provinces—invading them in the summer of 1940.²⁷⁹ Despite eventually joining the Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany in June 1941, after Hitler invaded the USSR, Stalin had already begun his Soviet expansionist campaign, which sparked concerns in Western European states. Thus, increasing the internal threat level of the wartime Grand Alliance. Yet, because the Grand Alliance members equally viewed the Axis Powers as an existential threat, the external threat level maintained a higher position over the alliance's internal threat level.²⁸⁰ Consequently, the Grand Alliance's cohesion was strong enough to overcome the internal tensions and mistrust.

Stalin's intentions for the expansion of the Soviet Union into Europe became increasingly apparent to the Western leaders during the Tehran Conference (November 28—December 1, 1943).²⁸¹ Declassified information released by the United States Department of State, Office of the Historian reveals that at the conference, "Stalin pressed for a revision of Poland's eastern border with the Soviet Union to match the line set by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1920. In order to compensate Poland for the resulting loss of territory, the three leaders agreed to move the German-Polish border to the Oder and Neisse rivers."²⁸² In return, Stalin, whose Red Army had already annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, agreed to allow these countries to hold democratic elections

²⁷⁷ Martin E. Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 296.

²⁷⁸ Wight, *Power Politics*, 215.

²⁷⁹ Wight, 215.

²⁸⁰ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 6.

²⁸¹ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991*, 296.

²⁸² Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, "The Tehran Conference, 1943" (United States Office of the Secretary of State), accessed February 13, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/tehran-conf>.

once the war was over—although he insisted that the future elections abide by the Soviet Constitution.²⁸³ Consequently, as Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, Eastern Europe was “conceded de facto to Josef Stalin by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill” at the conference in Tehran.²⁸⁴

The next meeting which the three Allied leaders (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) attended was the Yalta Conference, which took place at a Russian resort town in Crimea from February 4–11, 1945.²⁸⁵ With an Allied victory seemingly inevitable in the European theater, the three leaders made decisions regarding postwar Europe, among other topics. At this point in the war, the Soviet Red Army occupied territories in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Romania (in addition to the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).²⁸⁶ As Malia wrote, “For the West, the Yalta Conference became the symbol of the West’s naïve surrender of Eastern Europe to Stalin.”²⁸⁷ Indeed, Stalin’s irredentist designs through Soviet expansionism were visible well before the beginning of the Cold War. In short, Roosevelt and Churchill had been politically and militarily outmaneuvered by Stalin in Europe. Former U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, then a delegation member at the Yalta Conference, later reflected, “It was not a question of what we would *let* the Russians do, but what we could *get* the Russians to do.”²⁸⁸ In other words, Stalin had presented the move as a *fait accompli* to the Western leaders.

The slowly growing dealignment between Russia and the rest of the Grand Alliance or United Nations (as the alliance against the Axis Powers was called from January 1942 on) is not uncommon throughout the history of military alliances. Indeed, as the force that compelled the allied states to align is perceived to no longer be a threat, individual state interests take precedence once more. In other words, the *raison d’être* for the creation of

²⁸³ Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute.

²⁸⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984/85, 1, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1984-12-01/divided-europe-future-ymalta>.

²⁸⁵ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991*, 297.

²⁸⁶ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 13.

²⁸⁷ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991*, 297.

²⁸⁸ “Yalta Conference | Summary, Dates, Consequences, & Facts,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed February 15, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Yalta-Conference>.

the alliance no longer applies. According to Erik P. Hoffmann, each of the three Grand Alliance states' priorities greatly differed as the Second World War neared its end:

In probable order of importance, the United States was concerned with (1) removal of procedural obstacles to the creation of the United Nations; (2) war strategy in the Far East and Allied assistance in subduing Japan; and (3) the political and territorial status of postwar Europe, especially Germany and Poland. Great Britain was concerned with (1) its colonial empire; (2) the political ramifications of the fighting in Europe, especially the final location of Allied troops and the future of Germany, France, Poland, and the Balkans; (3) the Far East military situation; and (4) the United Nations. The USSR was concerned with (1) ensuring national security against Germany, other European powers, and the United States; (2) strengthening Stalin's control over the Soviet polity and the international Communist movement, which now included potentially powerful parties in Eastern Europe; (3) reconstructing the devastated Soviet economy, preferably with reparations from a united but permanently weakened Germany; (4) preserving the territories gained under the Nazi-Soviet pact; and (5) reacquiring territories lost to Japan in 1905 and acquiring new territories in Norway, Germany (East Prussia), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Iran, and Japan.²⁸⁹

Consequently, as the end of the Second World War drew near, each of the victorious belligerents began to increasingly pursue its individual national interests.

Yet, the significant reduction in the Grand Alliance's shared view of the external threat only explains part of the reason why it began to fray and ultimately dissolve. The second factor to consider is the internal threat level. There was much distrust between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, including centuries of war between varying Western European states and Tsarist Russia,²⁹⁰ their differing political ideologies, and suspicions by Stalin that the Western Allies would secretly make peace with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.²⁹¹ Regardless of this deep-seeded mistrust, the Grand Alliance's cohesion remained because the external threat level was much more significant than the internal threat level. However, once the threat of Nazi Germany was extinguished, the

²⁸⁹ Erik P. Hoffmann, "Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev," *The Academy of Political Science, Soviet Foreign Policy* 36, no. 4 (1987): 17.

²⁹⁰ Wight, *Power Politics*, 161–64.

²⁹¹ Donald M. Rothberg, "World War II Cables Reflect Stalin's Distrust of Allies," *AP News*, October 12, 1995, <https://apnews.com/f776500ab6ff258f3086293bbabd7b85>.

Grand Alliance's external threat level diminished and was usurped by its internal threat level.²⁹² Consequently, this change in threat levels undermined the alliance's cohesion and led to its dissolution.

2. The Perception of the Soviet Union as an Existential Threat to the West

The West's fear of the Soviet Union was caused by the combination of its expansionist policy, the perception of a formidable Red Army and its provocative behavior, and the increasing momentum of communist popular front movements during and after the Second World War in Europe.²⁹³ Indeed, by 1945, the Soviet Union "had annexed nearly 180,000 square miles of territory with a population of more than 23 million people."²⁹⁴ Walt and Weitsman hold that perceptions are critical to informing how states determine what they deem as a threat.²⁹⁵ Though scholars may disagree over the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives following the end of the Second World War, what ultimately matters concerning the formation of NATO is that the Soviet Union's behavior was perceived to be threatening to Western security, principles, and values.²⁹⁶

Overall, each of Walt's four variables of a threat (power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intention) contributed to the West's view of the Soviets as a threat. Following the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two great superpowers. Soviet expansionism into Europe decreased the geographic proximity between the Soviets and Western Europe, as they now shared a border. The Soviet Union maintained a large military presence in Eastern Europe well after the Second World War ended. Meanwhile, the Soviets were near to acquiring a nuclear

²⁹² Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 5–6.

²⁹³ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 11–15.

²⁹⁴ Rick Brix, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Transition," *Educational Non-Profit Organization* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, January 1994), 1, <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/BB-60-The-North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization-NATO-In-Transition.pdf>.

²⁹⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vii, x, 25, 179; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 32–33.

²⁹⁶ Hoffmann, "Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev," 18.

weapons capability. The combination of these four variables caused many in Western Europe to perceive the Soviet Union as an existential threat to liberal democracy, peace, and national security. Hence, these states displayed a balancing behavior, by seeking security arrangements with Canada and the United States and allying together against the prevailing threat—the Soviet Union.²⁹⁷ Yet, before the Alliance came into existence, the United States first tried to contain Soviet expansionism by implementing the Truman Doctrine.

3. The United States: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

The Truman Doctrine and the Economic Cooperation Act, better known as the Marshall Plan, were both parts of a comprehensive American grand strategy to provide security and economic means for Europe to recover from the ravages of the Second World War and deter Soviet expansionism. The grand strategy is still regarded as being successful because it strengthened the trans-Atlantic link between the United States and Europe, facilitated greater integration among the European states, and prevented further Soviet incursions into Western Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were arguably the seeds that eventually grew to become the NATO Alliance and the European Union. This grand strategy also benefited the United States by strengthening its national security and foreign policy aims by containing the Soviet Union and preventing its communist ideology from spreading across the whole of Europe.²⁹⁸

The United States had learned that it could no longer conduct an isolationist foreign policy as it did after the First World War. Having just suffered the carnage of the Second World War, the United States and its Western European partners had no desire to see the countries they had just fought to liberate become subjugated to another form of totalitarianism. Still, the catalyst for expediting the approval of both U.S. programs through Congress resulted from the urgent requests for assistance in preventing further Soviet

²⁹⁷ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 17.

²⁹⁸ Tim Kaine, “A 21st Century Truman Doctrine,” *Brookings* (blog), July 28, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/28/a-21st-century-truman-doctrine/>.

expansion into Western Europe by the free European nations.²⁹⁹ Lawrence S. Kaplan writes, “Despite the frequent charges that NATO was a product of America’s imperial reach after World War II, it was Europe’s initiative—not that of the United States—which opened the way to NATO.”³⁰⁰ Thus, in response to Europe’s concerns, President Truman declared in a speech to Congress that “It must be the policy of the United States of America to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressure” on March 12, 1947.³⁰¹

In support of the Truman Doctrine, the United States Congress authorized comprehensive security and economic aid that appropriated \$400 million and the authorization of both American military and civilian missions aimed at deterring Soviet and communist influences that were specifically directed towards Greece and Turkey.³⁰² NATO archives reveal that the Truman Doctrine was specifically designed to aid these two countries because they faced the gravest threats of succumbing to communist ideology within Greece and of caving in to Soviet intimidation tactics in the case of Turkey.³⁰³ According to William Hale, Greece’s situation was deemed to be more precarious than that of Turkey because Greece was struggling with internal political and economic challenges which gave rise to support in some quarters for communist ideology.³⁰⁴ Thus, the majority of U.S. aid was directed at stabilizing the internal turmoil in Greece.

Unlike Greece, Turkey was facing external pressure from the Soviet Union and Stalin’s Red Army. The Montreux Convention of 1936 granted Turkey legitimate control of the Turkish Straits.³⁰⁵ Understanding Turkey’s strategic value, Stalin demanded a

²⁹⁹ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 16.

³⁰⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Origins of NATO: 1948–1949,” *Emory University School of Law* 34, no. Special Issue (2019), <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-34/issue-special/articles/origins-nato-1948-1949.html>.

³⁰¹ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 17.

³⁰² NATO Information Service, 17.

³⁰³ NATO Information Service, 17.

³⁰⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 83.

³⁰⁵ Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, 1st edition (London; Portland: Routledge, 2003), 67.

revision of the Montreux Convention in 1945–46.³⁰⁶ The early success of the Soviet expansionist policy combined with Stalin’s desire for control of the Straits resulted in the Red Army surrounding Turkey’s east and west flanks. This form of coercion increased the pressure on Turkey, but Ankara continued to resist intimidation. Stalin’s likely aim, according to Hale, was “to isolate Turkey diplomatically and then force the rulers to accept a treaty that would give the USSR control of the straits and then of the government as a whole.”³⁰⁷

Shortly after President Truman’s famous speech, Secretary of State George Marshall gave a speech on June 5, 1947, at Harvard University, in which he proposed that the United States provide economic assistance to Europe to aid in its reconstruction and economic recovery.³⁰⁸ The speech resulted in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which was approved by Congress and subsequently signed by President Truman on April 3, 1948.³⁰⁹ The Act included the appropriation of approximately \$15 billion over the next four years to sixteen states for the reconstruction of their infrastructure, cities, and industrial capacity.³¹⁰ Though the Marshall Plan was primarily directed toward the economic recovery of Europe, Turkey was a recipient of the aid as well. In 1948 to 1950, the United States provided Turkey with \$183 million for economic development and \$200 million in military aid.³¹¹ The Marshall Plan not only served to foster greater cooperation among the recipients of this financial aid, but it also strengthened the trans-Atlantic relationship between the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey.

Although the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan successfully deterred Soviet expansionism in the West and reinvigorated the Western European economy, some scholars believe that the implementation of the Truman Doctrine was the catalyst for the

³⁰⁶ Moustakis, 67.

³⁰⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 81.

³⁰⁸ “Our Documents - Marshall Plan (1948),” *Government Archives*, www.ourdocuments.gov, accessed February 15, 2020, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=82>.

³⁰⁹ “Our Documents - Marshall Plan (1948).”

³¹⁰ “Marshall Plan - HISTORY,” Historical Analysis, *History*, August 21, 2018, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1>.

³¹¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 83.

beginning of the Cold War,³¹² rather than a prudent response to Soviet threats. Moreover, the strategy did not stop the Soviets from exhibiting provocative, aggressive behavior in Europe. In February 1948, the Soviets covertly supported a communist putsch in Czechoslovakia that removed the democratically elected government.³¹³ Then, in response to the West's efforts to consolidate Western Germany, the Soviet Union implemented a ground blockade to prevent communications between West Berlin and the West from June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949.³¹⁴ This spurred Britain, France, and the United States to respond by supplying the people of Berlin by air. Indeed, the Soviet Union's behavior continued to be of concern to the West. Thus, European calls for a collective defense and security pact increased.³¹⁵

Nonetheless, the Truman Doctrine's grand strategy successfully achieved its objectives of providing security reassurances, facilitating economic reconstruction, and blocking further Soviet expansionism into Western Europe and Turkey. For Turkey, the military and economic aid not only helped Ankara to ward off the Soviet Union's intimidation tactics, but also laid the foundation for a strong strategic partnership with the United States. Discussing the profound effect that the Truman Doctrine had on Turkey, the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, said, "The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated."³¹⁶ However, both programs were designed to be short term solutions. The looming shadow cast by the Soviet Union's expansion into Europe required a more permanent and robust solution for the deterrence of further Soviet expansion and the protection of the West from communism.³¹⁷ The West's solution to this issue became the creation of the NATO Alliance.

³¹² "Marshall Plan - HISTORY."

³¹³ Kaplan, "Origins of NATO," 5–7.

³¹⁴ Kaplan, 5–7.

³¹⁵ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 11.

³¹⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 83.

³¹⁷ Kaplan, "Origins of NATO," 3.

4. North Atlantic Treaty: Purpose and Principles

[NATO] “*was created to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down*”

—Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO³¹⁸

As previously mentioned, the main impetus for the creation of the NATO Alliance was the fear that the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism created within the West. However, honor and interest were also influential factors in its formation. As Lord Ismay’s famous statement implies, the Alliance was not founded purely to provide security against the Soviet Union. NATO was also formed to ensure that the United States maintained a presence in Europe to convey security reassurances to its European Allies, to foster positive trans-Atlantic relations and integration, and to prevent the re-emergence of European militarism.³¹⁹

The creation of NATO was a monumental achievement in the history of the world. The North Atlantic Treaty (see APPENDIX B) was purposefully written in “conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”³²⁰ Additionally, its framework signified the commitment of the allies to a set of shared liberal values, principles, and beliefs. Thus, the Alliance was more than purely a defensive security pact, as it incorporated political, economic, and social dimensions as well.³²¹ The North Atlantic Treaty emphasized the importance of economic and social progress, while reaffirming the signatories’ inherent right to collective self-defense. The Preamble of the Treaty states, “The Parties...are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty

³¹⁸ NATO, “Lord Ismay, 1952 - 1957,” *NATO*, accessed February 15, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.

³¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Declassified Archives), 1, accessed February 13, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm.

³²⁰ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 21.

³²¹ NATO Information Service, 21.

and the rule of law...[and] resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.”³²² The Treaty aimed not only to ensure the members’ security through collective self-defense but also to secure and promulgate Western ideals of liberalism. Although the Alliance has been successful in providing security, the liberal ideals within some of the member allies have not been enforced or fully achieved.³²³ Undoubtedly, the allies are committed to upholding the principles and values in the Preamble, but the history of NATO reveals that the priority of security, especially during certain times during the Cold War, has trumped the Treaty’s stated values.

C. TURKEY’S ACCESSION

Like the impetus for NATO’s formation in 1949, the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism caused fear within Turkey, which compelled it to seek accession to the Alliance. Hale writes, “there was a real fear on the Turkish side that the USSR wanted not only to gain control of the straits but also to convert Turkey into a satellite.”³²⁴ Although security concerns were Turkey’s top priority after the Second World War, the country was also seeking to bolster its economic development and modernization.³²⁵ Thus, Turkey saw membership in NATO as a means to guarantee the flow of Western aid that would enable the country to address both its security and economic concerns.³²⁶ Meanwhile, the Alliance considered Turkey’s accession to the Alliance as a way to bolster its security by safeguarding the Turkish Straits from Soviet control, thereby protecting Europe’s southern flank, as well as acting as a buffer state³²⁷ against Soviet expansion into the Near and

³²² NATO Information Service, 300.

³²³ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 365.

³²⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 80.

³²⁵ Hale, 5.

³²⁶ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 237.

³²⁷ “A buffer state is a weak power between two or more stronger ones, maintained or even created with the purpose of reducing conflict between them,” from Wight, *Power Politics*, 160.

Middle East.³²⁸ Still, Turkey faced many challenges before its application to the Alliance was finally approved.

1. Turkey's Early Attempts at Joining a Western Security Pact

The threat imposed by Soviet diplomatic isolation and the Red Army's apparent aggressive behavior caused Turkey to eagerly pursue membership in a greater Western security pact. Thus, in 1948, Turkey officially requested participation in any future alliance with the West.³²⁹ However, Turkey's request was denied. According to the United States Department of State, Office of the Historian records, "The Turkish Government was informed...[that] the conception [of a Western security pact] was clearly a geographical one, restricted geographically in scope to countries of the North Atlantic region."³³⁰ In the eyes of the West, Turkey was a Middle Eastern country. After NATO was created, Turkey, was still determined to gain formal security assurances with the West, submitted its first formal application for membership to the Alliance in May 1950.³³¹ It seemed that for Turkey to gain accession to the Alliance, it would first need to demonstrate its worth. Serendipitously, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided Turkey with this opportunity.

2. Turkey and the Korean War

Although the defense of South Korea during the Korean War (1950–1953) was under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), it nonetheless tested the resolve of the newly formed Alliance and compelled NATO to make its first transformation as a result. North Korea's invasion of South Korea was perceived as an extension of the Soviet Union's influence and its desire to spread communism. The war increased the West's fears of Soviet expansionism and revealed that it was a global threat to the Western way of

³²⁸ The Current Situation in Turkey (United States: Central Intelligence Agency, 1947), 1–2, <http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/BtfTQ7>.

³²⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 84.

³³⁰ Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Volume VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1977), 1647–48, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d1146>.

³³¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 85.

life.³³² When the UN requested membership participation in the war effort, Turkey saw an opportunity to gain the respect and approval of the Alliance. In other words, Ankara's contributions to the UN-led effort were tied to its entry into NATO.³³³ Less than a month after the Korean War began, Ankara offered to send a brigade of 4,500 troops to the war front. By the war's end, approximately 25,000 Turkish troops had served in the war—suffering over 6,000 casualties.³³⁴ According to John M. Vander Lippe, Turkey's decision to break from its nearly 30-year-old foreign policy based on neutrality was driven by both domestic and foreign factors. He writes, “Turkish leaders believed that participation in military operations in Korea would mean closer ties to the West, which in turn would lead to economic growth and greater diplomatic and military power.”³³⁵ Ultimately, Ankara's gamble was successful in achieving these ends. In September 1951, the North Atlantic Council convened in Ottawa and recommended the approval of Turkey's accession to the Alliance.³³⁶ Consequently, Turkey officially became a NATO member on February 18, 1952 (see APPENDIX C).³³⁷

3. Turkey's Contribution to the Alliance from the Western Perspective

Undoubtedly, the main factor for Turkey's invitation to join the Alliance stemmed from the threat of Soviet expansion.³³⁸ However, the West understood that having Turkey in NATO provided other important benefits for enhancing the Alliance. The first was Turkey's strategic location. According to Andrew M. Johnson, by 1950, “NATO was looking to expand its global reach through acquiring strategic basing rights. Because of Turkey's strategic location, accepting Turkey into the Alliance helped to achieve this

³³² Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, 67.

³³³ John M. Vander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 96.

³³⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 237.

³³⁵ Vander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War,” 93.

³³⁶ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, 31.

³³⁷ NATO Information Service, 20.

³³⁸ NATO Information Service, 15.

aim.”³³⁹ Indeed, with Turkey located at the crossroads between three distinct regions of the world—Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—offering Turkey inclusion in NATO considerably enhanced the Alliance’s ability to project power and influence and extend its strategic reach.³⁴⁰

Second, accepting Turkey in NATO prevented Moscow from achieving its centuries-long objective of taking control of the Turkish Straits.³⁴¹ In other words, by accepting Turkey’s accession to the Alliance, NATO had deterred further Soviet attempts at pursuing control over the straits, representing the accession as a *fait accompli*. This restricted the Soviet Navy’s access in and out of its only warm water port.

Third, Turkey’s membership greatly increased the size of NATO’s ground forces. An assessment done by the CIA in 1947 estimated that Turkey had a standing army of 555,000 men.³⁴²

Fourth, NATO saw that Turkey’s accession to the Alliance would increase the protection of—and access to—the West’s growing requirements for Middle Eastern oil.³⁴³

Finally, and perhaps most important, Turkey’s accession provided Europe a defender to protect its eastern and southern flank. Turkey’s role would be as a buffer state³⁴⁴ and an alternative avenue of approach to defend and launch a possible counter-attack against the Soviet Union if required.³⁴⁵ No longer could the Soviet Union focus solely on a possible European ground axis of approach if war broke out between NATO and the Soviet Union. Thus, by approving Turkey’s accession, the Alliance forced the Soviet Union to divide its forces and give credence to protecting its southern flank.

³³⁹ Andrew M. Johnston, *Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106.

³⁴⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “The Current Situation in Turkey” (Washington, D.C.: United States Central Intelligence Agency, October 20, 1947), 4, U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

³⁴¹ Central Intelligence Agency, 1–2.

³⁴² Central Intelligence Agency, 4.

³⁴³ Central Intelligence Agency, 1.

³⁴⁴ Wight, *Power Politics*, 162.

³⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “The Current Situation in Turkey,” 4.

D. CONCLUSION

Although the threat of Soviet expansionism following the end of the Second World War was key factor for the formation of NATO in 1949 and Turkey's accession to the Alliance in 1952, the need for creating a powerful Alliance stemmed from the dynamism and unprecedented amount of death and destruction during the first half of the twentieth century. Stalin's Soviet expansionist policy post-1945 was undoubtedly perceived as a threat to the security of Turkey and the West.

After the Second World War, the relationship between the United States and Turkey greatly deepened. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were key strategic plans that served to reassure Turkey and strengthen the strategic partnership that would develop over the next seven decades between the Washington and Ankara. Regardless of how real the threat from Soviet expansionism was to the West's and to Turkey's way of life, what matters is that the Soviet Union behaved in a manner that caused the West and Turkey to determine it was a threat, and this ultimately compelled Turkey to join the Alliance to balance against the Soviet Union. Indeed, all four of Walt's variables of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions were present during this period. Thus, the Soviet Union in the view of the West and Turkey was that it was a real threat. Walt contends that "States form alliances primarily to balance against threats."³⁴⁶ Undoubtedly, his Balance of Threat theory (BoT) holds in the case of the NATO Alliance's formation and Turkey's accession.

Stalin gravely miscalculated in his foreign policy decisions after the Second World War. His policy was founded on bandwagoning beliefs, thinking he could intimidate and threaten weaker states into allying with the Soviet Union or exact concession from them.³⁴⁷ However, his tactics and bandwagoning belief ultimately backfired, as states such as Turkey and Iran instead exhibited balancing behavior by seeking other states to balance

³⁴⁶ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vi.

³⁴⁷ Walt, 19.

against the Soviet Union.³⁴⁸ By forming the Alliance, the allies exhibited balancing behavior. This behavior not only increased each member's individual security against the threat, but the NATO Alliance arguably helped to create a sense of order and stability within an anarchical international system.

NATO's primary purpose was to deter Soviet aggression against the member states by maintaining a formidable Alliance founded on the idea of mutual collective defense against any would-be attacker. The Alliance's defense pledge is cemented in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that "an armed attack against one...shall be considered an attack against them all..."³⁴⁹ The creation of the Alliance provided reassurances to Western Europe and Turkey. NATO reinforced the West's solidarity by codifying the Alliance member's guarantees to defend one another and ensure the principles of liberty and other values the members shared. However, the Cold War was just beginning.

³⁴⁸ Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943–8," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 58–81.

³⁴⁹ NATO Information Service, *NATO*, North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, 300–302.

IV. TURKEY'S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN NATO

Having laid the historical foundation on which the NATO Alliance was created and having identified the key factors that influenced Turkey's accession to the Alliance in the previous chapter, the following chapter applied the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter II to examine Turkey's alliance behavior (see Figure 1). This chapter examines the security dimension of Turkish foreign policy and Ankara's alliance behavior from the period between Turkey's accession to NATO (1952) to its security decision making in 2019 to deepen the understanding of Turkey's tethering behavior towards Russia in Syria and to comprehend the factors that influenced Ankara's decision to acquire the S-400.

Although the period examined in the chapter includes Turkey's alliance behavior both during and after the Cold War, the primary focus and main body of the chapter are on Turkey's alliance behavior since 2013. After 2013, Turkey's alliance behavior and foreign policy decision making noticeably deviated from its normative alliance behavior—most notably Turkey's tethering behavior towards Russia that manifested in both countries, creating an informal alliance regarding security matters in Syria starting in 2016 and featuring Ankara's decision to purchase the Russian S-400 in 2017. The examination over this span of time reveals that the origins of Turkey's recent divergence from the rest of NATO began with the structural alterations to the international system as a result of the end of the Cold War. The subsequent Middle East instability demonstrated by the Gulf War (1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003–2012), and the Syrian War (2011–present) intensified the Alliance's threat level, while the wars increased Turkey's external threat level disproportionate to the rest of the allies' perceived external threat level in the Middle East. The combination left the cohesion of the Alliance in tatters and compelled Ankara to search for alternative ways to ensure the country's national security. Finally, the advent of the current Turkish regime (AKP) and its adherence to Ottoman Islamist ideology influenced the orientation of Turkey's interest away from that of the West and its traditional allies. These three critical factors not only influenced Turkey's perceptions of its place in the world, but also significantly altered the perceptions and opinions held by both Turkey and

the West toward one another. Yet, it was the events after the outbreak of the Syrian War that have called into question Turkey's alliance behavior and decision making.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, Turkey's alliance behavior during the Cold War is discussed with reference to the thesis' theoretical variables and concept of cause and effect to explain its 'traditional' alliance behavior. Additionally, this section will examine three internal Alliance disputes between Turkey and the Alliance that became the genesis of Ankara's doubts about NATO's security assurances. Although this section is succinct, the analysis regarding this period is necessary to establish a baseline for Turkey's normative alliance behavior. Next, the chapter discusses the significance of the end of the Cold War had on Turkish foreign policy, NATO, and the international system writ large. This seminal event deeply influenced Turkey's perception of its place in the world. Then, the chapter examines the Post-Cold War Middle East conflicts that increasingly shaped the collective Turkish perception of the United States and NATO at large. This section concludes by discussing the decisive events that arguably explain Turkey's marked change in its traditional alliance behavior exhibited by its tethering behavior towards Russia in Syria since 2016 and Ankara's S-400 decision in 2017. Finally, a synthesis of the findings is presented.

A. TURKEY'S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR DURING THE COLD WAR

Turkey's accession to the Alliance in 1952 was founded on Ankara's fear of Soviet expansionism that threatened Turkey's security and sovereignty. The Soviets' aggressive behavior and intimidation along Turkey's northern border, the Red Army's seemingly insurmountable military armament and enhanced offensive capabilities, and Stalin's well-known desire to acquire control of the Turkish Straits deeply influenced Ankara's perception that the Soviet Union was a real threat to Turkey. Indeed, Hale contends that "the fear that the USSR might try to take over Turkey as a means of controlling the straits was still the most important single reason for Turkey's attachment [and balancing behavior] to NATO."³⁵⁰ Applying the theoretical framework in examining Turkey's

³⁵⁰ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd Edition. (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 102.

alliance behavior during the 1950s, it is not surprising that Turkey (the weaker state) sought to join an alliance to balance against the Soviet Union (the strong state).³⁵¹ Ankara deemed the USSR an existential threat because it met all four of Walt's components of a threat.³⁵²

As previously discussed, the Soviet Union was the fundamental driver for the formation of NATO. In other words, the Alliance's *raison d'être* was to deter and defend each of the members against the high external threat level the Soviet Union presented. According to Weitsman, the cohesion of an alliance is greatly influenced by the level of the threat and where its source is derived from (externally or internally).³⁵³ Because the internal threat level within the Alliance never surpassed the allies' shared external threat level during the Cold War, the strength of the Alliance's cohesion stayed reasonably strong during this period. Hence, the strength of the Alliance's cohesion is intrinsically linked to its *raison d'être*.³⁵⁴ Consequently, the impetus and original purpose upon which an alliance is formed will help to determine its efficacy and longevity. Weitsman's theory explains why NATO was able to successfully accomplish its objective of collective defense against the Soviet Union.

Despite the success the Alliance had in deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Turkey's relations with its fellow NATO allies was by no means harmonious. There were a handful of historical disputes between Ankara and the Alliance since Turkey's accession to NATO that increased the internal threat level—most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–1963), the Cyprus Crisis involving President Johnson's letter (1963–1964), and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974).³⁵⁵ The last event led to an arms embargo by the United States (1975–1978).³⁵⁶ These events planted the seeds of Ankara's

³⁵¹Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 18–19, 22–23.

³⁵²Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 5, 263.

³⁵³Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 25.

³⁵⁴Weitsman, 5.

³⁵⁵Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 98–101, 106–8, 111–15.

³⁵⁶Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 98–101, 106–8, 111–15.

distrust of the Alliance's commitment to defending Turkey's security and interests.³⁵⁷ Explaining the impact of these internal disputes, Fuller writes that they "created doubt in Ankara about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the degree of U.S. sensitivity to Turkish interests."³⁵⁸ Subsequently, this doubt created a temporary change in Turkey's alliance behavior from balancing to tethering that was expressed through the short-lived rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the increase in the internal threat level that these events caused never surpassed the external threat level produced by the Soviet Union. Despite the internal friction, NATO was able to maintain a moderately high level of Alliance cohesion. Thus, it was able to overcome these internal Alliance quarrels.

1. The Cuban Missile Crisis

The first of the three was the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–1963). In October 1959, Washington and Ankara agreed to deploy fifteen nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles to Turkey that were installed in 1961, and became operational in 1962.³⁶⁰ The purpose of the missile agreement was not only to enhance Turkey's military capabilities and bolster the country's deterrence capabilities against the Soviet Union, but to demonstrate the Alliance's commitment and solidarity.³⁶¹ However, with the Soviet Union's nuclear-armed ballistic missile emplacement in Cuba, the Jupiter missiles became a bargaining chip to deescalate the potential of starting a nuclear war. Although the nuclear warheads remained in U.S. possession, the missiles belonged to Turkey.³⁶² Still, as part

³⁵⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 35.

³⁵⁸ Fuller, 35.

³⁵⁹ Fuller, 153.

³⁶⁰ Hale, 98–99.

³⁶¹ Hale, 99.

³⁶² Hale, 99.

of the crisis's resolution with the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey without first consulting about the decision with Ankara.³⁶³

Although the decision to remove the missiles deescalated a near nuclear war, Ankara perceived the removal of the missiles as “a sense of betrayal” by its strategic partner—the United States.³⁶⁴ Indeed, the “Turkey-for-Cuba trade” increased Ankara mistrust that the United States and NATO writ large would truly come to the defense of Turkey if a war broke out between the Soviet Union and Turkey.³⁶⁵ Although the Turkish ruling elites' suspicions of its allies may have grown, Hale remarks, “The incident failed to provoke [Turkish] public criticism” because Ankara decided to keep the incident from the public.³⁶⁶ Consequently, the removal of the nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles did little to increase the internal threat level.

2. The Republic of Cyprus and the Johnson Letter

The second internal Alliance clash involved Greece and Turkey over the island of Cyprus (1963–1964). Historically, the control of Cyprus has been exchanged between Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain.³⁶⁷ The island has remained a deeply political and emotional contentious issue between Greece and Turkey because both states have cultural, societal, and political affinities to the island. In 1878, Cyprus fell under the tutelage of the British Empire. After the Second World War, Great Britain withdrew its colonial control of the island, which resulted in an armed struggle between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that lasted until 1960.³⁶⁸ As part of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 and 1960, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain were to cooperate in transitioning the island into the independent state call the Republic of Cyprus, which was

³⁶³ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Ayşegül Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey* (Westport, Connecticut; London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 51.

³⁶⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 73.

³⁶⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 101.

³⁶⁶ Hale, 100.

³⁶⁷ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 137.

³⁶⁸ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 137.

to be a constitutional state.³⁶⁹ However, tensions between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots intensified in 1963, when the Greek Cypriots altered the constitution in their favor. The move left the Turkish Cypriots with limited rights. Subsequently, violence and protest ensued that resulted in the killing of Turkish Cypriots in 1963.³⁷⁰ The perceived atrocities on the Turkish Cypriots pressured Turkey to intervene on their behalf.

As a proxy war between Greece and Turkey seemed increasingly eminent, President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote his infamous letter to Turkey's Prime Minister İnönü (see APPENDIX D) that was aimed at preventing the two NATO allies from going to war. Not only would the conflict between NATO allies weaken the Alliance's cohesion, there was the real risk that the Soviet Union, who was supporting the Greek Cypriots, would initiate a large-scale conventional war if Turkey became too heavily involved.³⁷¹ Thus, possibly drawing the whole of NATO into a war against the Soviet Union under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In an excerpt from the letter to Prime Minister İnönü, President Johnson warned Ankara that the United States and NATO was unwilling to defend Turkey against a military conflict whether it be with Greece or against the Soviet Union if Ankara was seen to be the provocateur:

I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable.' Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a

³⁶⁹ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 137.

³⁷⁰ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 137.

³⁷¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 107–8.

step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.³⁷²

The “Johnson Letter” further deteriorated Turkey’s confidence that the United States and its fellow NATO allies would come to its defense. Indeed, according to Fuller the letter “Opened a major discussion in Turkey over the very cost and value of its alliance with the United States and NATO, sparking serious internal debate about whether Turkey should even withdraw from NATO...the crisis inaugurated a dramatic new era of rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.”³⁷³

3. The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and U.S. Punitive Actions

The last internal Alliance dispute was Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. The invasion of Cyprus was a continuation of the hostilities between Greece and Turkey that started nearly a decade earlier. On July 15, 1974, a pro-Greek military junta executed a successful putsch on the island. In response, Turkey evoked the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) and invaded the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots.³⁷⁴ After failing to achieve an agreeable settlement, the TSK conducted a series of military operations that captured roughly 40% of the island.³⁷⁵ In February 1975, Turkey proclaimed the newly conquered territory as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus—a “move that was unrecognized by any state except Turkey.”³⁷⁶ In response to Turkey’s unacceptable actions, the United States government froze U.S. aid and imposed an arms embargo on Turkey that lasted from 1975 to 1978.³⁷⁷ Ankara retaliated by rescinding the United States status of forces agreement

³⁷² Lyndon B. Johnson, “President Johnson’s Letter to Prime Minister Inonu,” June 5, 1964, 2, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey - Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54>.

³⁷³ Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, 153.

³⁷⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Politics, and the Military* (New York & London: Routledge, 2001), 217.

³⁷⁵ Hale, 217.

³⁷⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 115.

³⁷⁷ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 218.

and took control of all U.S. installations—although the United States and NATO were allowed to continue to perform NATO operations.³⁷⁸

4. Summary of Turkey's Alliance Behavior during the Cold War

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–3), the Johnson Letter (1964), and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974) and the resulting arms embargo by the United States (1975–1978) represent the low points between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance during the Cold War. The internal Alliance clashes between Turkey and the rest of NATO during the 1960s and 1970s did have an impact on Turkey's image as a stalwart Ally against the Soviet Union and the Alliance's perception of Ankara as a trustworthy Ally. For Turkey, these events reinforced its distrust of the Alliance's commitment to Turkey's security guarantees and its national interests.³⁷⁹

Examining Ankara's alliance behavior with Moscow during the 1960s and 1970s, it is possible to identify parallels with the alliance behavior Ankara has exhibited with Moscow since 2016. In both instances, Moscow saw an opportunity to exploit a rift between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance. Furthermore, Turkey has demonstrated a tethering behavior in each of the periods. Weitsman describes tethering as a form of alliance behavior that is "A strategy to manage relations with one's adversary [the Soviet Union] by drawing closer to it via agreement."³⁸⁰ The incidents discussed increased the internal threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance, while there was a disparity between Turkey's perception of the external threat and the other members of NATO. The increase in the internal threat level and the difference in the external threat level, combined with Ankara's perceived betrayal and the rest of the Alliance's mistrust of Turkey's intentions drove Turkey to exhibit a tethering behavior. Arguably, the same variables that are observed in the case of Turkey's shifting alliance behavior since 2016.

³⁷⁸ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, "Turkey-U.S. Relations: Timeline and Brief Historical Context" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2019), 1.

³⁷⁹ Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, 35.

³⁸⁰ Weitsman, 21.

Ankara felt compelled to tether with the Moscow to address its own national interest requirements that had been lost in the weakened relations with both the United States and NATO. Because tethering is generally temporary and less risky than bandwagoning, Ankara risked little retribution from NATO by tethering with the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s.³⁸¹ Furthermore, tethering enabled Ankara to redirect its interests and means toward the issue of Cyprus without having the heightened concern of Soviet aggression. .

Still, tethering is usually a temporary arrangement between rivals.³⁸² The ‘Johnson Letter’ may have shook the trust and confidence of Turkey in the Alliance and even brought about a short lived rapprochement with Moscow; however, the internal threat level never exceeded the external threat level of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow could never match the benefits that came with being a member of the Alliance.³⁸³ Thus, the Alliance cohesion held. As Hale points out these events represent irregularities when one observes the entirety of Turkey’s membership within the Alliance.³⁸⁴ Indeed, Steven A. Cook remarked during his testimony to Congress in 2016, “The overarching threat that the Soviet Union posed to both countries [Turkey and the United States]...ensured that these crises, problems, and irritants never disrupted the strategic relationship.”³⁸⁵ Why? Because the Soviet Union possessed of all four of Walt’s component of a threat throughout the Cold War, with perhaps the exception being the United States. Martin Wight opined, “the chief duty of each government is regarded as being to preserve the interests of the people it rules and represents against the competing interests of other peoples.”³⁸⁶ Maintaining the solidarity of the Alliance during the Cold War served this purpose for its members. Thus,

³⁸¹ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 21–22.

³⁸² Weitsman, 21.

³⁸³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 109.

³⁸⁴ Hale, 88.

³⁸⁵ Steven A Cook, “Priorities and Challenges in the U.S.- Turkey Relationship,” § Committee on Foreign Relations (2017), 1.

³⁸⁶ Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London; New York: Leicester University Press, 1978), 95.

it was advantageous for the members of the Alliance to maintain overall friendly relations through the Cold War to ensure its security and sovereignty.

Table 3. Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey's Alliance Behavior in the Cold War.

Period	Key Events	Internal Threat Level	External Threat Level	Alliance Cohesion	Turkish Ruling Elite Identity Proposal	Turkey's Alliance Behavior
1950s	Korean War, Turkey Joins NATO	Low	High	Strong	Republican Nationalism	Balancing with NATO
1960s - 1970s	Cuban Missile Crisis, Johnson Letter, Invasion of Cyprus, U.S. Arms Embargo	Medium/High	High	Weak	Republican Nationalism challenged by Ottoman Islamists and Pan-Turkic Nationalists ³⁸⁷	Tethering with the Soviet Union
1980s	Military Coup, <i>Ostpolitik</i>	Low	High to Moderate	Strong to Moderate	Republican Nationalism	Balancing to Hedging

From the Alliance's formation in 1949 to the end of the Cold War in 1989, NATO successfully achieved its *raison d'être*—collective defense to deter and if necessary, defend its members against the Soviet Union. As Yost opines, “Despite the rather motley and sometimes cumbersome character of the organization, it has been remarkably successful in aggregating power and achieving fundamental objectives.”³⁸⁸ NATO's success can be contributed to its ability to maintain a strong Alliance cohesion. Turkey's

³⁸⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 104–5.

³⁸⁸ David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 23.

NATO membership and contribution during the Cold War was a key factor to the Alliance's success. Noting the important role Turkey played, Retired U.S. ambassador James F. Jeffrey stated, "We could not have won the Cold War, had Turkey gone under or even better neutral—it's that simple."³⁸⁹ Yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) ushered in a new era of volatility that significantly altered the Alliance's shared perception of the external threat level it faced. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the threat that was the impetus for NATO's formation, greatly reducing the Alliance's shared high external threat level.

B. THE END OF THE COLD WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND TURKEY

The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the international order. Changing it from first a bipolar to unipolar and finally a multipolar system. The seminal event significantly altered U.S. foreign policy, the future of NATO, and Turkey's foreign policy. Weitsman opines that the original reason "behind a state's decision to ally is essential" to the overall alliance's efficacy.³⁹⁰ In other words, now that the Alliance had achieved its *raison d'être*, what further purpose did it serve and was membership in the Alliance still beneficial for the individual member state's own interests? During the Cold War, Turkey and other NATO allies considered the Soviet Union as the existential threat because it maintained all four of the threat components. Thus, the Alliance's shared external threat level remained high, while NATO's internal threat level remained relatively low. This combination of variables resulted in the Alliance maintaining strong cohesion.

1. Walt and the End of the Cold War's Impact

Considering that Walt's book was written before the Cold War ended, it is worth mentioning his remarkable accuracy in predicting the challenges that states would face in a multipolar international system. Walt warned that in a Post–Cold War world, "It will be far less clear which states pose the most serious threats; as a result, international alignments

³⁸⁹ James F. Jeffrey, "Turkey and the Failed Coup: One Year Later," Washington Institute, July 13, 2017 from Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 182.

³⁹⁰ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 24.

[alliances] will be more ambiguous and less durable.”³⁹¹ His prediction implies that alliance formation may become less formal and more flexible to more readily react to an uncertain international system. In Walt’s view, “Perceptions of intent will be increasingly important, because the distribution of capabilities will be more equal and geography may not offer clear guidance.”³⁹² In other words, the rise of a multipolar world will create a diffusion of power that will make threats more difficult to recognize and effectively counter. Consequently, state decision making with regards to alliance behavior may become less predictable and more unreliable. Walt’s projections have been remarkably accurate with regards to Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. Walt’s forecast helps to deepen the understanding of the underlying causes that have facilitated Turkey’s tethering behavior to Russia in Syria and Ankara’s seemingly incoherent shift away from its traditional balancing behavior with the Alliance.³⁹³

2. The End of The Cold War on the Future of NATO

The end of the Cold War called into question NATO’s continued existence. The impetus for the formation of the Alliance was gone. Therefore, NATO’s *raison d’être* had been fulfilled. Although at the core NATO was a military alliance, it also incorporated political, economic, and social dimensions.³⁹⁴ As Weitsman keenly observes, “In the absence of conflicts of interest, common values, institutions, and goals may flourish.”³⁹⁵ Fortunately, NATO’s preamble clearly codifies the members commitment to upholding a set of shared values.³⁹⁶ Still, for NATO to remain relevant and justify its continued existence, the Alliance would need to adapt to the new Post–Cold War system.

³⁹¹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vii.

³⁹² Walt, vii.

³⁹³ Michael A. Reynolds, “Turkey and Russia: A Remarkable Rapprochement,” *The Texas National Security Review, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey’s Foreign Policy*, October 24, 2019, 23–37; Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 73; Stephen Starr, “A Deeper Look at Syria-Related Jihadist Activity in Turkey,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point* 7, no. 8 (August 2014): 8.

³⁹⁴ NATO Information Service, 21.

³⁹⁵ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 27.

³⁹⁶ NATO Information Service, 300.

3. Walt and How the Collapse of the Soviet Union Would Impact NATO and the International System

Regarding how the collapse of the Soviet Union would impact NATO, Walt predicted that “Without a clear and present threat [the NATO allies] are likely to find cooperation more difficult to sustain.”³⁹⁷ Ultimately, the end of the Cold War will create new challenges for the United States “because U.S. protection will be less important to its allies.”³⁹⁸ Thus, lacking a great unifying threat, states will become more independent, form new alliances, and increasingly pursue state national interests. Turkey’s foreign policy activism following the Cold War is in keeping with Walt’s keen prediction. Yet, the danger in states increasingly pursuing their own interests is that state on state disputes and potential conflicts are likely to increase. Ultimately, the absence of a shared external threat that can surpass the internal threat level of an alliance will result in the erosion of the alliance’s cohesion and possibly its dissolution. Rick Brix perhaps captures the conundrum the Alliance had to grapple with regarding its future after 1991:

The end of the Cold War and the improbability of a military attack on Western Europe, has brought into question the existence of NATO itself. Some have argued that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO has lost its *raison d’être*. After all, the sole reason that NATO was formed was to counter the Soviet threat and its purpose for existence throughout the Cold War remained solely to counter that threat. Others, however, have argued that NATO was about more than just countering the Soviet threat. They point to the fact that nowhere in the North Atlantic Treaty is the Soviet Union even mentioned by name. The treaty’s purpose, as stated in the preamble, is “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” and “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization.”³⁹⁹

Indeed, the end of the Cold War presented NATO with a significant challenge to its continued existence. Moreover, the seminal event in history was fraught with great uncertainty for the members of the Alliance who depended on the security it assured.

³⁹⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vii.

³⁹⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

³⁹⁹ Rick Brix, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Transition,” *Educational Non-Profit Organization* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, January 1994), 5–6, <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/BB-60-The-North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization-NATO-In-Transition.pdf>.

a. NATO Adapts

NATO was able to overcome the challenges of no longer having the Soviet Union as its main external threat through adaptation of its purposes. Starting in the 1990 London Declaration, the Alliance began to reinvent itself by asserting that NATO could “Help build the structures of a more united continent supporting security and stability with the strength of shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”⁴⁰⁰ Subsequently, the Alliance published its 1991 Strategic Concepts. Although NATO would remain primarily a collective defense alliance, the Strategic Concepts redefined NATO’s purposes and core tasks base off the Alliance’s outlined future threat environment:

The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.⁴⁰¹

In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.⁴⁰²

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed

⁴⁰⁰ North Atlantic Council, “The London Declaration,” July 5–6, 1990, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.

⁴⁰¹ North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept,” NATO, November 7, 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

⁴⁰² North Atlantic Council.

conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.⁴⁰³

To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.⁴⁰⁴

The Alliance continued to evolve in the Post–Cold War Era. In 1994, NATO produced its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document.⁴⁰⁵ Then, NATO published its 1999 Strategic Concept that outlined five security tasks and, according to Yost, “reworded their [allies] definition of the Alliance’s essential purpose...to shape the broader international security environment, and not only to ensure the safety of Allied territory.”⁴⁰⁶ Lastly, the Alliance published the 2010 Strategic Concept that modified NATO’s missions down to three essential tasks:

The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling

⁴⁰³ North Atlantic Council.

⁴⁰⁴ North Atlantic Council.

⁴⁰⁵ PfP enables states to partner bilaterally and multilaterally with the Alliance without becoming a full-fledged member; Susan Pond, “Understanding the PfP Tool Kit,” *NATO*, January 1, 2004, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_21328.htm.

⁴⁰⁶ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 12.

effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:⁴⁰⁷

1. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
2. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.
3. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door of membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.⁴⁰⁸

Aside from redefining the Alliance's purposes, NATO has also undergone a massive expansion of its member states. When the Cold War ended, the Alliance had sixteen members.⁴⁰⁹ As of 2020, that number has grown to thirty—with North Macedonia becoming the latest Ally in 2020.⁴¹⁰ Yet, Weitsman keenly observe, “NATO's decision...to alter the mission of the alliance and expand its membership after the end of

⁴⁰⁷ North Atlantic Council, “2010 Strategic Concepts,” *NATO*, June 12, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm.

⁴⁰⁸ North Atlantic Council.

⁴⁰⁹ NATO, “Member Countries,” *NATO*, March 24, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.

⁴¹⁰ NATO.

the Cold War has had an important effect on the relationships of amity and enmity in the system.”⁴¹¹ In other words, it has improved the security of the new members of the Alliance. Yet, its accumulation of greater aggregate power, Moscow’s perceived intentions of encirclement by NATO demonstrated by its continued expansionism, and the creation of out groups through exclusion not only fosters enmity, but could potentially create a security dilemma with between the Alliance and states like Russia or China.

Ironically, it was the Soviet Union’s expansionism that compelled the formation of the Alliance—now, it is NATO expansionism that is the perceived threat to Moscow.⁴¹² As Lilia Shevtsova argues, “NATO enlargement is a threat not to Russia but to the Russian regime and the elite, who want to create a *cordon sanitaire* of failed or weak states around themselves. For the elites...NATO is the optimal foe.”⁴¹³ What Shevtsova means is the Russian regime needs to create a mythos of NATO as the enemy in order to remain in power and galvanize the Russian populous. Indeed, this is yet another parallel that the current regimes in Ankara and Moscow share, both create a narrative of the West as the enemy to invoke nationalistic fervor and maintain their position in power.⁴¹⁴

Overall, NATO has excelled at adapting to the changing international system and the evolving threat environment. Yet, the Alliance must walk a fine line between its desire to accumulate additional aggregate power through expansionism and risking NATO purposes becoming too ambiguous. Indeed, as Wight once remarked, “The more general the scope of the alliance, the less does it work as either party intended.”⁴¹⁵ Two lessons for NATO can be gleaned from Wight’s observation. First, if the Alliance continues to expand its membership, it risks becoming too cumbersome and impotent because NATO requires a unanimous consensus with its members to take military action. Second, if NATO

⁴¹¹ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 1.

⁴¹² Lilia Shevtsova, *Lonely Power: Why Russia Has Failed to Become the West and the West Is Weary of Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 145–46.

⁴¹³ Shevtsova, 145.

⁴¹⁴ Aykan Erdemir, “Scapegoats of Wrath, Subjects of Benevolence: Turkey’s Minorities Under Erdoğan,” *Hudson Institute* 24 (July 2019): 5–8.

⁴¹⁵ Wight, *Power Politics*, 128.

assumes too many missions and core tasks, it risks maintaining its original purpose for which the Alliance was formed—collective defense.

4. Impact on Turkey

The origins of Turkey's changing alliance behavior with the Alliance can be traced back to the end of the Cold War.⁴¹⁶ This seminal event altered the structural integrity of the international system and heightened Turkey's security concerns, and its threat perceptions. In addition, the belief of a new world order that offered Ankara great opportunity to become a regional hegemon and bridge connecting the East and West. Combined, these two very different outlooks profoundly influenced Turkey's perception both of itself and of the West. Ankara's perceived that in the Post-Cold War Era, Turkey would transform from a functional ally to the West, into a core state that wield influence over the Middle East.⁴¹⁷ However, there was much uncertainty and concern in Ankara regarding the NATO's continued relevancy. Without the Alliance, Turkey's security assurances would be at jeopardy, exposing Turkey to greater instability and increased threats.⁴¹⁸ In short, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had two important implications for Turkey's foreign policy—increased autonomy and a greater need to ensure its national security.

a. Increased Autonomy

The first implication was it loosened the constraints on Turkey's national interests, which enabled the country to pursue a more independent foreign policy because of the power vacuum that was created in the regions surrounding Turkey as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the once seemingly powerful Soviet satellites in the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia were now weak states in comparison to Turkey's

⁴¹⁶ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 102–3, 107–8.

⁴¹⁷ North, "2015 - 105 PCTR 15 E - Mission Report Turkey | NATO PA" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliament Assembly, April 13, 2015), 2, <https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2015-105-pctr-15-e-mission-report-turkey>; Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 120–27.

⁴¹⁸ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 4th Edition. (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2017), 315; William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd Edition. (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 135–36.

relative position. Moreover, Turkey emerged from the end of the Cold War as a contender for the Middle East regional core state. This offered Ankara an opportunity to increase its regional influence and global prestige by implementing an assertive foreign policy over historically significant former Ottoman territories by emphasizing Turkey's historical, religious, and cultural affinities aimed at growing its political and economic resources.⁴¹⁹

b. Security and Instability

The second implication of the Soviet Union's dissolution was uncertainty within the international system. This seminal change in the system potentially threatened Turkey's security guarantee, which it had enjoyed as part of the Alliance for the last forty years. The question of NATO's continued existence was unsettling for Turkey. Moreover, even if NATO were to continue its existence in the Post-Cold War Era, there was growing concern about Turkey among members of the Alliance.⁴²⁰ During the Cold War, the Alliance was willing to overlook Turkey's historical authoritarian form of governance and list of human rights violations in exchange for security. Indeed, as David Yost, explains, "the NATO Allies were not during the Cold War so exigent in upholding requirements for membership, nor have they over the decades seen it as their responsibility to deal with nondemocratic conduct or "backsliding" by fellow allies."⁴²¹ Yet, the Alliance quickly reinvented its purposes and relevancy in the new world order by reprioritizing its interests that placed a greater emphasis on upholding the Treaty preamble's values and principles. Thus, Turkey's questionable pursuit towards liberal democratic ideals and the protection of individual liberties were increasingly criticized by the West. Consequently, the West's criticism of Turkish domestic policies and Ankara's misaligned value of the preamble's stated values increased the internal threat level. Additionally, in the Post-Cold War Era, the Kurdish question significantly accelerated to the forefront of Turkish security concerns because the 'question' had evolved from a state policy issue of assimilation into a high politicized movement demanding Kurdish ethnic recognition and potential pursuit of self-

⁴¹⁹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 315.

⁴²⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 136.

⁴²¹ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 365.

determination that Ankara perceived as a threat to the country's territorial integrity.⁴²² Further still, subsequent wars increasingly destabilized the Middle East and the Balkans—two regions of great historical, cultural, and economic interest to Ankara resulting from the alteration of the stability that the former bipolar international system provided.⁴²³ Hale describes the concerns and the potential dangers that Turkey faced following the Soviet Union's collapse, writing, "Turkey might be seen as a strategic and political liability rather than an asset to the west—strategically because it had a host of complex regional security concerns...and politically because of its non-membership of the European Community, its internal Kurdish problem, poor human rights record and conflicts with Greece."⁴²⁴ Discussing the intrinsic interaction between the internal and external threat levels and how they can effect an alliance, Weitsman writes, "The motivations that draw states together in the first place determine which of the following will be most pronounced: the level of threat within the alliance or the level of threat external to it."⁴²⁵ In other words, the issues just discussed, created a disparity between the external threat level perceived by Turkey and the rest of the Alliance. For Turkey, the threat level remained high and for the rest of the allies the level decreased. Meanwhile, the internal threat level significantly increased because the key political, ideological, and cultural differences took on a relevancy that was not prioritized during the Cold War between Turkey and its fellow NATO allies.⁴²⁶ Consequently, the Alliance's cohesion, which enabled NATO to succeed in the Cold War, now began to erode.

⁴²² Emin Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu, *Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony through Transformation*, Islam and Nationalism (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 100–101.

⁴²³ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, 93, no. 3 (1964); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chap. 8 from Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 38.

⁴²⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 136.

⁴²⁵ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 37.

⁴²⁶ Jeremy Ghez, "Alliances in the 21st Century: Implications for the US-European Partnership," RAND Corporation Occasional Paper Series (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2011), 18.

c. Turkey's Continued Relevance

Still, NATO recognized the potential significance Turkey's role within the Alliance could play in the Post–Cold War international system. As the only Muslim majority NATO member, Turkey was often described as the West's conduit to the Middle East. Indeed, while visiting Turkey in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaimed that Washington and Ankara enjoyed a “very important strategic relationship,” founded on shared interests, values, and a vision for the future.⁴²⁷ Similarly, in 2009, President Barack Obama described Turkey as Westernized model partner.⁴²⁸ These political overtures were meant to praise Turkey and encourage other Middle Eastern states to follow Turkey's ‘democratic’ lead. However, Walt opines that in a Post–Cold War world “U.S. [and Western] influence over these states [like Turkey] is virtually certain to decline.”⁴²⁹ The United States and NATO wanted Turkey to continue to ponder to the West as it had during the majority of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War's impact on the structure of the international system altered NATO and Turkey's perception of itself in the new system. Because the Alliance's shared external threat was removed, NATO had to reinvent to remain justifiably relevant. Meanwhile, Post–Cold War system enabled Turkey's foreign policy to transform from a functional Ally to a foreign policy that was more independent and assertive.⁴³⁰ Huntington keenly observed, “At some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic

⁴²⁷ Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul After Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, February 6, 2005, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41862.htm>. From Steven A. Cook, “Neither Friend nor Foe: The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations,” *Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018), 7.

⁴²⁸ Bulent Aliriza, “President Obama's Trip to Turkey: Building a ‘Model Partnership,’” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, April 2009.

⁴²⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

⁴³⁰ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, Ahmet Selim Tekelioglu, and Kadir Ustun, eds., *Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Ankara: SETA Publications, 2014), 13.

interlocutor and antagonist of the West.”⁴³¹ Indeed, as Huntington and Walt predicted, the AKP developed a ‘zero problems with neighbors’ or ‘strategic depth’ foreign policy predicated on emphasizing Turkey’s unique geography and its former Ottoman historical, religious, and cultural affiliations in the Middle East to increase Turkish influence and pursue regional hegemony.⁴³² Unfortunately, it was not long after the end of the Cold War that conflicts broke out in the Middle East and in the Balkans that cause TFP to transform yet again.

C. TURKEY’S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND OPINION OF THE WEST: KEY POST–COLD WAR MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS

The transformation of the international system from a bipolar to unipolar world dominated by the sole remaining super power—the United States—convinced many policy makers and scholars that Western-style democracy was the regime type of the new world order.⁴³³ Shaped by this way of thinking, U.S. foreign policy was embolden to impose its democratic ideals in the Middle East.⁴³⁴ Unfortunately, foreign interventionism in places since the end of the Cold War have disrupted Ankara’s vision as the regional hegemon and impeded the Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy, which emphasized Turkey’s unique geography and former Ottoman historical, religious, and cultural affiliations in the Middle East to expand its influence and prestige.⁴³⁵ Not only did this negatively shape the Turkish ruling elites opinion of the West, but increased Turkey’s perceived external threat level disproportionately to the rest of the Alliance. Walt’s BoT provides a possible explanation for the disparity between Turkey and the rest of its fellow allies. The continuation of war

⁴³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Paperback Ed (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011), 178.

⁴³² Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 200–205.

⁴³³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History, and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁴³⁴ Stephen D. Krasner, “Learning to Live With Despots: The Limits of Democracy Promotion,” *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 2 (April 2020): 49.

⁴³⁵ Aaron Stein, *Turkey’s New Foreign Policy : Davutoglu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order* (Philadelphia, PA: Routledge, 2014), 6–9, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315657110>; Kirişci, 200–205; John J Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 233; Lisel Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 116.

in the Middle East since 2001 are perceived as a threat to Ankara differently because of the proximity, the increased offensive capabilities of state and non-state actors in the region, the relative power disparity between Ankara and its neighbors, and the perceived malign actions by both Turkey's traditional rivals and allies.⁴³⁶ Kirişci captures Ankara's growing threat concerns well, writing, "According to a retired Turkish diplomat, the country was surrounded by a 'veritable ring of evil,' which necessitated a readiness to fight 'two and a half wars' simultaneously—against Greece, Syria and the PKK."⁴³⁷

The Gulf War (1991), the American-led invasion of Iraq (2003–2012), and the Syrian War (2011–present) are arguably the three most significant Middle Eastern wars that negatively altered the perceptions by the Turkish elite and its populous of the West.⁴³⁸ They reinforced Turkey's skepticism of the Alliance's security guarantees and its allies understanding of Turkish interests. Thus, influencing Turkey's decision to tether to Russia in Syria and purchase the Russian S-400. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the AKP's neo-Ottoman foreign policy, notes, "Assertive nations define threats according to their strategies, while non-assertive and submissive nations shape their fragile strategies according to their definitions of threats."⁴³⁹ Perhaps the reason these conflicts negatively impacted the perceptions by the Turkish elite and its populous toward the West was caused by the its continuing foreign interventionism in the Middle East and the conflicting threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance in the Syrian War. All of which can be perceived as a threat to the AKP's foreign policy strategy because of the instability and increased national security threats it inflicted on Turkey.

⁴³⁶ Sitki Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," *All Azimuth* 8, no. 1 (2019): 70–71; David Stefanovic, "Turkey's Perennial Strategic Importance and the S-400 Saga," *Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy*, FOKUS, October 2019, 2; E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Arab Spring Era: From Proactive to Buffer State," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 12 (2016): 2276–2280.

⁴³⁷ Quotes from Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," 34 from Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 69.

⁴³⁸ Kirişci, 73.

⁴³⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* (2001), 62 from Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 151.

1. The Gulf War (1990–1991)

The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990 immediately followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Seeking to assert itself as a regional power, Ankara saw participation and support towards the United States and its coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War as an opportunity to boost Turkey's global prestige.⁴⁴⁰ According to Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Gulf War was a perfect opportunity for Ozal to reassert Turkey's place in the Post–Cold War system and to prove its continued geostrategic significance to its chief ally, the United States...Washington presented three demands to Ankara: (1) mobilizing troops along its border with Iraq....(2) allowing the United States to use its airspace; and (3) contributing troops that would participate in the...war."⁴⁴¹ Turkey agreed to the first two demands, but did not contribute troops to the war due to internal Turkish political opposition.⁴⁴² Ankara did however turn off the oil pipelines that carried Iraqi oil to the Turkish port of Yumurtalik.⁴⁴³

Despite Turkey's cohesiveness to the war effort, the Gulf War exposed significant vulnerabilities to Turkey's nominal AMD. The fear of Iraqi Scud missiles landing on Turkish territory unimpeded created great consternation in Ankara.⁴⁴⁴ In response, Turkey requested security and defense assistance from the Alliance.⁴⁴⁵ However, Germany's concerns over a potential Article 5 obligation to Turkey caused the Alliance to hesitate, as discord over the decision ensued.⁴⁴⁶ Eventually, the Alliance authorized the temporary deployment of defensive measures to Turkey, but the discord unveiled small fissures within the Alliance. Not only did this increase Ankara's desire for its own AMD capability, the minor resistance it felt by Germany intensified Turkey's mistrust and skepticism of the Alliance's security assurances when facing a perceived threat. Consequently, the external

⁴⁴⁰ Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 122–23.

⁴⁴¹ Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 123.

⁴⁴² Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 123.

⁴⁴³ Kosebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, 123.

⁴⁴⁴ Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," 72.

⁴⁴⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 40.

⁴⁴⁶ Yost, 40.

threat level was higher for Turkey due to its proximity to the threat, perceived intentions of Iraqi Scud attacks on Turkey, and Turkey's inability to defend itself with enhanced military capabilities. Meanwhile, the internal threat level grew from feelings of distrust and skepticism of the Alliance. Ultimately, this combination of variables negatively impacted the Alliance's overall cohesion. Unfortunately, this was to be the first of several such incidents between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance in the Post-Cold War Era.

2. The American-Led Invasion of Iraq (2003–2012)

The American-led invasion of Iraq was a seminal event that significantly altered Turkish popular opinion of the United States. The Iraq War greatly contributed to the destabilization of the region surrounding Turkey, which increased the country's national security threats from both state and non-state actors.⁴⁴⁷ Indeed, Kirişci claims, "The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 became the source of major conflict and instability that has since adversely affected Turkey's interest."⁴⁴⁸ Consequently, the actions taken by Turkey, the United States, and the rest of NATO increased the skepticism and distrust between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance.

Like the Gulf War, the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exposed Turkey to external threats on its border. Walt's variables of proximity, Turkey's nominal military capabilities relative to its neighbors, and Ankara's perceived intentions by both its allies and rivals contributed to Turkey's increased external threat level that was disproportionate to that of the rest of the Alliance. As such, Ankara's actively voiced its disapproval of the United States invasion and urged the Bush Administration to seek diplomatic solutions with Saddam Hussein.⁴⁴⁹ Having failed at convincing the Washington and Bagdad to come to a peaceful resolution, the Turkish parliament initially refused the United States to use its country as a staging ground to launch the invasion.⁴⁵⁰ The refusal led to the

⁴⁴⁷ Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch-Turkey*, 118–19; Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," 70–71.

⁴⁴⁸ Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 77.

⁴⁴⁹ Kirişci, 70.

⁴⁵⁰ Kanat, Tekelioglu, and Ustun, *Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 68.

deterioration of the strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States. On the one hand, the United States questioned whether Turkey was a trusted ally. On the other hand, Turkey considered the American-led invasion as an act of disregard for Turkish interests and concerns.⁴⁵¹

Ankara concerns over the war were justifiable. It feared that the invasion and ensuing war would significantly destabilize the region and increase terrorist attacks within their country by inciting an increase in PKK attacks on Turkey. Kirişçi notes, “Iraq’s territorial integrity presented a problem to Turkey, particularly in relation to the Kurdish issue. The question was whether an independent Kurdish state would emerge in the event Iraq disintegrated...the fact that the PKK was based in northern Iraq and that it had terminated the ceasefire with the Turkish state in 2004 alarmed Turkey’s national security advisors.”⁴⁵² Indeed, the American-led invasion did empower the Kurdish regional government to be more assertive and reinvigorated the idea of an independent Kurdistan.⁴⁵³ Additionally, Turkey had legitimate concerns regarding the potential that the Iraqi’s would target Turkey with its Scud missiles, which Turkey’s military had no autonomous AMDs for it to defend against. Thus, Ankara requested protective measures from the Alliance. Belgium, France, and Germany disapproved of Ankara’s request partly because of their opposition to the invasion writ large.⁴⁵⁴ Their disapproval of the defensive measures was not out of spite for Turkey, but instead a politically motivated response directed at the United States

In response to the allies disapproved request, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the Treaty in February 2003.⁴⁵⁵ Eventually, a consensus was reached and Turkey’s fellow allies agreed to deploy their defensive measures.⁴⁵⁶ Despite the decision, the Alliance’s

⁴⁵¹ Kanat, Tekelioglu, and Ustun, 69.

⁴⁵² Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 70–71.

⁴⁵³ Kanat, Tekelioglu, and Ustun, *Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 69.

⁴⁵⁴ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 40.

⁴⁵⁵ Under Article 4, a member state can convene a meeting of NATO members to “consult” when it feels its independence or security are threatened. NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO, 1976), 301.

⁴⁵⁶ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 164.

failure to recognize Turkey as part of ‘itself’ added to Turkey’s growing distrust.⁴⁵⁷ Additionally, it further convinced Ankara that it could not depend on others to provide for its own security. Indeed, Jeremy Shapiro, an observer during this time, concluded, “No matter how much the French, Germans, and Belgians insisted that their solidarity with Turkey was complete, the way events transpired left an impression of allies unwilling to stand together in a time of need.”⁴⁵⁸ Discussing the considerations of European military intervention risk in 1913, Sir Edward Grey, the former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, articulately stated, “if the Powers [European nations] were to have intervened effectively in recent events, they would have had to use troops; they would have had to land those troops, and march them to shoot at the risk of being shot. In your own country’s quarrel you do those things, but it is exceedingly difficult to get the Powers of Europe, or any of them, to vote money and to use its troops in any cause except one which it feels the interests of its own country absolutely requires.”⁴⁵⁹ The deployment of any Allied protective capabilities included that country’s military personnel to operate it. Thus, exposing its soldiers to danger. Aside from sending a political message to the United States, perhaps this was in part the calculus Belgium, France, and Germany used when considering its support to Turkey. If so, then the Alliance’s credibility is worrisome. In any case, the way in which Turkey’s insecurities were initially addressed by fellow members of the Alliance during the advent of both the Gulf War and Iraq War contributed to Turkey’s growing need for its own AMD and further increased its feeling of mistrust with the West.

Further intensifying the internal threat level during the Iraq War was the infamous ‘hood incident’ that occurred within Iraq’s Kurdish town of Sulaymaniah between U.S. and Turkish forces.⁴⁶⁰ In July 2003, U.S. Special Forces conducted a raid in Sulaymaniah, in which a number of Turkish military and intelligence officers were detained and forced

⁴⁵⁷ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 197.

⁴⁵⁸ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 40.

⁴⁵⁹ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Statement on War in the Balkans, Hansard (Commons), 12 August 1913, col. 2294. “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?,” Carnegie Europe, accessed February 21, 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73174>.

⁴⁶⁰ Kerem Öktem, *Turkey since 1989: Angry Nation* (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2011), 133.

to wear black hoods over their heads as they were being extracted.⁴⁶¹ Kerem Öktem posits that the event was “Probably meant as an act of revenge for Turkey’s lack of commitment to the war.”⁴⁶² Irrespective of the intentions of the United States, the event was deeply humiliating for Turkey and impacted the state’s national psyche. Moreover, the embarrassing incident triggered massive anti-American protests in Turkey and greatly contributed to Turkey’s negative opinion of the United States.⁴⁶³ Indeed, a 2007 Pew poll illustrates the negative views Turks had of the United States and its foreign policy, stating, “9% of Turks support the U.S.-led war on terror, and only 14% think the U.S. considers the interests of countries like Turkey when making foreign policy decisions...86% of Turks now favor removing U.S. troops from Iraq.”⁴⁶⁴ According to Soner Cagaptay the Iraq War “Added fuel to the Islamist fire in Turkey” and created conspiracy theories that the war was a “U.S.-Jewish-Israeli attempt to dominate the Middle East”.⁴⁶⁵ Indeed, the invasion of Iraq significantly altered the Turkish perception of the United States as an imperialistic state and increased Turkey’s elites’ skepticism of the United States as a strategic partnership, while Turkey’s resistance to support the United States-led invasion was perceived as a sense of betrayal by Washington. Combined, the opposing negative views of one another caused the internal threat level to further grow. Consequently, the cohesion of the Alliance suffered greatly.

In sum, the events that transpired with the advent of the Iraq War caused Ankara to see the external threat level much higher than that of the United States and the rest of the Alliance. The proximity to the threat, Turkey’s inferior military capabilities, and its perceived intentions by its traditional enemies and allies caused the disparity in the external threat level between Turkey and the Alliance. While the internal threat level spiked because

⁴⁶¹ Öktem, 133.

⁴⁶² Öktem, 133.

⁴⁶³ Öktem, 133.

⁴⁶⁴ Brian J. Grim and Richard Wike, “Turkey and Its (Many) Discontents” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, October 25, 2007), <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2007/10/25/turkey-and-its-many-discontents/>.

⁴⁶⁵ Soner Cagaptay, “Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?,” *Middle East Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 43–52.

of Turkey's refusal to enable the United States to launch its invasion from Turkey, the United States perceived insensitivities to Turkey's interests and security concerns, the Alliance's initial hesitation to deploy protective measures on Turkey's behalf, and the 'hood incident.' Consequently, the cohesion of the Alliance suffered greatly.

3. The Syrian War (2011–present)

The events following the outbreak of the Syrian War exponentially amplified Turkey's threat perception both internally and externally. The combined threat components caused by the Syrian War included: the proximity to the war, disparity in the belligerents' offensive capabilities, and the perceived intentions by Ankara's foes and its fellow allies in Syria significantly increased the Alliance's internal threat level and heightened Turkey's external threat level disproportionately to that perceived by the rest of the Alliance. Indeed, Kirişci contends that "The war in Syria proved to be a key turning point in Turkey's relations with the West."⁴⁶⁶ The events following the advent of the Syrian War caused Turkey to reassess its value and its trust in the Alliance, as well as formulate a pragmatic solution to achieving Ankara's interests without upsetting key state actors in Syria. Consequently, the cohesion of the Alliance has deeply suffered and it has ultimately the key factor for Turkey's shifting alliance behavior from balancing with its fellow allies to tethering to Russia in order to appease the stronger state and influence the events and eventual outcome of the War in Syria.

a. Proximity to the War

Turkey's proximity to the Syrian conflict has increased Turkey's external threat level asymmetrically to that of the rest of the Alliance. Geographic proximity is an important component of a threat because the closer a state is to another, the easier it is to project influence on other states. This does not bode well for Turkey, as it shares over 500 miles of border with Syria.⁴⁶⁷ According to Walt, proximity is a significance threat

⁴⁶⁶ Kirişci, 72.

⁴⁶⁷ Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 31, 2018), <https://crsreports.congress.gov>.

component “Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. Other things being equal, therefore, states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant.”⁴⁶⁸ The country’s proximity to the war has resulted in the death of Turks by both state actors and non-state actors. In June 2012, a Turkish reconnaissance plane was shot down by Syrian forces, killing both pilots.⁴⁶⁹ Yet, another incident involving Syrian forces occurred in October 2012, when Syrian artillery rounds landed in Turkey killing five citizens.⁴⁷⁰ Thus, it accelerated Ankara’s urgency to pursue enhanced, independent military capabilities, particularly an AMD. Indeed, a NATO Mission Report on Syria from 2015, specifically notes that one of the key “contentious issues between Turkey and the allies” currently includes missile defense.⁴⁷¹ In response to the issue between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance over missile defense, NATO convened a security council meeting under Article 4 to determine which actions to take.⁴⁷² The allies agreed to the deployment of six PATRIOT missile batteries on their behalf of Turkey.⁴⁷³ Although this act of Alliance solidarity demonstrated the allies commitment to Turkey’s security it was to be short lived. Since 2016, all but one Spanish PATRIOT system remains in Turkey and is tasked with defending Incirlik Airbase.⁴⁷⁴

Moreover, the refugee crisis emanating from Syria has had a significant impact on Turkey, which hosts roughly 3.64 million Syrian refugees.⁴⁷⁵ The refugee crisis has not

⁴⁶⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 23.

⁴⁶⁹ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 40.

⁴⁷⁰ Yost, 40.

⁴⁷¹ North, “2015 - 105 PCTR 15 E - Mission Report Turkey | NATO PA,” 1.

⁴⁷² Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, 40.

⁴⁷³ Joseph Trevithick, “Turkey Asks America To Send Patriot Missiles To Its Border As Its Troops Die In Syria Airstrikes,” *The Drive*, accessed May 7, 2020, <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32297/turkey-asks-america-to-send-patriot-missiles-to-its-border-as-its-troops-die-in-syria-airstrikes>.

⁴⁷⁴ Nick Ottens, “Why Did the United States Remove Patriots from Turkey?,” *Atlantic Sentinel*, August 18, 2015, <https://atlanticsentinel.com/2015/08/why-did-the-united-states-remove-patriots-from-turkey/>; Trevithick, “Turkey Asks America To Send Patriot Missiles To Its Border As Its Troops Die In Syria Airstrikes.”

⁴⁷⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Emergency,” *UNHCR*, accessed March 19, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>.

only negatively affected the Turkish economy and the country's sense of security, but also facilitated the recent rise of Turkish nationalism and increased Turkish skepticism about the West. The apparent insufficient response to Turkey's Syrian refugee crisis by Western nations, specifically European nations and the United States, has allowed Ankara to pursue a more independent foreign policy.⁴⁷⁶

b. Disparity in Offensive Capabilities Among the Belligerents

The second threat component that has contributed to Turkey's alliance behavior is the involvement of powerful state actors. Syria has become the battleground for multiple external actors who seek competing national interests in Syria. Russia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Turkey are all involved in Syria. Russia and Iran are perhaps the most significant actors shaping foreign policies in Syria. Yet, they are traditional rivals of Turkey and have expressed their support to the Assad regime in the forms of money, military might, and political influence act as a deterrent to international intervention in the war. Russia, a permanent member on the UN Security Council, has impeded the UN from acting. Moreover, the international community fears that any military involvement in the conflict may risk starting a war with Russia or a war between Israel and Iran. Despite these valid concerns, Ankara has felt abandon by the West.⁴⁷⁷

Turkey's regional neighbors, all possess more advanced military capabilities than Ankara. Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Greece all possess air forces equal to or greater than Turkey's own. Eight states (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Greece) near Turkey possess short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles capabilities that can range Turkish territory.⁴⁷⁸ Additionally, six of these eight countries (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, and Greece) also have advanced cruise missiles.⁴⁷⁹ Viewed from Turkey's perspective, the regional threat environment indeed

⁴⁷⁶ Suzan Fraser, "Turkey Threatens to Open Gates for Syria Refugees to Go West," *Washington Post*, September 5, 2019, sec. Europe, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/turkey-threatens-to-open-gates-for-syria-refugees-to-go-west/2019/09/05/7bf88468-cfc0-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html.

⁴⁷⁷ Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*.

⁴⁷⁸ Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," 70.

⁴⁷⁹ Egeli, 70.

appears daunting. The potential threats these nations impose, coupled with Turkey's perceived lack of confidence in the Alliance's solidarity, have significantly contributed to Turkey's security concerns and mistrust—ultimately influencing Ankara's decision to purchase the S-400.

c. Perceived Intentions and Conflicting Objectives

The third threat component contributing to the external and internal threat levels is the perceived intentions or opposing interests between Ankara and its fellow allies in Syria. Their competing interests and activities in Syria have contributed to the relationship's mistrust toward one another. As Walt and Weitsman posit, perceived intentions are a key component of what a state deems as a threat.⁴⁸⁰ This component above all others is arguably the reason Turkey choose to tether to Russia and seek to appease Moscow by agreeing to purchase the S-400.

(1) President Obama's Redline Speech

One of the persistent complaints by Ankara has been that the United States and the rest of its allies have not done enough to end the Syrian War. This is especially the case after President Obama declare the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would be a red line. During a press briefing given on August 20, 2012, President Obama stated:

The point that you made about chemical and biological weapons is critical. That's an issue that doesn't just concern Syria; it concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us... We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation... We have put together a range of contingency plans. We have communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that's a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if

⁴⁸⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vii, x, 25, 179; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 32–33.

we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly.⁴⁸¹

Indeed, Kirişci notes, “The first signs of differences over the approach to the Syrian war became apparent when Erdoğan reacted sharply to Obama’s failure to act on his ‘red lines’ against the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government.”⁴⁸² The United States decision not to respond to the chemical attack on September 2013, left Turkey vulnerable to Syria and Russia. The realization that the United States and the Alliance were unwilling to commit forces to fight the Syrian military further increase Turkey’s distrust of the Alliance, which increased the internal threat level and demonstrated the differing external threat level perceptions held between Turkey and its fellow allies. Turkey was left to deal with Russia alone in order to achieve its national security interests in Syria.

(2) U.S. and the Allies: its Main Objective in Syria

The United States and the Alliance’s stated objective has been to defeat IS in Syria. To achieve this objective, the United States has provided supported to the YPG in Syria at the behest of Ankara.⁴⁸³ The West’s foreign policy in Syria has infuriated the Turkish elite and many of the Turkish citizens because they view the YPG as a splinter group of the PKK, a terrorist organization, which Turkey has been in conflict with since 1984.⁴⁸⁴ Indeed, President Erdoğan voiced Turkish anger when he stated that the United States was turning the region “into a pool of blood” by deciding to ally with the YPG in Syria—demanding the United States choose either the Kurds or its NATO ally.⁴⁸⁵ The internal threat level with in the Alliance reached new levels in May 2017, when the Trump Administration officially announced that the United States would begin arming the YPG

⁴⁸¹ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps,” [whitehouse.gov](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps), August 20, 2012, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

⁴⁸² Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 5.

⁴⁸³ Zanotti and Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations.”

⁴⁸⁴ Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 22.

⁴⁸⁵ “Turkey Denounces U.S. Support for Kurds,” February 10, 2016, sec. Middle East, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35541003>.

in its fight against IS in Syria.⁴⁸⁶ Thus, as Kirişci contends, “The legacy of the U.S. policy in Syria will be seen as one that adversely affected Turkish national security and stability.”⁴⁸⁷ The inability for Turkey, the United States, and the Alliance to agree to a mutual security strategy in Syria has significantly altered Turkey’s alliance behavior in Syria because their interests are not aligned and Ankara cannot rely on the Alliance to guarantee its security if attacked by Russia, Iran, or Syria.

(3) Turkey: its Main Objectives in Syria

Meanwhile, Ankara considered the PKK, the PYD, and its military wing—the YPG more threatening to Turkey’s national security than IS or other radical Sunni extremist organizations. According to Hill and Taşpınar, in Ankara’s view the greatest “terrorist threat to Turkish interests is still considered to come from Kurdish separatists of the PKK.”⁴⁸⁸ Thus, Ankara’s primary concern remains to prevent PKK terrorist attacks on Turkish soil by creating a buffer zone inside Syria. To achieve this goal Turkey originally relied heavily on Islamic proxy groups to attack the Kurdish rebels, facilitating their actions by providing these groups with arms, supplies, and a safe haven from which to launch attacks from.⁴⁸⁹ Lisel Hintz offers some insight as to why Ankara is committed to defeating the Syrian Kurds, regardless of the United States support, rather than cooperate with defeating IS, explaining that the Ottoman Islamists (Erdoğan and the AKP) and the Pan-Turkic Nationalists (MHP) identity proposals, both of which currently share a political alliance in Turkey, consider support of any kind to the PKK or any of its affiliates as a red line that cannot be tolerated.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁶ Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 71.

⁴⁸⁷ Kirişci, 73.

⁴⁸⁸ Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?,” *Survival* 48, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 86.

⁴⁸⁹ Christopher Phillips, *The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016), 137, 140, 186; David L. Phillips, “Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links” (New York, Columbia University, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html.

⁴⁹⁰ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 38, 53.

The decisions and events that occurred following the advent of the Syrian War have unequivocally increased Turkey's threat perception and national security concerns. Because of the war's proximity to Turkey, the disparity in the belligerents' offensive capabilities, and most importantly—the perceived intentions by Ankara's allies and enemies, not only disproportionately influenced the external threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance, but increased the Alliance's internal threat level to new heights. Thus, the cohesion of the Alliance had deteriorated to the point where Turkey choose to change its alliance behavior from balancing with the Alliance to tethering to Russia in Syria to achieve its interests. The next section will delve into the reasons and benefits tethering to Russia provided Turkey. The United States non-interventionist policy toward the state actors in Syria left Russia as the top power in the war. Because Ankara choose to tether and appease Moscow so that Turkey pursue its national interests in Syria.

4. Erdoğan, the AKP, and its Ottoman Islamist Identity

Starting with the Gezi Park protests in May and June 2013 an increasingly distinct transformation within Turkish politics has occurred that has especially been recognizable after the failed coup attempt on Erdoğan in July 2016. Since the protests in 2013, Turkish politics have taken on an increasingly despotic, personalistic form of political rule mirrored after President Erdoğan.⁴⁹¹ Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov contend, “President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personality and style have come to embody the Turkish nation, the state and its economic, social and political institutions” with “four main dimensions: electoral authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, populism as the political strategy and Islamism as the political ideology.”⁴⁹² The consolidation of Erdoğan's power reached new heights after the 2018 presidential election, after which he was able to purge political dissidents, transform Turkish institutions, and assume total command of the military.⁴⁹³ Thus, many of the key founding AKP members

⁴⁹¹ Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov, “The AKP after 15 Years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey,” *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 9 (2018): 1812, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371>.

⁴⁹² Yilmaz and Bashirov, 1812.

⁴⁹³ Hannah Lucinda Smith, *Erdoğan Rising: The Battle for the Soul of Turkey* (London: William Collins, 2019), 348–63.

(e.g. Abdullah Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Bülent Arinc) were either forced to resign or left willingly.⁴⁹⁴ Hence, Erdoğan further consolidated his power by filling key government positions “with ultra-loyalists, sycophants and yes men...Erdoğan’s appointment of his son-in-law Berat Albayrak to the treasury, his childhood friend Mustafa Varank to the industry and technology ministry, and Hulusi Akar, the army chief who stayed loyal on the night of the coup, to the defence ministry, showed he has little concern for diversity of opinion in his cabinet.”⁴⁹⁵ Indeed, according to Hannah Lucinda Smith:

The day before Erdoğan is officially sworn in comes the largest single round-up of suspected Gülenists, almost two years on from the coup attempt. Eighteen thousand people, including soldiers, policemen and judges, are either sacked or arrested. The website of the Official Gazette crashes as Turks rush to check whether their names are on the list. The number of those dismissed now tops more than 180,000. The judiciary has lost more than a third of its manpower since the purge began – and under the new system, the top judges will be appointed jointly by Erdoğan and by the parliament that Erdoğan controls. The state of emergency has been lifted – almost two years to the day since it was first brought in – but that will make little difference now that Erdoğan has hollowed out the state and filled it with his loyalists, and rules by presidential decree anyway. Amendments to the anti-terror laws pushed through just before emergency rule ended allow the police to detain suspects without charge, for up to twelve days in some cases. Local governors, directly appointed by the government, can continue to restrict access to public areas on security grounds, and demonstrations can be banned on an even broader set of pretexts than under the emergency law.⁴⁹⁶

It didn’t take Erdoğan long to start exercising his new powers. He had announced the cabinet within six hours of being sworn in. By the next morning he had issued his first presidential decree, appointing Hulusi Akar as the new head of the armed forces and changing the chain of command. The military’s higher appointments council, once a group of generals who decided who would fill the top positions, was abolished. Now, the commanders of the navy, air force and army are all under the direct command of the president, and all officers down to the level of colonel are appointed by him.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁴ Smith, 359–60.

⁴⁹⁵ Smith, 359–60.

⁴⁹⁶ Smith, 361–62.

⁴⁹⁷ Smith, 360–61.

Indeed, Erdoğan's vision for Turkey is taking on a quasi-sultanistic political regime type.⁴⁹⁸

Yilmaz's and Bashirov's description of the changes that have occurred under Erdoğan and the AKP align with the Ottoman Islamist identity proposal put forth by Lisel Hintz, in which she describes the Turkish ruling elite as becoming "Increasingly hierarchal, patriarchal, and personalistic organization that refuses to tolerate public questioning of any of its actions."⁴⁹⁹ According to Hintz, Ottoman Islamists have certain 'red lines' that are unacceptable, including "questioning the judgement of those in political authority...disrespecting the principles of Sunni Islam," and "ethnic nationalism, in terms of the politicization of ethnicity for secessionist goals."⁵⁰⁰ Indeed, Erdoğan has proclaimed that Turks who defy his will are in fact enemies of the state because by defying him, they are defying the will of the nation.

Moreover, Ottoman Islamists place primacy on Turks behaving as conservative, pious Muslim. The AKP and Erdoğan's value on piety has been illustrated by past speeches and statements regarding their disdain of women who show too much cleavage and wear red lipstick.⁵⁰¹ In their view, part of a conservative Muslim means accepting paternalism as the acceptable Turkish societal behavior.⁵⁰² In other words, a woman should be subordinate to a man, and a pious Muslim woman's role in the family is to cook and bare children.⁵⁰³ Thus, the Turkish ruling elites' adherence to Ottoman Islamism, which puts

⁴⁹⁸ Yilmaz and Bashirov, "The AKP after 15 Years," 1822–24.

⁴⁹⁹ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 101.

⁵⁰⁰ Hintz, 51–53.

⁵⁰¹ Ece Toksabay, "Erdogan Accuses Women's March of Disrespecting Islam," *Reuters*, March 10, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-womens-day-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN1QR0JT>; "THY'den Kırmızı Ruj Yasağı! Kırmızı, Bordo Ruj, Dövme Yasak," accessed May 18, 2020, <https://www.aksam.com.tr/yasam/thyden-kirmizi-ruj-yasagi-kirmizi-bordo-ruj-dovme-yasak/haber-200689>; Marc Champion, "Turkey Cracks Down on Cleavage - *Bloomberg*," October 9, 2013, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-10-09/turkey-cracks-down-on-cleavage> from Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 51.

⁵⁰² Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 52; Yilmaz and Bashirov, "The AKP after 15 Years."

⁵⁰³ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 51.

a primacy on the principles of Sunni Islam, combined with the elites glorification of the former Ottoman Empire, and skepticism of the West help in the understanding of what Ankara perceives to be a threat. Smith posits:

Erdoğan's personal views on Brussels have always been far muddier than those of his AKP co-founders. He fits more naturally with the leaders of Muslim countries, who tend to look up to and flatter him, while among the leaders of Europe he appears awkward and surly. Turks' views on the EU have also shifted, so that now most say they do not want to join compared to the two-thirds who were in favour in 2002. Doubtless that is partly down to the endless agitations of Turkey's pro-Erdoğan media (one tabloid newspaper published a front page of Angela Merkel mocked-up as Hitler during the height of the row between the two countries in 2017). But as the EU bloc is engulfed by economic woes, squabbling over refugees, and its own rising swell of populism, it no longer looks the good bet it was at the start of the AKP's tenure. Turks believe they have other relationships they can turn to, in Russia, the Balkans – and post-Brexit Britain.⁵⁰⁴

There can be little doubt of the negative implications that perceived intentions, along with the other threat components of proximity, power, and offensive capabilities have had on the Alliance's internal threat level and the differing perceptions of the external threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance after the advent of the Syrian War. Both alliance theory variables have greatly eroded the Alliance's cohesion. Consequently, the differing perceptions of the AKP in comparison to the Kemalists (Republican Nationalist identity proposal) who ruled throughout the majority of the Cold War, contributes to the understanding of Turkey's changing alliance behavior.

5. Turkey Tethering Behavior

The ongoing war in Syria has remained a profound concern for Russia and Turkey. Although both countries have deep-seated interests in Syria, these interests are in direct opposition to one another. Beyond their shared interest for stability in Syria, Ankara and Moscow envision distinct outcomes for a post-war Syria. They remain diametrically opposed on the future of Assad. Ankara is committed to his removal, while Moscow has vowed to ensure he remains in power. Ankara's top concern in Syria remains the terrorist

⁵⁰⁴ Smith, *Erdoğan Rising: The Battle for the Soul of Turkey*, 358.

threat posed by the PKK and the fear that the Syrian Kurds will garnish enough support or consolidate enough power to establish a Kurdish autonomous region bordering Turkey.⁵⁰⁵ Russia's main interest in Syria is to project itself as a global power broker and to gain international recognition as a legitimate great power by ensuring the Assad regime survives.⁵⁰⁶

Turkey's tethering behavior toward Russia in Syria began after Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 in November 2015.⁵⁰⁷ The incident was met with extreme punitive measures by Moscow that deeply impacted Turkey's economy due to its heavy dependence on Russian imports, tourism, construction, and energy.⁵⁰⁸ Putin's coercive tactics were indeed effective. According to Henri J. Barkey, "Within a few months [of the SU-24 incident] Erdoğan and company not only reversed course, but, incredibly, they blamed the shootdown on pilots whose allegiance was not to Turkey but to Erdoğan's nefarious enemy, the Gülen movement. Turkey was subsequently forced to apologize to Russia."⁵⁰⁹ Moscow's punitive measures caused Ankara to reassess its policy in Syria. Ankara realized that the United States may be its strategic partner, but Russia was its strategic neighbor that Turkey was beholden to.

Ankara recognized to achieve its top national security interest of being a participant in the shaping of the final outcome of the Syrian War, it would require Ankara to appease Moscow and rely on Putin's benevolence.⁵¹⁰ By tethering to Russia, Turkey has gained Moscow's permission to pursue its key interests in Syria with little risk of Syrian, Iranian, or Russian retribution to the TSK operations in Syria. This has enabled Ankara to address

⁵⁰⁵ Moira Goff-Taylor, "Why Turkey Needs Russia," *Wilson Center*, Viewpoints, no. 113 (September 2017): 2.

⁵⁰⁶ Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 175–76, <https://www.brookings.edu/book/russia-and-the-new-world-disorder/>.

⁵⁰⁷ Reynolds, "Turkey and Russia: A Remarkable Rapprochement," 4.

⁵⁰⁸ Lisel Hintz, "No One Lost Turkey: Erdoğan's Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond," *The Texas National Security Review*, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey's Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 16.

⁵⁰⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "Putin Plays Erdoğan Like a Fiddle," *Foreign Policy*, September 3, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/03/putin-plays-erdogan-like-a-fiddle-syria/>.

⁵¹⁰ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 5, 71–72.

its greatest fear—a Kurdish controlled region in Syria by gradually establishing a buffer zone in Syria.⁵¹¹ The buffer zone not only bolsters Turkey’s security against the PKK and its affiliates, but also will enable Ankara to begin repatriating the roughly 3.6 million Syrian refugees it has been hosting.⁵¹²

Turkey’s decision to tether resulted from a combination of factors, including Ankara’s high external threat level in comparison to its fellow allies; shared mistrust between Turkey and the rest of NATO, which increased the internal threat level; and the AKP’s Ottoman Islamist ideology. Hintz holds, “Turkey’s relationship with Russia today hinges upon the economic, energy, and security interests the latter can help the former meet, but Moscow expects to get something in return.”⁵¹³ What did Moscow want in return for its benevolence? Arguably the cost to Ankara was its purchase of the S-400. As Moira Goff-Taylor posits, “The Russian S-400 air defense system is driven in part by Ankara’s desire to curry favor with Moscow.”⁵¹⁴ Ankara debatably had to demonstrate its appeasement to Moscow by purchasing the S-400 in order to receive its blessing to conduct military operations in Syria.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹¹ Goff-Taylor, “Why Turkey Needs Russia,” 2.

⁵¹² Aaron Stein, “The Crisis Is Coming: Syria and the End of the U.S.-Turkish Alliance,” *War on the Rocks*, August 5, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/the-crisis-is-coming-syria-and-the-end-of-the-u-s-turkish-alliance/>.

⁵¹³ Hintz, “No One Lost Turkey: Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond,” 14–15.

⁵¹⁴ Moira Goff-Taylor, “Why Turkey Needs Russia,” *Wilson Center*, Viewpoints, no. 113 (September 2017): 3.

⁵¹⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 21, 176.

Table 4. Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey's Alliance Behavior in the Post–Cold War.

Period	Key Events	Internal Threat Level	External Threat Level	Alliance Cohesion	Turkish Ruling Elite Identity Proposal	Turkey's Alliance Behavior
1990s	End of Cold War, Gulf War, Balkan Conflicts, Post-Modern Coup (1997)	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Republican Nationalism to Ottoman Islamists	Balancing
2000s	AKP Comes to Power, 9/11, American-led Invasion of Iraq	Medium	Moderate (Alliance) Moderate to High (Turkey)	Moderate to Weak	Ottoman Islamists	Balancing to Moving toward Tethering
2010s	Arab Spring, Libya Conflict, Syrian War, Gezi Park Protests, Failed Coup (2016), S-400 Deal, Increasing Illiberal-Backsliding	High	Low (Alliance) High (Turkey)	Weak	Ottoman Islamists	Tethering

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter clearly demonstrates that Turkey's national security has been heavily reliant on the United States and the Alliance for guaranteeing its security assurances and for providing military arms since the end of the Second World War. Yet, since the Cuban Missile Crisis and its 'Turkey-for-Cuba trade,' Ankara's distrust and skepticism that the Alliance would fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense in Turkey's time of need. Pontificating on the Prussian dynasty, Gordon A. Craig once wrote, "Alliances to be sure, are good, but forces of one's own still better. Upon them one can rely with more security, and a lord is of no consideration if he does not have means and troops of his own."⁵¹⁶ Like the Prussian Hohenzollern dynasty, perhaps the Turks are simply trying to ensure they can provide and ensure they can achieve their own security needs and interests. Turkey's changing alliance behavior and decision to purchase the S-400 was culminated with the events that occurred after the advent of the Syrian War. However, the rising internal threat level gradually began to surpass the Alliance's shared external threat level beginning with the end of the Cold War. This phenomenon continued to worsen with the Middle East conflicts in the Post-Cold War system. Finally, the rise of the AKP (2002–present) and its Ottoman Islamist ideology influenced Turkey's apparent misalignment with the Alliance that is observed today. The rising further disillusionment that the Alliance is committed to Turkey's security and interests has increased the internal threat level partly because Turkey and the rest of NATO do not share the same external threat level in Syria, nor the same objectives. Consequently, Ankara's changed alliance behavior from balancing with the Alliance to tethering to Moscow is a result of the erosion of the Alliance's main function in the eyes of Ankara. Moscow identified the rift in the Alliance and Moscow exploited the rift by allowing Turkey to tether to it in order for Ankara to achieve its interests in Syria at the cost of purchasing the S-400. The opportunistic foreign policy move by Putin is likely aimed at achieving its strategic goal of weakening and delegitimizing NATO.

⁵¹⁶ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 2.

V. CONCLUSION

This study set out to answer the question: what factors led to Ankara's security cooperation with Moscow in Syria and its decision to acquire the S-400 despite the assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO allies that both decisions jeopardize the integrity, security, and overall cohesion of the Alliance? For the purpose of the study, both Ankara's informal alliance with Moscow and its decision to purchase the S-400 fall under alliance behavior. Using the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter II, the evidence suggests Turkey's changing alliance behavior is the result of structural changes to the international system, increasing security threats that were not mutually perceived by the Alliance as a whole, and the rise of the AKP with its Ottoman Islamist ideology.

During the Cold War, Soviet expansion resulted in a shared high external threat level within the Alliance. This external threat level suppressed the internal threat level. Thus, the cohesion of the Alliance remained strong. However, with the structural alternation of the international system caused by the end of the Cold War, Turkey gradually began to adopt interests divergent from those of the rest of NATO. The actions during the Gulf War (1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003–2012), and the Syrian War (2011–present) increasingly revealed a mutual distrust between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance and reciprocal indifference to their interests that was accelerated by the rise of the AKP and its Ottoman Islamist ideology.

Turkey's disillusionment with the Alliance's security assurances peaked during the Syrian War. No longer did Turkey and the rest of the Alliance have a shared external threat level because of the Middle East's increasing destabilization. Walt's threat components (proximity, power, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions) significantly increased Turkey's threat perception disproportionately to that of the other allies. The disparity in the external threat level, increasing mistrust between Turkey and the West over domestic policies, the rise of Ottoman Islamist ideology, as well as the changing perception of the Turkish elites' perception of itself and the West caused the Alliance's internal threat level to surpass the external threat level, which resulted in the significant deterioration of the

Alliance's cohesion. This growing skepticism is illustrated in the February 2020 Pew Research Center's poll of the individual NATO member citizens' opinion of NATO.⁵¹⁷ The findings show that Turkey had the lowest view of the Alliance with a 21% approval rating.⁵¹⁸ The results of the poll indicate a "sharp decline in Turkish favorable view and solidarity in the Alliance."⁵¹⁹ Indeed, Kristian Brakel asserts that Turkey's "trust in Western allies has reached rock bottom."⁵²⁰ Regardless of who is to blame, the erosion of trust in any relationship has significant implications. For NATO to be successful, security assurances must be guaranteed, or the cohesion of the Alliance will continue to fracture. As Michael F. Altfeld keenly observes, "Alliances that fail to increase [their] partners' security levels almost never form [or last]".⁵²¹ Perhaps this is how Turkey feels with regard to the war in Syria.

Nevertheless, the perceived abandonment by the Alliance in Syria, combined with the AKP's identity proposal that is anti-Western, likely influenced Ankara's decision to find alternative partners to ensure Turkey's national security interests in Syria.⁵²² Consequently, Ankara's changed alliance behavior from balancing with the Alliance to tethering to Moscow is likely a result of the failure of NATO to perform its main function of collective defense—or as Weitsman would call it the erosion of the Alliance's cohesion, which she "defines as the main function of collective defense. the ability of alliance members to mutually agree on objectives, interests, strategy, and to coordinate member activities to achieve the agreed upon ends."⁵²³

⁵¹⁷ Moira Fagan and Jacob Poushter, "NATO Viewed Favorably Across Member States," *Survey, Global Attitudes Project* (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, February 9, 2020), 3, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/>.

⁵¹⁸ Fagan and Poushter, "NATO Viewed Favorably Across Member States."

⁵¹⁹ Fagan and Poushter.

⁵²⁰ "Judy Asks."

⁵²¹ Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision To Ally: A Theory and Test," *Western Political Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December 1, 1984): 538, <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298403700402>.

⁵²² Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 36.

⁵²³ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 35.

By tethering to Moscow, Ankara has been able to pursue its security interests more easily in Syria and aims to participate in the shaping of a post-war Syria.⁵²⁴ However, there is risk in such alliance behavior. First, the behavior puts Turkey at risk of being isolated and possibly sanctioned by its fellow NATO allies. Second, it jeopardizes the security and solidarity of the Alliance writ large. Third, for Turkey's tethering behavior to work, Ankara is dependent on Moscow's continuing benevolence.⁵²⁵

Moscow's munificence likely came at a cost to Ankara and the Alliance. The cost of Ankara's tethering arguably was the agreement to purchase the Russian S-400.⁵²⁶ Admittedly, there is no way to truly prove that the S-400 was indeed the price Ankara had to paid for Moscow's appeasement. Moreover, due to Erdoğan's Ottoman Islamist ideology, it is possible that the decision to purchase the S-400 was mutually beneficial to both Putin's strategic goals of weakening NATO and Erdoğan's security interests. Wight, in his book, *Power Politics*, explains that "the chief duty of each government is regarded as being to preserve the interests of the people."⁵²⁷ If one agrees with the assessment that Erdoğan adheres to the tenets of Hintz's Ottoman Islamism, then it can be said that Ankara's shift from balancing to tethering to Russia and its decision to purchase the S-400 is founded on Erdoğan's belief that he embodies the Turkish nation and its interests. In other words, his personal security is the chief duty of the state because he believes that he embodies and expresses the will of the people.

Nevertheless, Putin's maneuver to exploit the fissure between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance was brilliantly executed. The opportunistic foreign policy that Putin devised "has Erdoğan exactly where he wants him. He knows that Erdoğan will not dare to criticize him and, having alienated many in Washington, Erdoğan's options are limited. Instead,

⁵²⁴ Walt, 21.

⁵²⁵ Walt, 29.

⁵²⁶ Moira Goff-Taylor, "Why Turkey Needs Russia," *Wilson Center*, Viewpoints, no. 113 (September 2017): 3.

⁵²⁷ Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round," 71.

Erdoğan and his minions in the government and his press will continue to denounce the United States as Turkey's primary enemy...Putin...is laughing all the way to the bank."⁵²⁸

A. TURKEY STILL IMPORTANT TO NATO

Despite Turkey's apparent misalignment with its traditional allies, Turkey's value in NATO remains important. Noting the important role Turkey played, Retired U.S. ambassador James F. Jeffrey stated, "In the Post-Cold War mess...almost all our [U.S.] conflicts Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iran nukes, Syria, Gaza...they all involved Turkey and we could not have done the things we did had Turkey been uncooperative or opposed to it—it's that simple."⁵²⁹ Turkey's strategic location has enabled the Alliance to conduct counter-terrorism operations and defeat Islamic extremists in Africa and the Middle East. Turkey continues to be a defender of Europe's eastern and southern flank, just perhaps in different terms. For example, Turkey hosts the largest Syrian refugee population—roughly 3.64 million.⁵³⁰ By hosting the majority of Syria's refugees, Turkey is continues to serve as a buffer state and to safeguard Europe's southeastern frontier from being consumed by a flood of refugees.⁵³¹ If Turkey decided to allow the refugees to pass through its borders unimpeded, it would likely lead to a significant immigration crisis in Europe. Subsequently, the crisis would arguably cause a surge in populist, xenophobic political opposition, a rise in anti-EU sentiment, and ultimately weaken NATO—all the while, bolstering Moscow's desire to be viewed as a great power and strengthen its revisionist interests through the weakening of the Alliance's cohesion and undermining its international legitimacy.⁵³²

⁵²⁸ Barkey, "Putin Plays Erdoğan Like a Fiddle."

⁵²⁹ James F. Jeffrey, "Turkey and the Failed Coup: One Year Later," *Washington Institute*, July 13, 2017 from Kirişci, *Turkey and the West*, 182.

⁵³⁰ Refugees, "Syria Emergency."

⁵³¹ Kemal Kirişci, "Europe's Refugee/Migrant Crisis: Can 'Illiberal Turkey' Save 'Liberal Europe' While Helping Syrian Refugees?," *Brookings Institution*, November 30, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europes-refugeemigrant-crisis-can-illiberal-turkey-save-liberal-europe-while-helping-syrian-refugees/>.

⁵³² Sandy Tolliver, "Expelling Turkey from NATO Would Create a Dangerous Foe," *The Hill*, October 23, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466747-expelling-turkey-from-nato-would-create-a-dangerous-foe>.

B. TURKEY AND RUSSIA

Despite Ankara's recent alliance behavior, the informal alliance between Turkey and Russia is unstable at best because it was created to solve short-term, tactical issues in Syria—none of which address the key underlying issues of the future of the Kurds in Syria and of Assad's regime. Hintz keenly observes that the improved security relations between Ankara and Moscow "Came only after substantial Russian coercion, suggesting that the new closeness between Russia and Turkey may be more pragmatic than ideological."⁵³³ In other words, there is still reason to believe the diverging relationship between Turkey and the West can still be salvaged. Still, there should be a reasonable understanding that Turkey will continue to value the Russian relationship for a variety of domestic reasons and on the basis of its foreign policy interests at some level regardless of Turkey's position in NATO.

Instead, what is should be more concerning is Erdoğan's Ottoman Islamist ideology. Understanding Erdoğan and his AKP perceptions are pivotal to managing the Alliance for the time being. As this study has discussed earlier, many of the founding members of the AKP have left the party because of Erdoğan's quasi-sultanic regime transformation. This is a hopeful sign for the West because it indicates not all Turkish elites are favorable to his vision for a new Turkey. Yet, until he is gone, the West will need to accept his seemingly erratic foreign policy. Indeed, Kirschi explains that "Turkish foreign policy is likely to be shaped by Erdoğan's priorities and preference in the foreseeable future. Turkish foreign policy is likely to oscillate between the pragmatism called for by mundane realism, on the one hand, and the ideological impulses of 'new' Turkey, steeped in political Islam and rising nationalism, on the other."⁵³⁴

C. CONCLUSION

The dilemma the Alliance now faces is bigger than Turkey's changing alliance behavior alone. What is currently at stake is the legitimacy and further erosion of the

⁵³³ Doyle Hodges, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey's Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 4, <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-turkeys-foreign-policy/>.

⁵³⁴ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 186.

Alliance's cohesion. Turkey's decision to purchase and the potential for the operational employment of the S-400 will likely weaken the Alliance's security and cohesion. Consequently, tensions between Turkey and its fellow allies will increase. Regarding foreign aid and penetration, Walt's evidence suggests "That the usual U.S. concerns about foreign penetration are...not a significant danger, because such efforts almost always fail when other incentives for alignment are lacking. A greater problem may well be the manipulation of U.S. foreign policy by elites whose interests may not always be identical with those of the nation as a whole."⁵³⁵ Despite Turkey's changing alliance behavior, the NATO ally remains a vital member of NATO. Its strategic location, large army, and military installations provide necessary means to enhance the security of the Alliance. Meanwhile, the Alliance continues to be beneficial for Turkey. It is largely dependent on U.S. foreign military sales to obtain weapons and parts for its existing equipment. Furthermore, Turkey's economy is deeply embedded in—and reliant on—Western international economic institutions, particularly the European Customs Union.⁵³⁶ Although it is theoretically possible for Turkey to offset an equipment loss by meeting this requirement through arms sales with Russia, Turkey will not be able to find a replacement for its economic integration with the West. Russia is an economically backward country that is overly reliant on natural resources to provide for its economic budget.⁵³⁷ Moreover, Russia lacks the attraction of foreign investment and technology vis-à-vis the West. Thus, Russia suffers from 'brain drain,' as many of Russia's youth search for opportunity abroad.⁵³⁸ How the West, specifically the United States, decides to respond to Turkey's S-400 purchase and its recent alliance behavior will likely determine the intensity of the tensions between Turkey and the West and possibly the future of the Alliance at large.

Seventy-one years since the founding of NATO, the Alliance has demonstrated its continued utility and resolve. With the reemergence of the great power competition, it is

⁵³⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 269.

⁵³⁶ "Turkey | Trade at a Glance | Most Recent Value | WITS | Data," accessed September 10, 2019, <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/TUR>.

⁵³⁷ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 82–88.

⁵³⁸ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 116–29, 179–88.

vital that Turkey and the West find a diplomatic solution to change Turkey's current divergent trajectory and maintain the Alliance's solidarity. A continuation of the present trajectory would serve Russia's revisionist interests and undermine the legitimacy of the Alliance.

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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Defining key and reoccurring alliance theory terminology is critical for enhancing the reader's understanding and increasing the transparency for how the thesis makes use of the terms. Because these terms will be used extensively throughout the thesis, it is necessary to provide a section dedicated to important alliance terminology. The first section provides definition of general terms that are widely accepted by alliance theory scholars. The section discusses important forms of alliance behavior. Although, each behavior is distinct and can likely lead to differing outcomes, it is important to note that regardless of the decision a state makes, each behavior exhibited is in response to a perceived threat.⁵³⁹

A. GENERAL TERMINOLOGY

- Alignment: The concept of alignment among states is a broad phenomenon that subsumes alliances.⁵⁴⁰ Alignment is the “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions.”⁵⁴¹ The phenomenon of alignment generally occurs when a state “brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve mutual security goals.”⁵⁴²
- Alliance (military): “An alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”⁵⁴³ The purpose of the alliance is “to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states” by combining the capabilities of the member states with “an implicit or explicit agreement to come to the other’s aid

⁵³⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 22.

⁵⁴⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” ed. Stephen M. Walt et al., *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 123.

⁵⁴¹ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 6.

⁵⁴² Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 225.

⁵⁴³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 12.

[militarily] or to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of war.”⁵⁴⁴
Alliances may be offensive, defensive, wartime, and/or peacetime in nature.⁵⁴⁵

- Cohesion: “Cohesion is the ability of alliance members to mutually agree on objectives, interests, strategy, and to coordinate member activities to achieve the agreed upon ends.”⁵⁴⁶
- Informal Alliance: See *Alliance* definition
- Power: Power (aggregate power) is a state’s or an alliance’s total resources which are composed of the size of population, access to natural resources, economy, industrial production, military size and capabilities, strategic position, geographical reach, prestige, political influence, state institutional efficiency, education, technological capabilities, and moral cohesion (national unity).⁵⁴⁷ “The power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used.”⁵⁴⁸
- Rapprochement: Rapprochement is “a situation in which the relationship between two countries...becomes more friendly after a period during which they were enemies.”⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁴ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 34.

⁵⁴⁵ Wight, *Power Politics*, 122.

⁵⁴⁶ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 35.

⁵⁴⁷ Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London; New York: Leicester University Press, 1978), 26; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 22

⁵⁴⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, x.

⁵⁴⁹ “Rapprochement Noun - Definition, Pictures, Pronunciation and Usage Notes | Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com,” accessed April 13, 2020, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/rapprochement>.

- Threat: The components of a threat “are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.”⁵⁵⁰ Walt and Weitsman emphasize the criticality of understanding perceived intentions because ultimately “a threat is an inherently perceptual concept.”⁵⁵¹
- Security Dilemma: Security Dilemma “is a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security.”⁵⁵²
- Social Engineering: “Social engineering encompasses the exercise of all possible state policies aimed at changing a given society...tantamount to the enforced maximization of ethnic, religious, economic, cultural (in other words: identity) homogeneity by any means.”⁵⁵³ These methods are top-down policies implemented by the political elite on the population.⁵⁵⁴
- Sovereignty: Sovereignty is the belief that absolute political authority belongs to individual states within its territorial borders and no higher level of power or authority exists above the state within the international system.⁵⁵⁵
- Vital Interest: A vital interest is a national interest that a state “deems essential to its continued independence” and “will go to war to

⁵⁵⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, vi.

⁵⁵¹ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 33.

⁵⁵² “Security Dilemma | International Relations,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed December 6, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/security-dilemma>.

⁵⁵³ Üngör, “Seeing like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913–50,” 16.

⁵⁵⁴ Üngör, 16.

⁵⁵⁵ Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 158–59.

defend.”⁵⁵⁶ A state’s vital interests “are what it thinks them to be and not what another power says them to be.”⁵⁵⁷

B. FORMS OF ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR

- **Balancing:** Balancing is a form of alliance behavior that is performed by a state by allying itself with one or more states to oppose a prevailing threat.⁵⁵⁸
- **Bandwagoning:** Bandwagoning is a form of behavior in which the state chooses to align with the source of the threat or danger.⁵⁵⁹ There are two distinct forms of bandwagoning—offensive and defensive. Offensive bandwagoning is alignment with a dominant state in order to share in the spoils of victory. Offensive bandwagoning is often motivated by greed. Defensive bandwagoning is alignment with an aggressive state in order to avoid danger. This behavior is often motivated out of fear and is considered a form of appeasement.⁵⁶⁰
- **Buck-passing:** Buck-passing is a form of alliance behavior a state may choose to avoid the cost of confronting the threat by passing the burden to other alliance members. This behavior is more likely to occur when the state passing the burden is weak and assumes its fellow allies are readily available to accept the costs.⁵⁶¹
- **Free-riding:** Free-riding is an alliance behavior conducted by a state by relying on its allies to shoulder the burden of security, while offering little or no assistance toward the task. It is often exhibited by weak states with

⁵⁵⁶ Wight, *Power Politics*, 95.

⁵⁵⁷ Wight, 95.

⁵⁵⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 17.

⁵⁵⁹ Walt, 17.

⁵⁶⁰ Walt, 21.

⁵⁶¹ Walt, 31–33.

little to contribute and hold a high level of confidence that fellow allies will assist in providing security.⁵⁶²

- Hedging: “Hedging is a tactic designed to reduce some of the risk inherent in more full-fledged alliances.”⁵⁶³ A state may choose this behavior in order to keep its options open between opposing sides. It generally entails low levels of commitment to either side and provides a state greater flexibility or bargaining power with outside external actors at a low risk to self.
- Tethering: “Tethering is a strategy to manage relations with one’s adversary by drawing closer to it via agreement.”⁵⁶⁴ This form of behavior is distinct because its driven by mutual antipathy. Tethering allows rivals to control conflicts of interest and reduce threat levels between one another—if only for a temporary period of time.

C. PERCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

- Value: A value is “a preference for one state of reality over another. Values do not specify what is but rather what ought to be.”⁵⁶⁵
- Belief: A belief is “a conviction that a description of reality is true, proven or known. A belief is not the same as a value.”⁵⁶⁶
- Cognition: Cognition is “a data or information received from the environment. Cognitions are key elements in establishing perpetual systems and in changing these systems.”⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶² Walt, 30.

⁵⁶³ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, 20.

⁵⁶⁴ Weitsman, 21.

⁵⁶⁵ Dwivedi, “Alliances in International Relations Theory,” 229.

⁵⁶⁶ Dwivedi, 229.

⁵⁶⁷ Dwivedi, 229.

- Identity Proposal: An identity proposal is an identity-based group that competes for acceptance as the national identity for its citizens.⁵⁶⁸
- Hegemony: Hegemony is both the political authority to restrict and enforce norms of prescribed and proscribed behavior and also provides a fulfillment of a group's "sense of existence by being able to realize their (identity-based) interests in practice."⁵⁶⁹
- Social Identity: Social identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group...together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership."⁵⁷⁰ This offers an individual a mechanism to generate self-esteem enabling one to fulfill a need for distinctiveness.⁵⁷¹
- Constitutive Norms: Constitutive norms "provides guidelines for membership within and appropriate behavior for the in-group, defining who 'we' are and how we should behave."⁵⁷²
- Social Purpose: Social purpose "defines group interests, the goals that the in-group believes it should achieve."⁵⁷³
- Relational Meaning: Relational meaning "defines the in-group's relation to various out-groups; some of these relations may be friendly while others may be hostile, fearful, and so forth."⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁶⁸ Hintz, *Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey*, 19.

⁵⁶⁹ Hintz, 18.

⁵⁷⁰ Hintz, 19.

⁵⁷¹ Hintz, 19.

⁵⁷² Hintz, 22.

⁵⁷³ Hintz, 22.

⁵⁷⁴ Hintz, 22.

- Cognitive Worldview: Cognitive worldview “provides an overarching sense of the group’s role in the international sphere.”⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁵ Hintz, 22.

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APPENDIX B. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (1949)⁵⁷⁶

Washington, D.C., - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain, and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

⁵⁷⁶ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty" (NATO, April 4, 1949), 1–3, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the

provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular, it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.
(3)

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

APPENDIX C. PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY⁵⁷⁷

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, **communicate** to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article 2 of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

1. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

⁵⁷⁷ NATO, “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey” of *The North Atlantic Treaty* (NATO, October 22, 1951), 4, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. (NATO).

2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 3

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 4

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

APPENDIX D. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER TO ANKARA⁵⁷⁸

54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, June 5, 1964, 12:15 a.m.

1296. Deliver İnönü soonest following message from President:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable.' Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey

⁵⁷⁸ Johnson, "President Johnson's Letter to Prime Minister Inonu," June 5, 1964.

takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We

have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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